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I.  AN ACCOMPANYING LETTER 
We are of one mind in recommending for consideration the thoughtful 
report developed by the Presidential Succession Clinic of the Fordham 
University School of Law.  We were pleased to participate in the Fordham 
Law Review program that preceded the establishment of the Clinic and led 
to the publication of an issue of the journal, entitled The Adequacy of the 
Presidential Succession System in the 21st Century:  Filling the Gaps and 
Clarifying the Ambiguities in Constitutional and Extraconstitutional 
Arrangements, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 775–1160 (2010).  The program was a 
unique, but highly practical, academic undertaking.  We each also 
participated in a class with the Clinic, sharing our experiences with the 
students and responding to their questions. 
We are each aware from our own public service of the importance of 
anticipating and developing approaches to the handling of contingencies 
that, if they occurred, could endanger our nation.  We have been reminded 
time and again that what may appear at one time to be remote does in fact 
occur.  Luckily, we have met past challenges and have taken steps to 
improve our system, but we have not addressed every gap. 
The accompanying Report, entitled Ensuring the Stability of Presidential 
Succession in the Modern Era:  Report of the Fordham University School of 
Law’s Clinic on Presidential Succession, is important for many reasons.  It 
provides a thorough history of our nation’s three succession statutes, 
examines the Twenty-Fifth Amendment that has served the nation well, and 
discusses political party rules and procedures for responding to succession 
contingencies in the pre-inaugural period.  The three professors and nine 
students of Fordham Law School who have studied the system of 
presidential succession and developed this Report offer recommendations 
worthy of careful attention regardless of one’s point of view on the subject 
generally or on any particular recommendation.  Fordham Law School has 
made valuable contributions in the field of presidential succession, and this 
Report is the latest and possibly most immediately constructive. 
We thank Fordham Law School, its deans, professors, and students, for 
inviting us to participate in this rich and vital endeavor.  We have no doubt 
that this Report will be of enormous benefit to decision makers and citizens 
more broadly, and we urge decision makers in the federal government, as 
well as our national party leadership, to give it their most serious 
consideration. 
Birch Bayh  Benton Becker  Fred F. Fielding 
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III.  FOREWORD 
In April 2010, the Fordham University School of Law hosted a two-day 
symposium entitled The Adequacy of the Presidential Succession System in 
the 21st Century.  The symposium featured many of the leading scholars on 
the law and practicalities of transition in the case of the President’s 
temporary inability to serve or, of far greater potential concern, a national 
tragedy resulting in the death or inability of the President, Vice President, 
or both. 
As a result of the symposium, William Michael Treanor, then Dean of 
Fordham Law School, suggested that a clinic be created to study and 
propose solutions for the many and challenging issues that remain 
unaddressed by the Constitution, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, and current 
federal and state statutes. 
A clinical seminar was thus established for the Fall 2010 and Spring 
2011 terms, led by former Dean John D. Feerick, who has had a lifelong 
interest in these issues, has published books and articles on them, and 
worked closely with Senator Birch Bayh and others in Congress on the 
drafting, passage, and ratification of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.  Dean 
Feerick was joined by Adjunct Professor Dora Galacatos of Fordham Law 
School and Senior Counsel for the Law School’s Feerick Center for Social 
Justice, and Adjunct Assistant Professor Nicole A. Gordon of the Robert F. 
Wagner Graduate School of Public Service at New York University, a 
former chair of the New York State Bar Association Committee on the 
Federal Constitution.  Nine students of different backgrounds were selected 
to participate in the Clinic.  The course required a significant commitment 
by the students in order to master the literature and intricacies of the 
subjects raised by the topic. 
Beyond their study, the students determined the subjects that the Report 
would address.  The seminar examined the question of what actual “gaps” 
exist in the current succession process (i.e., those for which there is no clear 
direction in law), as opposed to possible gaps for which a solution does 
exist but is not ideal.  The students ordered priorities among the true gaps 
and decided which were the most urgent and practical to address. 
A further purpose of the seminar was to make a non-partisan, 
constitutionally sound, and practical contribution that could be recognized 
as worthy and within the immediate reach of the political process.  There 
was an interest not only in producing a Report, but also in acting on it:  
presenting it to decision makers in Congress, the executive branch, and the 
political parties, and arguing the merits of the group’s recommendations. 
The Clinic decided not to propose a constitutional amendment because of 
the extreme difficulty of instituting change in this manner.  Instead, the 
students focused on suggestions for statutory change, exercise of executive 
(and personal) powers, amendment of political party and congressional 
rules, and practical plans that can be implemented in the absence of any 
change in the law, but that are consistent with the Constitution and existing 
succession law. 
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The Clinic’s recommendations are summarized in the Executive 
Summary and Part VIII of this Report.  These recommendations represent 
the consensus of the group and should not be attributed to any one person. 
We are grateful for the assistance of numerous participants in our work 
who are named in the acknowledgements and without whose contributions 
we would not have understood the subject as well, as readily, or as deeply. 
John D. Feerick Dora Galacatos Nicole A. Gordon 
October 2012 
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IV.  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The attempted assassination in January 2011 of U.S. Representative 
Gabrielle Giffords in Tucson, Arizona, highlights the fact that the safety of 
our political leaders is under constant threat.  The President of the United 
States, more than any other individual, unites and strengthens the nation and 
serves as a source of stability in crisis situations.  The gaps and 
contingencies that exist in the current system of presidential succession 
leave our country vulnerable to a vacuum in national leadership.  It is easy 
to conclude that the unaddressed contingencies in the current system of 
presidential succession are too remote to be of significant concern, but the 
unexpected and unforeseen do occur.  A catastrophic event could leave both 
the President and the Vice President dead or incapacitated. 
The symposium on presidential succession, sponsored by the Fordham 
Law Review and held at Fordham Law School in April 2010, highlighted 
weaknesses and gaps in our system of presidential succession.1  Many of 
the nation’s foremost public servants in past succession crises joined with 
other experts in academia, law, national security, public policy, and politics 
to discuss these issues.  They encouraged continued work in this field 
leading to the establishment of the Clinic.  In July 2010, the Presidential 
Succession Clinic at the Fordham University School of Law, composed of 
three professors and nine students, undertook the task of analyzing the gaps 
in the presidential succession system and advancing recommendations to 
address them. 
The work of a law school clinic may be seen by some as a largely 
academic endeavor; however, as Former Dean William Michael Treanor 
noted at the symposium, “[g]iven the terrible frequency with which 
Presidents fail to complete their terms of office and the frequency with 
which they are disabled, any ambiguities concerning presidential succession 
and any flaws in the rules governing succession have the capacity to lead to 
national disaster.”2  We agree.  The unforeseen and remote can occur, and 
advance contingency planning can prevent confusion, or even chaos, at a 
time of national distress. 
The Clinic began by studying the system of presidential succession as set 
forth in the text of the Constitution—Article II, Section 1, Clause 6, and the 
Twelfth, Twentieth, and Twenty-Fifth Amendments—the Presidential 
Succession Act of 1947, as amended (1947 Act), other federal and state 
statutes, political party rules, and documents such as “letter agreements” 
that provided for a transition process in certain circumstances.  The Clinic 
examined a broad range of proposals regarding presidential succession and 
interviewed, among others, many of the experts who participated in the 
Fordham symposium. 
In making recommendations for reform, we were guided by five values: 
 
 1. William J. Treanor, Introduction:  The Adequacy of the Presidential Succession 
System in the 21st Century:  Filling the Gaps and Clarifying the Ambiguities in 
Constitutional and Extraconstitutional Arrangement, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 775 (2010). 
 2. Id. at 775–76. 
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 Adherence to the Constitution; 
 Certainty and predictability in the transition of leadership; 
 Legitimacy of a presidential successor in the eyes of the public; 
 Party continuity; and 
 Depth in the qualifications of possible successors. 
The Clinic studied three distinct areas:  presidential and vice presidential 
inabilities not provided for by the Twenty-Fifth Amendment; the line of 
succession; and the pre-inaugural period. 
First, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment does not address certain instances of 
inability of a President or Vice President.  These include: 
 Inability of the President when there is a vacancy in the office of 
Vice President; 
 Dual inability of the President and Vice President; 
 Inability of the Vice President; and 
 Inability of a statutory successor while acting as President. 
Second, succession to the presidency is possible through a line that 
includes members of both the legislative and executive branches.  The gaps 
and contingencies in this area include: 
 The questionable constitutionality of having legislative leaders in 
the line of succession; 
 Concerns about the qualifications and presidential pedigree of 
executive officers in the line of succession; 
 The effects of the “bumping” provision in the current succession 
law, which can result in multiple individuals exercising the 
powers of the President in a short period of time; and 
 Lack of clarity on whether acting cabinet secretaries are in the 
line of succession. 
Finally, each segment within the pre-inaugural period, running up to the 
start of the quadrennial presidential term on January 20, presents distinct 
gaps and contingencies.  We address these with particular attention to 
democratic legitimacy and current political realities.  They include: 
 Party procedures that do not adequately address the death or 
resignation of a presidential or vice presidential candidate prior 
to Inauguration Day; 
 Lack of clarity regarding the duties of presidential electors and 
Congress with respect to the casting and counting of electoral 
votes in the event of the death or resignation of a presidential or 
vice presidential nominee, or both; and 
 Lack of an institutionalized process for nominating cabinet 
members during the transition between presidential 
administrations. 
*** 
14 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
The Clinic is aware of the political challenges to reform in this area.  
Although we have certain preferred recommendations, we recognize the 
obstacles to change and have made a range of proposals so that decision 
makers may consider different options.  We also note that our 
recommendations for executive action will almost all require cooperation 
with the legislative branch.  Some of the recommendations surely reflect 
actions already taken by recent administrations, but which are not 
necessarily known to the public. 
A.  Presidential and Vice Presidential Inability 
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the Constitution establishes procedures 
for both filling a vacancy in the office of the Vice President and for 
addressing a case of presidential inability.  The Amendment’s availability in 
1973 and 1974, when both the elected President and Vice President 
resigned from their offices, provided essential stability and continuity at a 
time of great national turmoil. 
Although the Twenty-Fifth Amendment has dealt successfully with 
challenges encountered since its adoption in 1967, neither the Amendment 
nor the 1947 Act addresses several key threats to presidential continuity 
posed by presidential or vice presidential inability. 
First, the Amendment is predicated on the availability of an able Vice 
President.  In the event that the office of Vice President is vacant or the 
Vice President, due to his own inability, is unable to act with the Cabinet 
under Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, the Amendment does not 
provide an alternative means for making a declaration that the President is 
unable.  History has shown that a vacancy or inability in the office of the 
Vice President is a contingency that cannot be ignored. 
Second, the Amendment does not establish a procedure for declaring the 
inability of the Vice President.  In the event that a President dies, resigns, or 
is removed from office, a situation may arise in which an unable Vice 
President would assume the presidency.  In addition, a President 
anticipating a temporary inability, or one who is unable but recognizes his 
own inability, will likely be reluctant to transfer his powers even briefly to 
an unable Vice President.  Furthermore, an unable Vice President may not 
be in a position to exercise his responsibility pursuant to Section 4 to 
declare a President unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office. 
Third, neither the Amendment nor the 1947 Act establishes procedures 
for declaring the inability of an Acting President when there is no Vice 
President or the Vice President is unable. 
1.  Presidential and Acting Presidential Inability Recommendations 
a.  Statutory Action 
1.  Acknowledge that the President or Acting President, upon 
declaration of his own inability, can transfer his powers voluntarily to the 
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next in the line of succession in instances of vice presidential inability or 
vacancy. 
2.   Authorize the person next in the line of succession after the Vice 
President, together with a majority of the Cabinet, to declare the inability of 
the President or Acting President in instances of vice presidential inability 
or vacancy. 
b.  Executive Contingency Planning 
3. The President or Acting President should prepare a prospective 
executive declaration of inability at the beginning of his service, in which 
he would define the situations that, in his view, would render him unable to 
discharge the powers and duties of the presidency in the future and would 
provide that the declaration of his inability goes into effect based upon a 
review process set out by the President or Acting President. 
2.  Vice Presidential Inability Recommendation 
a.  Executive Contingency Planning 
4. The Vice President should prepare a prospective executive 
declaration of inability at the beginning of his service, in which he would 
define the situations that, in his view, would render him unable to discharge 
the powers and duties of the vice presidency in the future and would 
provide that the declaration of his inability goes into effect based upon a 
review process set out by the Vice President. 
B.  Line of Succession 
Article II of the Constitution names the Vice President as the first person 
on whom the powers and duties of the presidency will devolve and 
authorizes Congress to establish a line of succession after the Vice 
President.  The 1947 Act expands the line to include the Speaker of the 
House of Representatives, the President pro tempore of the Senate, and then 
the cabinet secretaries in the order in which their departments were created. 
Debate about the constitutionality of including legislative leaders in the 
line of succession has remained a steady undercurrent in the legislative 
history of the Presidential Succession Acts of 1792, 1886, and 1947.  There 
are two major criticisms of including legislative leaders in the line of 
succession.  First, some argue that the Speaker of the House and President 
pro tempore of the Senate are not “Officers” within the meaning of Article 
II.  Second, some maintain that the inclusion of legislative officers in the 
line of succession compromises the principle of separation of powers 
between the executive and legislative branches. 
In the case of presidential inability, the Speaker and the President pro 
tempore can become Acting President in the absence of a Vice President.  
Including legislators in the line of succession for this purpose is especially 
problematic because they are required by statute to resign from their roles 
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and seats in Congress in order to act as President and cannot simply return 
to their previous positions when the inability of the President is removed.  
Thus, temporarily acting as President until an inability is removed could 
effectively end the political career of a legislative leader.  This creates a 
disincentive for a legislative leader to act as President at a time when stable 
leadership is most urgent. 
Moreover, the Speaker and the President pro tempore can “bump” 
members of the Cabinet who are acting as President, which can result in 
multiple successors serving as Acting President during a short period. 
1.  Line of Succession Recommendations 
a.  Statutory Action 
5. Establish an executive line of succession that runs exclusively 
through the Cabinet after the President and Vice President.  In the case of 
removal, death, or resignation of the President, the cabinet member 
assuming the powers and duties of the presidency should be required to 
resign from the Cabinet.  In a case of inability, the cabinet member 
assuming the powers and duties of the presidency should not be required to 
resign. 
6. In the event an executive line of succession is not adopted, establish 
a binary line of succession that first runs through Congress, and then the 
Cabinet, in instances of death, resignation, and removal.  Successors would 
be required to resign in these circumstances.  The line of succession would 
run solely through the Cabinet in instances of presidential and vice 
presidential inability or failure to qualify.  Under this proposal, when a 
cabinet member assumes the powers and duties of the presidency, that 
cabinet member would not be required to resign. 
7. Confirm whether acting secretaries are included in the line of 
succession, and, if so, either remove them from the line, or alternatively, 
amend the 1947 Act so that acting secretaries can assume the powers and 
duties of the presidency, in the order of the departments’ creation, but only 
after succession has passed through all of the cabinet secretaries. 
C.  Pre-inaugural Period 
The current system of pre-inaugural presidential succession is governed 
by a legal framework based on constitutional provisions, federal and state 
statutes, and political party rules.  Contingencies that may occur during the 
period prior to a general election are governed almost exclusively by party 
rules.  The political parties are authorized by their rules to fill any vacancies 
in the nominations for the offices of President and Vice President. 
The parties are similarly authorized to fill vacancies that may occur on 
their respective national tickets after the general election, prior to the 
casting of the Electoral College votes in mid-December. 
The Twelfth Amendment governs contingencies that may occur between 
the casting of the electoral votes in mid-December and the counting of those 
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votes by Congress on January 6.  The Amendment is silent, however, as to 
whether Congress can invalidate electoral votes cast for a presidential or 
vice presidential nominee who dies after the meeting of the Electoral 
College but before Congress counts the electoral votes.   
The Clinic has concluded that Congress is required to count these votes 
and that it must declare the winners even if they have both died since the 
meeting of the Electoral College.   
The Twentieth Amendment addresses the death of either a President-elect 
or Vice President elect during the fourteen days between the congressional 
count of the electoral votes on January 6 and Inauguration Day on January 
20.  In the case of the death or resignation of the President-elect, the Vice 
President elect becomes President on January 20.  In the case of the death or 
resignation of the Vice President elect, the new President is required to 
nominate a Vice President to be approved by a majority of both houses of 
Congress. 
In the event of the double death of the successful presidential and vice 
presidential candidates, the Speaker would become Acting President 
pursuant to the 1947 Act.  Such a scenario may, however, result in a change 
in the party of the presidency contrary to the will of the electorate. 
1.  Pre-inaugural Period Recommendations 
a.  Political Party Rules 
8. In the event of the death or resignation of a presidential candidate 
before the political party conventions, require the parties to hold an open 
meeting to decide which replacement candidate(s) will receive the 
delegates’ votes. 
9. In the event of the death or resignation of a presidential nominee 
between the political party conventions and the general election, require the 
parties to either hold an open meeting to select a replacement candidate or 
recall the convention delegates. 
10. During the period between the general election and the meeting of 
the Electoral College, provide that the vice presidential candidate replaces a 
deceased or resigned presidential candidate of the same ticket and that the 
candidate’s party issue recommendations to the presidential electors as to a 
new candidate for the office of Vice President. 
b.  Congressional Rules 
11. In the event of the death or resignation of a presidential or vice 
presidential candidate between the meeting of the Electoral College and the 
counting and declaration of the electoral votes by Congress, require 
Congress to count votes cast for a candidate if he was alive at the time of 
the electoral vote. 
18 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
c.  Executive Contingency Planning 
12. During the period between the counting and declaration of electoral 
votes by Congress and Inauguration Day, the outgoing President should 
consider promptly nominating any Cabinet nominees the President-elect 
submits to him, and Congress should confirm as many nominees as possible 
prior to Inauguration Day, consistent with the proper discharge of 
Congress’s advice and consent responsibility.  One or more newly 
confirmed cabinet secretaries should remain at a secure location outside of 
Washington, D.C., on Inauguration Day. This recommendation is 
particularly important in the case of an exclusively executive line of 
succession, as the Clinic recommends. 
D.  Conclusion 
The work of the Constitution’s Framers in creating a system for 
presidential succession has provided stability and continuity for the nation 
during many uncertain moments in its history.  The Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment, adopted after the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, 
further buttressed the system of presidential succession by providing 
mechanisms for the seamless succession of the Vice President to the 
presidency in the case of a vacancy in that office, the filling of a vacancy in 
the vice presidency, and addressing instances of presidential inability. 
Our recommendations are designed to be consistent with the separation 
of powers and the framework of checks and balances, to protect the 
electorate’s choice of President and Vice President and their party for a 
four-year term, and to ensure the stability and continuity of government in 
the modern era.  We believe the adoption of the Clinic’s recommendations 
will support these goals. 
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V.  INABILITY AND PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION ISSUES 
A.  Introduction 
The Framers of the Constitution constructed a succession provision that 
enabled the Vice President to assume the powers and duties of the President 
in the event of the death, resignation, removal, or inability of the President.3  
The succession provision, however, did not cover all possible 
contingencies.  The adoption of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment in 1967 filled 
several important gaps, but it did not provide for every instance of 
presidential inability, nor did it address the case of vice presidential 
inability.4  These open areas continue to present policy challenges, 
constitutional issues, and questions regarding the interpretation of current 
statutes. 
B.  The Twenty-Fifth Amendment 
1.  History of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment 
The assassination of President John F. Kennedy in 1963 renewed 
Congress’s interest in providing safeguards in the event of presidential 
inability.5  Senator Birch Bayh, as chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on 
Constitutional Amendments, largely led these efforts.6  After conducting 
extensive hearings and debates and considering the opinions of the 
American Bar Association and others on the topic, Congress completed 
work on what would become the Twenty-Fifth Amendment in July of 
1965.7  The Amendment was ratified on February 10, 1967.8 
Section 1 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment codifies the precedent set by 
President John Tyler in 1841, when he assumed the office of the President 
rather than the position of Acting President, upon President William Henry 
Harrison’s death.9  Under Section 1, when the President dies, resigns, or is 
removed from office, the Vice President becomes President, rather than 
 
 3. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6 (granting Congress the power to provide for 
succession only in the event of dual inability and/or vacancy). 
 4. See id. amend. XXV. 
 5. See JOHN D. FEERICK, THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT:  ITS COMPLETE HISTORY AND 
APPLICATIONS 59 (2d ed. 1992). 
 6. See id. 
 7. See id. at 104–08. 
 8. Id. 
 9. See id. at 193; see also John D. Feerick, The Problem of Presidential Inability—Will 
Congress Ever Solve It?, 32 FORDHAM L. REV. 73, 91–92 (1963) (citing CONG. GLOBE, 27TH 
CONG., 1ST SESS., 3–4 (1841); 10 MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS:  COMPRISING PORTIONS 
OF HIS DIARY FROM 1795 TO 1848, at 463–64 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1876)); Joel K. 
Goldstein, Taking from the Twenty-Fifth Amendment:  Lessons in Ensuring Presidential 
Continuity, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 959, 966 (2010). 
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Acting President, and is no longer Vice President.10  This section is 
intended to ensure that there is never a vacancy in the office of President.11 
Section 2 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment deals with a vice presidential 
vacancy.  When there is a vice presidential vacancy resulting either from 
the death, resignation, or removal of the Vice President or from the Vice 
President’s succession to the presidency upon the death, resignation, or 
removal of the President, the new President must nominate a Vice 
President, who is subject to confirmation by a majority of both houses of 
Congress.12  The term “vacancy” does not cover an inability of the 
President or Vice President.13 
Sections 3 and 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment address presidential 
inability.  Section 3 provides a mechanism by which the President can 
declare his own inability in a writing to the President pro tempore and the 
Speaker, which results in the Vice President serving as Acting President 
until the President declares that his inability has been removed.14  Section 4 
of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment sets forth the process by which the Vice 
President and a majority of the Cabinet—or another body as Congress may 
provide15—can act together to declare the President unable to perform the 
duties of his office when he cannot, or will not, do so himself.16  The Vice 
President and a majority of the Cabinet must transmit to the President pro 
tempore and the Speaker their written declaration that the President is 
unable to perform the duties of his office.17  In both instances, once 
presidential inability is declared, the Vice President becomes Acting 
President while also continuing as Vice President.18 
Under Section 4, the President can dispute the determination of his 
inability by declaring in writing to the President pro tempore and the 
Speaker that no inability exists.19  The President then resumes his powers 
and duties at the end of a four-day period unless the Vice President and 
Cabinet majority object within four days of the President’s written 
declaration.20  If within that four-day period the Vice President and the 
Cabinet majority transmit to the President pro tempore and the Speaker a 
written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the duties of his 
office, the issue is then given to Congress which can, by a vote of two-
 
 10. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 1. 
 11. See FEERICK, supra note 5, at 193. 
 12. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 2. 
 13. See FEERICK, supra note 5, at 193–94. 
 14. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 3. 
 15. Congress has never exercised its power to substitute a body for the Cabinet to work 
with the Vice President under Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. 
 16. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4. 
 17. See id. 
 18. See id. 
 19. See id. 
 20. See id.; see also FEERICK, supra note 5, at 204 (“Once the President announces his 
recovery by transmitting an appropriate written declaration to the Speaker and the President 
pro tempore, he then must wait four days before resuming his powers and duties . . . .  Either 
the Vice President alone or the Cabinet and Vice President can agree to the President’s 
taking over immediately or at any time short of four days.”). 
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thirds in each house, declare the President unable.21  If Congress does not 
act within twenty-one days, or if either House supports the President, the 
President resumes his powers.22  In the interim, the Vice President remains 
the Acting President.23 
2.  Applications of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment 
President Gerald R. Ford was the first, and so far only, person to become 
President under Section 1 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.  In 1974, Vice 
President Ford became President when President Richard M. Nixon 
resigned from office.24 
President Ford was also the first person to become Vice President under 
Section 2 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment in 1973.25  After President 
Nixon’s first Vice President, Spiro Agnew, resigned, Nixon nominated 
then-Representative Ford to be the new Vice President,26 and both houses 
of Congress confirmed him.27  Less than a year later, Vice President Ford 
became President upon President Nixon’s resignation from the presidency, 
and President Ford nominated Nelson Rockefeller to be his Vice President. 
Rockefeller then became Vice President under Section 2 of the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment after both houses of Congress confirmed him in 1974.28 
Although not formally recognized at the time, President Ronald Reagan 
was the first to employ the procedures of Section 3 of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment when he underwent anesthesia in 1985.  While he followed the 
requirements of Section 3 by submitting a letter to the President pro 
tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House, he stated that he was 
not invoking the Twenty-Fifth Amendment because he did not want to set a 
precedent.29  In his letter, President Reagan explained that he did “not 
believe that the drafters of this Amendment intended its application to 
 
 21. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4. 
 22. See id. 
 23. See id. 
 24. See FEERICK, supra note 5, at 160; see also Goldstein, supra note 9, at 969. 
 25. See Goldstein, supra note 9, at 970. 
 26. Remarks Announcing Intention to Nominate Gerald R. Ford to be Vice President, 
PUB. PAPERS 867–69 (Oct. 12, 1973). 
 27. 119 CONG. REC. 39,807, 39,899 (1973) (House of Representatives vote); 119 CONG. 
REC. 38,212, 38,225 (1973) (Senate vote). 
 28. 120 CONG. REC. 41,419, 41,516–17 (1974) (House of Representatives vote); 120 
CONG. REC. 38,918, 38,936 (1974) (Senate vote); see also FEERICK, supra note 5, at 184; 
Goldstein, supra note 9, at 972 (discussing the political confirmation process at length). 
 29. Letter from President Ronald Reagan to the President Pro Tempore of the Senate 
and the Speaker of the House on the Discharge of the President’s Powers and Duties During 
His Surgery, 2 PUB. PAPERS 919 (July 13, 1985) [hereinafter Reagan Letter], available at 
http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1985/71385b.htm; see also HERBERT L. 
ABRAMS, THE PRESIDENT HAS BEEN SHOT:  CONFUSION, DISABILITY, AND THE 25TH  
AMENDMENT IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION OF RONALD REAGAN 
199–200 (1992); Fred F. Fielding, Keynote Address at the Fordham Law Review 
Symposium:  An Eyewitness Account of Executive “Inability” (Apr. 16, 2010), in 79 
FORDHAM L. REV. 823, 830 (2010) (noting that President Reagan signed a letter which 
authorized the procedures of Section 3 without formally invoking it). 
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situations such as the instant one.”30  President Reagan said he was 
following a “long-standing arrangement” with his Vice President, rather 
than the constitutional provision created for inability.31 
In 2002, President George W. Bush was the first President to formally 
invoke Section 3 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment in anticipation of 
undergoing sedation.32  In 2007, President Bush again invoked Section 3 to 
transfer presidential powers and duties to Vice President Richard Cheney 
when he underwent a second procedure during his term in office.33  In both 
instances, President Bush followed the process set forth in Section 3 by 
transmitting a written declaration of his own inability to perform the duties 
of his office to the President pro tempore and the Speaker.34  President 
Bush reclaimed the powers and duties of the presidency by issuing a letter 
to the President pro tempore and the Speaker on the same day in both 
instances.35 
Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment has never been employed,36 
but it arguably could have been in the wake of the attempted assassination 
of President Reagan on March 30, 1981.37  Although White House Counsel 
Fred Fielding had prepared draft documents prior to the assassination 
attempt providing for the invocation of either Section 3 or Section 4 of the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment under such circumstances, no formal transfer of 
power occurred.38  The misstatement of Secretary of State Alexander Haig, 
the top Cabinet official in the line of succession, that until Vice President 
 
 30. See Reagan Letter, supra note 29; see also Fielding, supra note 29, at 830 
(discussing President Reagan’s concerns in writing the letter this way). 
 31. See Reagan Letter, supra note 29; see also Fielding, supra note 29, at 830.  After he 
left office, President Reagan acknowledged invoking the Twenty-Fifth Amendment at this 
time. See RONALD REAGAN, AN AMERICAN LIFE 500 (1990). 
 32. See Fielding, supra note 29, at 833; Adam R.F. Gustafson, Note, Presidential 
Inability and Subjective Meaning, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 459, 488 (2009). 
 33. See Fielding, supra note 29, at 833; see also Gustafson, supra note 32, at 489. 
 34. Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Temporary Transfer of the Powers and 
Duties of the President of the United States, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1003–04 (July 21, 2007) 
[hereinafter 2007 Bush Letter on Temporary Transfer of Powers], available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=75568; Letter from President George W. Bush to 
Congressional Leaders on Temporary Transfer of the Powers and Duties of President of the 
United States, 1 PUB. PAPERS 1083 (June 29, 2002) [hereinafter 2002 Bush Letter on 
Temporary Transfer of Powers], available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/
?pid=63676. 
 35. Letter from President George W. Bush to Congressional Leaders on Resuming the 
Powers and Duties of the President of the United States, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1004 (July 21, 2007) 
[hereinafter 2007 Bush Letter on Resuming Powers], available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=75573; Letter from President George W. Bush to 
Congressional Leaders on Resuming the Powers and Duties of President of the United 
States, 1 PUB. PAPERS 1084 (June 29, 2002) [hereinafter 2002 Bush Letter on Resuming 
Powers], available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=73051. 
 36. John D. Feerick, Presidential Succession and Inability:  Before and After the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 907, 933 (2010) (“Section 4 of the 
Amendment, perhaps the strongest test the inability provisions might face, has yet to be 
tested.”). 
 37. See Fielding, supra note 29, at 823–24 (noting that some historians argue that the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment should have been invoked at this time). 
 38. See id. at 827, 829. 
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Bush’s return to the White House he was in charge because 
“[c]onstitutionally . . . you have the President, the Vice President, and the 
Secretary of State, in that order,” reflected confusion about the order of 
succession.39  Chief of Staff James Baker and Edwin Meese III rejected a 
discussion of a transfer of presidential power “until they learned more from 
the doctors.”40  Vice President Bush made clear that he would not act as 
President in the absence of a formal transfer of power.41 
C.  Contingencies Not Addressed by the Twenty-Fifth Amendment 
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment provides for many—but not all—
contingencies in the event of presidential inability.  Currently, there exists 
no legal mechanism to declare a President unable to discharge the powers 
and duties of his office in the event of either a vice presidential vacancy or 
inability, declare a Vice President unable to discharge the powers and duties 
of his office, or declare an Acting President unable to discharge the powers 
and duties of the presidency. 
That the Twenty-Fifth Amendment does not address these contingencies, 
referred to generally as the “inability gaps,” was not an oversight by its 
drafters.42  At the time of the drafting, Representative Richard Poff asked 
John D. Feerick, then a member of the American Bar Association (ABA) 
Conference on Presidential Inability and Succession, to suggest language 
for the Twenty-Fifth Amendment that would cover the case of simultaneous 
inability of the President and Vice President.43  Dean Feerick identified the 
inability gaps referred to above and drafted language that would permit 
succession in the event of dual inability as well as in the event of a vice 
presidential inability.44 
Dean Feerick proposed, in the case of a vice presidential vacancy or 
inability, that “the person next in line of succession shall act in lieu of the 
Vice-President” to determine presidential inability.45  He also suggested 
that “[t]he inability of the Vice-President shall be determined in the same 
manner as that of the President except that the Vice-President shall have no 
right to participate in such determination.”46  This language, and the drafted 
contingencies, were not included in the final amendment. 
Furthermore, these inability gaps were addressed in a like manner by 
both an amendment proposed by a bipartisan majority of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee in 1958 and an amendment proposed by Senator Birch 
 
 39. Id. at 828. 
 40. DEL QUENTIN WILBER, RAWHIDE DOWN:  THE NEAR ASSASSINATION OF RONALD 
REAGAN 181 (2011). 
 41. See id. at 178, 193; see also ABRAMS, supra note 29, at 185–89. 
 42. Feerick, supra note 36, at 909. 
 43. See Letter from John D. Feerick to Rep. Richard Poff (Feb. 7, 1965) [hereinafter 
Letter from Feerick to Rep. Poff] (on file with the Fordham Law Review). 
 44. See id.  
 45. See id.  
 46. See id.; see also Feerick, supra note 36, at 909  n.1. 
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Bayh in 1963.47  Herbert Brownell, Attorney General under President 
Dwight D. Eisenhower, explained that the proposed 1958 amendment 
provided that “‘if at any time there is no Vice President,’ the functions 
envisaged for the Vice President by the proposed new constitutional 
amendment ‘shall devolve upon the officer eligible to act as President next 
in the line of succession to the office of President, as provided by law.’”48  
Thus, the next in the line of succession was to have the authority to act in 
concert with the Cabinet in determining presidential inability.49  The ABA’s 
final proposal similarly contained a provision by which the next in the line 
of succession, if there were no able Vice President, could act with a 
majority of the Cabinet to determine presidential inability.50 
 
 47. See S.J. Res. 161, 85th Cong. (1958); see also S.J. Res. 139, 88th Cong. (1963).  The 
language of Senate Resolution 139 was very similar to Dean Feerick’s in his letter to 
Representative Poff. Compare id., with Letter from Feerick to Rep. Poff, supra note 43. 
 48. Herbert Brownell, Jr., Presidential Disability:  The Need for a Constitutional 
Amendment, 68 YALE L.J. 189, 210 (1958); see also S.J. Res. 19, 87th Cong. (1961); H.R.J. 
Res. 529, 87th Cong. (1961); S.J. Res. 161. 
 49. See S.J. Res. 161; see also AM. ENTER. INST. FOR PUB. POLICY RESEARCH, 
PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND VICE PRESIDENTIAL VACANCIES 9 (1964). 
 50. See FEERICK, supra note 5, at 59–61.  Two months after President Kennedy’s 
assassination, the American Bar Association convened a committee of twelve attorneys and 
released its consensus report in January 1964. See id.  The report contained guiding 
principles that largely tracked Senator Birch Bayh’s proposal, Senate Joint Resolution 139, 
and the eventual Twenty-Fifth Amendment. Id. at 60–61.  The consensus expressed in the 
report, following the two-day conference on January 20 and January 21, 1964 was as 
follows: 
1. Agreements between the President and Vice President or person next in line of 
succession provide a partial solution, but not an acceptable permanent solution of 
the problem. 
2. An amendment to the Constitution of the United States should be adopted to 
resolve the problems which would arise in the event of the inability of the 
President to discharge the powers and duties of his office. 
3. The amendment should provide that in the event of the inability of the President 
the powers and duties, but not the office, shall devolve upon the Vice President or 
person next in line of succession for the duration of the inability of the President or 
until expiration of his term of office. 
4. The amendment should provide that the inability of the President may be 
established by declaration in writing of the President.  In the event that the 
President does not make known his inability, it may be established by action of the 
Vice President or person next in line of succession with concurrence of a majority 
of the Cabinet or by action of such other body as the Congress may by law 
provide. 
5. The amendment should provide that the ability of the President to resume the 
powers and duties of his office shall be established by his declaration in writing.  
In the event that the Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet or such other 
body as Congress may by law provide shall not concur in the declaration of the 
President, the continuing inability of the President may then be determined by the 
vote of two-thirds of the elected members of each House of the Congress.  
Id. at 60.  The Conference came to a consensus on presidential succession as well, 
finding that: 
1. The Constitution should be amended to provide that in the event of the death, 
resignation or removal of the President, the Vice President or the person next in 
line of succession shall succeed to the office for the unexpired term. 
2. It is highly desirable that the office of Vice President be filled at all times.  An 
amendment to the Constitution should be adopted providing that when a vacancy 
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When Congress did not include language in the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment to address these inability gaps, Senator Samuel Ervin 
commented that attempting to fill every gap could jeopardize ratification of 
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.51  As Dean Feerick points out, “[i]t was 
believed at the time that an amendment providing for every possible 
scenario would be too complex and therefore unlikely to survive the 
difficult congressional and state ratification processes . . . .”52  
Nevertheless, the inability gaps that persist are serious and must be 
addressed because mass catastrophe, illness, or some other happenstance 
can occur at any time. 
1.  Inability of the President in Certain Circumstances 
Sections 3 and 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, which permit the 
declaration of a presidential inability, are premised on the availability of an 
able Vice President.53  Neither Section discusses what should occur if the 
office of the Vice President is vacant or its occupant is himself unable.54  
Section 3 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment is unavailable to a President who 
wishes to transfer power temporarily if there is a vice presidential vacancy, 
because there is no Vice President to act as President.55  Furthermore, 
although Section 3 may be available to the President during a vice 
presidential inability, a President would be hard pressed to transfer 
authority to an unable Vice President.  Similarly, Section 4 depends on the 
presence of an able Vice President to work with the Cabinet in declaring the 
President unable.  Section 4 does not provide a substitute for the Vice 
President to make such a declaration if the vice presidency is vacant, or if 
the Vice President is himself unable and thus incapable of declaring a case 
of presidential inability.56 
2.  Inability of the Vice President in Certain Circumstances 
Currently, no mechanism exists by which a Vice President can be 
declared unable to perform the powers and duties of his office.57  This gap 
results in a number of unaddressed issues if the Vice President is, in fact, 
unable.  First, if the President dies, resigns, or is removed from office, the 
Vice President automatically becomes President under Section 1 of the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment, even in a case of a Vice President’s undeclared 
 
occurs in the office of Vice President, the President shall nominate a person who, 
upon approval by a majority of the elected members of Congress meeting in joint 
session, shall then become Vice President for the unexpired term.  
Id. at 60–61 & n.3. 
 51. 110 CONG. REC. 22,950, 22,991–92 (1964). 
 52. Feerick, supra note 36, at 936. 
 53. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, §§ 3, 4. 
 54. See id. 
 55. See id. § 3. 
 56. See id. § 4. 
 57. See Feerick, supra note 36, at 934–36. 
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inability.58  Second, if a President sought to transfer his powers temporarily 
to the Vice President under Section 3 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, he 
would be transferring powers to a Vice President unable to exercise them.  
Furthermore, Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment cannot be invoked 
when the Vice President is unable, because the Vice President is a 
necessary actor in the determination of presidential inability under Section 
4.59 
3.  Inability of the Acting President in Certain Circumstances 
Current succession law provides no mechanism for dealing with an 
inability of an Acting President, whether a Vice President or a statutory 
successor.60 
D.  Recommendations 
Following President Kennedy’s assassination, Congress acted wisely in 
proposing the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to eliminate major gaps in the 
system of presidential succession.  We urge the President and Congress to 
address the remaining inability gaps. 
The Clinic believes that much can be done to anticipate and address these 
gaps with changes in the law and contingency planning.  In 1988, 
participants of the Miller Center Commission on Presidential Disability and 
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, including Senator Birch Bayh, Herbert 
Brownell, and Fred Fielding, advanced many helpful recommendations for 
contingency planning.  Such planning has routinely taken place since at 
least 1980.61  The exercise is of course confidential, and while we identify 
 
 58. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 1 (stating that the Vice President becomes 
President upon the death, resignation, or removal from the office of President). 
 59. See id. § 4 (establishing that the Vice President is a necessary actor in the 
determination of presidential inability). 
 60. The situation in which an Acting President is exercising the powers and duties of the 
presidency during a presidential inability and a vice presidential vacancy raises issues 
beyond the scope of this Report.  These include the question whether an Acting President 
can exercise presidential power under Section 2 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment and 
nominate a new Vice President while the President is alive but unable.  For further 
discussion of this issue, see generally William F. Baker & Beth A. FitzPatrick, Presidential 
Succession Scenarios in Popular Culture and History and the Need for Reform, 79 
FORDHAM L. REV. 835 (2010) and Examination of the First Implementation of Section Two 
of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment:  Hearing on S.J. Res. 26 Before the Subcomm. on 
Constitutional Amendments of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. (1975). 
 61. Fielding, supra note 29, at 825.  Fred Fielding stated: 
[O]ne of the first things that I did when I became Counsel to President Reagan was 
to put my staff to work on preparing a book.  It was going to be a comprehensive 
book.  It was really kind of an emergency manual, which detailed every possible 
scenario that we could think of for presidential inability or even vice presidential 
inability.  
Id. at 828.  Fielding said this manual was passed on to the administration of George W. Bush 
and that copies were still stored in safe locations. Id. at 828–29.  More generally, see Dean 
Feerick’s background information regarding the Miller Center Commission in his book on 
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, FEERICK, supra note 5, at xx–xxi (“In 1985, a Commission on 
Presidential Disability was appointed by the White Burkett Miller Center of Public Affairs at 
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gaps and suggest responses to them, we well understand that others in 
positions of responsibility have already engaged in contingency planning 
and may find our recommendations duplicative of work already undertaken.  
Nonetheless we support continued planning, as is surely underway, 
recalling the wisdom of the writers of the Federalist Papers that “[a] wise 
nation . . . does not rashly preclude itself from any resource which may 
become essential to its safety.”62 
1.  Statute 
The Clinic supports a statutory approach that mirrors the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment to address the inability gaps.  There is sufficient basis in the 
Constitution and law for doing so.  We recommend that Congress enact 
legislation facilitating the President’s ability to voluntarily transfer his 
powers to the next in the line of succession during a vice presidential 
vacancy or inability.  We also recommend conferring authority on the next 
in line in conjunction with the Cabinet to declare a presidential inability in 
the absence of an able Vice President. 
A mechanism for the voluntary transfer of power by the President or 
Acting President to the next in line in the absence of an able Vice President 
would track the provisions in Section 3 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 
requiring a record of the transfer by written declaration to the President pro 
tempore and the Speaker of the House or, if they are not available, by a 
filing in the Office of the Department of State.63  For the more difficult case 
of an obviously unable President or Acting President who refuses or is 
unable to declare his own inability, a joint declaration of presidential 
inability by the next in line acting together with the Cabinet would assure 
responsible handling of the matter and would promote confidence among 
the public at large.64 
Reliance on the cabinet members, who are close to the President and can 
evaluate the President’s or Acting President’s situation, together with the 
next immediate successor of either party, would minimize the risk of abuse 
of power and facilitate an appropriate transfer.  A statutory approach could 
also, like the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, contain provisions for dealing with 
 
the University of Virginia to review the country’s experience with the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment and to examine important issues regarding presidential health.  Included on the 
Commission were two principal authors of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, former Attorney 
General Herbert Brownell and former Senator Birch Bayh.”).  Following the Clinic’s work 
on this Report, former Vice President Cheney published his memoir in which he reflected on 
presidential succession issues and, in particular, the implications of vice presidential 
inability. See DICK CHENEY, IN MY TIME:  A PERSONAL AND POLITICAL MEMOIR 319–21 
(2011). 
 62. THE FEDERALIST NO. 41 (James Madison). 
 63. The Office of the Department of State is an appropriate repository as an alternative 
to filing with legislative leaders, because those leaders might be the next in the line of 
succession, as would be the case under current law.  This recommendation presents a 
potential problem, however, if the next in the line of succession is the Secretary of State. 
 64. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, §§ 3, 4. 
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a disagreement between the unable President or Acting President and the 
person who is next in line acting together with the Cabinet. 
Turning to a justification of this approach, we review the reach of 
Congress’s power and the role of the next in line. 
a.  Congressional Authority 
Article II, Section 1, Clause 6 of the Constitution gives Congress the 
authority to decide who is to act as President in the event that both the 
President and the Vice President are unable to perform the duties of their 
offices, as well as in the event that the President is unable when the vice 
presidency is vacant. 
Article II, Section 1, Clause 6 of the Constitution states: 
In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, 
Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said 
Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress 
may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or 
Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer 
shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until 
the Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.65 
The 1792, 1886, and 1947 Acts, by which Congress created lines of 
succession beyond the Vice President, rest on this authority.66  The statutes 
reflect the idea that a clear line of succession allows the government to 
continue to function in the case of simultaneous vacancies and/or inabilities 
by ensuring that there is always a qualified successor to carry out the 
powers and duties of the presidency. 
However, when there is no able Vice President and the President is 
incapable of declaring his own inability, the 1947 Act has no mechanism 
for declaring presidential inability.67  Thus, although Congress has the 
constitutional authority to create the line of succession, the 1947 Act does 
not exercise that authority to its full extent. 
In addition to the language of Article II, Congress appears to have 
authority to address this gap pursuant to the Necessary and Proper Clause in 
Article I, Section 8, Clause 18 of the Constitution.  The Necessary and 
Proper Clause provides that Congress shall have the power “[t]o make all 
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the 
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the 
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer 
thereof.”68 
 
 65. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 6. 
 66. Presidential Succession Act of 1947, 3 U.S.C. § 19(d)(1) (2006); Presidential 
Succession Act of 1886, ch. 4, 24 Stat. 1 (repealed 1947); Presidential Succession Act of 
1792, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 239 (repealed 1886). 
 67. See 3 U.S.C. § 19 (2006). 
 68. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
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The Supreme Court interpreted Congress’s power under the Necessary 
and Proper Clause broadly in its 1819 decision in McCulloch v. Maryland.69  
Holding that Congress had the authority to charter a bank, even though the 
Constitution did not explicitly give Congress such power, Chief Justice 
John Marshall wrote: 
[W]e think the sound construction of the constitution must allow to the 
national legislature that discretion, with respect to the means by which the 
powers it confers are to be carried into execution, which will enable that 
body to perform the high duties assigned to it, in the manner most 
beneficial to the people.  Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the 
scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are 
plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the 
letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.70 
While the Court has given the Clause an expansive reach, it has also stated 
that the Clause “is not the delegation of a new and independent power, but 
simply provision for making effective the powers theretofore mentioned.”71 
Experts on presidential succession have suggested that a statute providing 
a mechanism by which the President or Acting President could be declared 
unable to perform the duties of his office would be sound under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, because it would be consistent with the 
express power of Congress under the Constitution to establish the line of 
succession.72  One commentator writes that such a statute “would not 
appear to grant a new and independent power to Congress, [but] only a 
measure to ensure the legitimate end of providing for a successor beyond 
the Vice President in circumstances where additional process is deemed 
necessary as an effective use of the power.”73  Providing for the 
determination of presidential inability is “necessary to ensure that the 
executive power does not fall into abeyance . . . [and so this Congressional] 
power is clearly within the scope of the [Necessary and Proper Clause].”74 
Even those who oppose a broad reading of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause in terms of presidential succession agree that the clause allows for 
intervention where both the President and Vice President are incapacitated.  
Presidential succession scholar Ruth Silva, writing prior to the adoption of 
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, noted that the Constitution gives Congress 
the express power to provide for presidential succession only “when there is 
neither a functioning President nor a functioning Vice President.”75  She 
argued that “because enumeration in the Constitution of certain powers 
denies all others unless incident to an expressed power or necessary to its 
 
 69. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 70. Id. at  421. 
 71. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 88 (1907). 
 72. See Feerick, Presidential Succession and Inability, supra note 36, at 942–43. See 
generally Interview by Deborah Eltgroth & Daniel Hafetz with Birch Bayh, former U.S. 
Senator, in Easton, Md. (Oct. 2, 2009), in 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 781 (2010). 
 73. Feerick, supra note 36, at 942. 
 74. RUTH C. SILVA, PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION 106–07 (1951); see also 14 CONG. REC. 
915–16 (1883); 13 CONG. REC. 131 (1881). 
 75. Ruth C. Silva, Presidential Inability, 35 U. DET. L.J. 139, 171 (1957). 
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execution,” Congress does not have the authority to legislate regarding any 
scenario but that of a dual inability and/or vacancy.76  Herbert Brownell 
agreed that “congressional action under the ‘necessary and proper’ clause 
would seem restricted to the uncommon situation in which both the 
President and Vice President are incapacitated.”77 
b.  The Role of the Next in the Line of Succession in Determining Incapacity 
Prior to the adoption of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, many who wrote 
on the topic of presidential succession relied on the concept of a contingent 
grant of power to justify an authority in the next in the line of succession to 
determine presidential inability.78  Professor Silva explained that, according 
to this theory, “it is a well-established rule of law that the one to whom the 
power is granted is to decide when the emergency has arisen.”79  Silva 
wrote: 
[T]he Vice President, or the “officer” designated by law to act as 
President, is constituted the judge of a President’s inability . . . .  The 
Constitution provides that the power of acting as President belongs to the 
Vice President or to the “Officer” while a President is disabled.  Since the 
Constitution mentions only the successor, he is the judge of the facts.80 
Herbert Brownell agreed that “whenever any official by law . . . is 
designated to perform certain duties on the happening of certain 
contingencies, unless otherwise specified, that person who bears the 
responsibility for performing the duties must also determine when the 
contingency for the exercise of his powers arises.”81  Attorney General 
Robert F. Kennedy issued an opinion in 1961 adopting this theory, stating 
that the “Vice President or [an]other ‘officer’ designated by law to act as 
President has the authority under the Constitution to decide when inability 
exists.”82 
Thus, the contingent grant of power theory supports the idea that the next 
in the line of succession should have a role in the determination of 
presidential inability.  However, to permit the next in the line of succession 
alone to determine presidential inability would grant him more power than 
what is granted to the Vice President under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 
which does not permit the Vice President to act alone but requires him to 
act with a majority of the Cabinet or other congressionally designated 
body.83  As a result, reliance on the theory of a contingent grant of power 
 
 76. Id. 
 77. Brownell, supra note 48, at 206. 
 78. See Presidential Inability, 42 Op. Att’y Gen. 69, 88–90 (1961); see also SILVA, supra 
note 74, at 101. 
 79. SILVA, supra note 74, at 101; see also Silva, supra note 75, at 156. 
 80. See SILVA, supra note 74, at 101. 
 81. Brownell, supra note 48, at 204. 
 82. Presidential Inability, supra note 78, at 88, 90 (identifying this as the scholarly 
majority view and concurring with it) (emphasis added). 
 83. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4. 
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might yield a result that is not consistent with the framework set forth in the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment. 
c.  Summary 
Some may argue that only a constitutional amendment can expand upon 
the existing mechanism for declaring a presidential inability.  The Clinic, 
however, is persuaded that Congress has the power to enact a statute 
providing a mechanism for the determination of presidential inability during 
a vice presidential inability or vacancy.  Based on the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment and a theory of contingent grants of power, which is accepted 
by scholars familiar with presidential succession, the Clinic believes 
Congress has the authority to legislate in this area.  The Clinic recommends 
that such a statute be enacted on the basis that it is necessary and proper to 
implement Congress’s express power under Article II, Section 1, Clause 6 
to provide for the line of succession and to ensure the continuation of 
effective government.  We recommend the adoption of a statute that 
acknowledges that the next in the line of succession has the power to 
determine, with the Cabinet or another body that Congress may choose, the 
existence of an inability of the President or Acting President in the absence 
of an able Vice President.  We recommend that this statute also confirm that 
a President or Acting President may voluntarily transfer his powers and 
duties to the next in the line of succession during a vice presidential 
inability or vacancy. 
2.  Executive Action 
The Clinic believes congressional enactment of a statute addressing 
presidential inability gaps, in the absence of a constitutional amendment, 
presents a sound and feasible approach.  However, the Clinic recognizes 
that enactment of a statute can be a lengthy process and that national 
emergencies may occur at any time.  In the absence of statutory reform, the 
Clinic is aware that executive branch officials have instituted 
comprehensive practices, procedures, and rules to ensure preparedness in 
the event of gaps in leadership.  The Clinic endorses such contingency 
planning and suggests that prospective executive declarations of inability84 
provide an effective way to address both presidential and vice presidential 
inability while congressional action is under consideration. 
Article II, Section 1 permits Congress to provide for a line of succession 
only in the event of a dual inability and/or vacancy in the presidency and 
vice presidency.85  An executive declaration of prospective inability would 
permit the President, Vice President, or Acting President to describe, in a 
formal writing, the situations in which he would consider himself unable to 
 
 84. Executive declarations of inability are similar to letter agreements.  See Appendix B 
for a compilation of letter agreements and declarations from various administrations. 
 85. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6. 
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discharge the powers and duties of his office.86  Executive declarations of 
prospective inability allow the President, Vice President, or Acting 
President to provide for future instances of inability, and thereby permit 
timely implementation of the current succession law. 
An executive declaration of inability permits the line of succession to be 
triggered during a vice presidential vacancy or inability by giving the 
President or Acting President a way in which to declare himself unable to 
perform the powers and duties of his office prospectively, in the event that 
he becomes unable to declare his own inability in the future.  An executive 
declaration of prospective inability by the Vice President similarly allows 
the succession law to go into effect as intended. 
a.  Historical Support for Prospective Executive Declarations of Inability 
Declarations for future contingencies are consistent with Section 3 of the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment, which allows the President to temporarily 
transfer his powers when he “recognizes his inability—or the imminence of 
his inability.”87  Although the President can transfer his power during 
foreseen periods of inability, he might be able to do so “even prospectively 
for unexpected yet contemplated future incidents.”88  Former Attorney 
General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach testified that “the President should be 
able to arrange for the Vice President to act . . . in the event of a certain 
contingency . . . which would be a self-executive [sic] provision.”89 
Others agree.  Noting that President Bush signed a letter formally 
transferring his powers to Vice President Cheney prior to undergoing 
anesthesia, Adam Gustafson argues that “there is no overwhelming 
constitutional reason why such a letter may not be sent further in 
advance.”90  Indeed, some have suggested that the President and Vice 
President can “outlin[e] procedures for contingent cessions of executive 
power” for “unplanned future inabilities.”91  These procedures might extend 
as well to a statutory successor in contemplation of a possible vacancy in 
the vice presidency or an inability of the Vice President.  Although 
“[p]rospective declarations of inability would require a broad reading” of 
Section 3, a narrow reading that “discourages the President from taking 
 
 86. The Clinic acknowledges that such a writing will require some person or persons to 
decide whether the conditions set forth in the executive declaration of prospective inability 
are present.  The Clinic notes that an executive declaration of prospective inability could 
possibly authorize a designated party to resign on behalf of the President or Vice President in 
defined circumstances.  For an example of such a letter, see the Eisenhower-Nixon Letter 
Agreement in Appendix B.  A sample Executive Declaration of Inability is also included in 
Appendix B. 
 87. 111 CONG. REC. 7941 (1965) (statement of Rep. Richard Poff). 
 88. Gustafson, supra note 32, at 476. 
 89. Presidential Inability and Vacancies in the Office of Vice President:  Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the S. Comm. of the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 
21 (1965) (statement of Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Acting Att’y Gen.). 
 90. Gustafson, supra note 32, at 476–77. 
 91. Id. at 477. 
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present action for future contingencies . . . may undermine the 
Amendment’s purpose of promoting executive branch continuity.”92 
This cession of power is not unprecedented in American history.  Prior to 
the adoption of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, when no mechanism for the 
declaration of presidential inability existed, President Eisenhower 
recognized the urgency of addressing presidential succession issues.93  In 
1958, he presented to Vice President Nixon a “letter agreement” setting 
forth certain procedures in the event of his future inability as President.94  
President Eisenhower wrote that he and Vice President Nixon “could do 
much to eliminate all these uncertainties by agreeing, in advance, as to the 
proper steps to be taken at any time when [he] might become unable to 
discharge the powers and duties of the President.”95  President Eisenhower 
stated that “this agreement would not in any way contravene the clear 
intention of the Constitution; on the contrary, it is rather a statement of our 
common intention to act completely according to the spirit of . . . the 
Constitution.”96 
Pursuant to the letter agreement, Vice President Nixon was to act as 
President if President Eisenhower determined himself to be unable or if 
Vice President Nixon determined President Eisenhower was unable; 
Eisenhower would resume his presidential duties upon his own declaration 
that the inability had ended.97  Later administrations followed the 
Eisenhower-Nixon precedent by entering into letter agreements to provide 
for prospective inability, including President Kennedy and Vice President 
Lyndon B. Johnson,98 and President Johnson and Speaker of the House 
John W. McCormack.99  Although they appeared to share a similar 
understanding,100 a fully executed agreement between President Johnson 
and Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey has not yet been found.  There 
appears to be evidence that, even after the adoption of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment, Presidents George H.W. Bush and Clinton executed letter 
agreements with their Vice Presidents indicating their intentions for the 
transfer of power in case of inability.101  One commentator noted that prior 
 
 92. Id. at 479. 
 93. See Feerick, Presidential Succession and Inability, supra note 36, at 921. 
 94. See id.  For a reproduction of the letter, see Appendix B. 
 95. Letter from President Dwight D. Eisenhower to Richard Milhous Nixon (Feb. 5, 
1958), available at http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/second-term/
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 96. Id. 
 97. See id. 
 98. See Feerick, supra note 36, at 922. 
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 100. See id. 
 101. See Gustafson, supra note 32, at 477 (citing David A. Drachman et al., 
Subcommittee Report:  Criteria for Disability and Impairment, in PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY:  
PAPERS, DISCUSSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT AND 
ISSUES OF INABILITY AND DISABILITY AMONG PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 276 (James 
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to the adoption of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, letter agreements “did not 
have the force of law behind them and depended entirely on the good will 
of the incumbent President and Vice President.”102 
b.  Summary 
In case a presidential inability arises during a vice presidential vacancy or 
inability, an executive declaration of prospective inability can fill the gap 
that is not addressed by the Twenty-Fifth Amendment by allowing the 
President to define a future inability.  The declaration of a future inability, 
although not explicitly provided for in Section 3 of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment, is consistent with the purpose of Section 3 (and the Article II 
succession provision), to promote executive branch continuity, and has 
historical precedent. 
The Clinic believes that vice presidential inability is also best addressed 
through the use of executive declarations of prospective inability.  An 
executive declaration of prospective inability would permit the Vice 
President to describe the situations that he considers would render him 
unable.  Upon the occurrence of one of these situations, if the Vice 
President has made a declaration of prospective inability, the next in the 
line of succession would then be in a position to declare the inability of the 
President or Acting President, as circumstances require. 
Although the Vice President does not have the explicit authority under 
the Constitution to declare his own inability, the Clinic believes such 
authority is implicit.  A mechanism by which vice presidential inability can 
be declared is necessary for an effective system of presidential succession.  
Historical precedent supports this approach since past and current 
administrations have engaged in contingency planning to address issues 
arising from vice presidential inability.103 
3.  Other Options 
a.  Vice Presidential Inability 
The Clinic considered various options to deal with vice presidential 
inability and ultimately favors executive declarations of prospective 
inability, as described above.  Below is a summary of the other options we 
considered. 
i.  Statute 
The Clinic considered congressional enactment of a statute providing a 
mechanism for a determination of vice presidential inability.  The Vice 
President plays a vital role in succession through his authority, with the 
 
 102. See Feerick, supra note 36, at 922. 
 103. See Fielding, supra note 29, at 828–29 (noting that he created a book “which 
detailed every possible scenario that we could think of for presidential inability or even vice 
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Cabinet, to determine presidential inability under the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment. Thus, a statute providing for a determination of the Vice 
President’s inability could be seen as necessary and proper to enable the 
person next in the line of succession to play a vital role in the event of a 
Vice President’s inability.  Ultimately, the Clinic did not believe such a 
statute would pass constitutional muster because the Constitution specifies 
that Congress can act in the event of a dual inability; it does not provide that 
Congress can act in the case of vice presidential inability alone.104  Silva 
and Brownell, as indicated above, believed that congressional authority was 
limited to circumstances in which both the President and Vice President 
were unable or absent.105 
ii.  Impeachment 
Impeachment would be a dubious and problematic route to address the 
problem of vice presidential inability.  The wrongdoing contemplated by 
the Constitution’s requirement of “high crimes and misdemeanors” has 
been a source of debate and somewhat broadly construed by some.106  
However, although impeachable conduct need not be criminal, inability still 
stands far apart from bribery, treason, and the other types of “political” 
crimes that constitute a willful abuse of office and that justify impeachment 
and removal.107  Further, partisan considerations have frequently played a 
role in impeachment and removal.  The impeachment and removal of a 
President or Vice President for inability is both unsupported by the 
language or any reasonable interpretation of the Constitution and could set a 
dangerous precedent for the use or threat of impeachment and removal as a 
partisan political weapon.108 
VI.  LINE OF SUCCESSION ISSUES 
A.  Introduction 
Under Article II, Section I, Clause 6 of the Constitution, the Vice 
President is the first successor to the powers and duties of the presidency, 
and Congress is authorized to create a line of succession.109  The line of 
succession beyond the vice presidency has taken three different forms over 
the past 220 years.  The Presidential Succession Act of 1792 (1792 Act) 
included a line of succession that was strictly legislative in nature, running 
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to the President pro tempore of the Senate and then to the Speaker of the 
House of Representatives.110  Then, the Presidential Succession Act of 1886 
(1886 Act) changed the line of succession to an entirely executive line, 
running through the cabinet secretaries.111  The 1947 Act, changed the line 
of succession to include both legislators and executive officers, starting 
with the Speaker, followed by the President pro tempore, and then cabinet 
secretaries in the order of their departments’ creation:  the “Secretary of 
State, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of Defense, Attorney General, 
Secretary of the Interior, Secretary of Agriculture, Secretary of Commerce, 
Secretary of Labor, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Secretary of 
Housing and Urban Development, Secretary of Transportation, Secretary of 
Energy, Secretary of Education, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, and 
Secretary of Homeland Security.”112 
The 1947 Act, like the 1792 Act, has been subject to criticism on 
constitutional grounds, as well as on the basis of policy considerations.113  
There is a serious question regarding both the constitutionality of including 
legislative members in the line of succession and the “bumping” provision 
that permits a cabinet member, acting as President, to be replaced by the 
Speaker or President pro tempore. 
As a matter of policy, the succession of legislative members presents 
numerous concerns, including the violation of the doctrine of separation of 
powers, the possibility of a sudden and complete shift in party control of the 
executive branch, and conflicts of interest issues in instances of 
impeachment or removal of the President.  On the other hand, inclusion of 
executive officers also raises questions about cabinet members’ 
qualifications to serve as Acting President.  The Clinic treats each of these 
issues in the sections that follow and advances a recommendation for 
returning to the executive line of succession as provided for in the 1886 
Act.  Failing adoption of this recommendation, the Clinic recommends an 
exclusively cabinet line of succession for cases of presidential inability.  
This reform will facilitate a voluntary transfer of presidential power when 
circumstances require it and will reduce disruption in legislative leadership, 
but will otherwise preserve legislative succession. 
B.  Constitutional Concerns 
1.  Constitutionality of the Legislative Line of Succession 
The constitutionality of the 1947 Act and, more generally, of the 
legislative line of succession is questionable.  The first constitutional 
question is whether the term “Officer,” as understood by the Framers and as 
it appears in Article II, Section 1, Clause 6, includes legislators.  Article II, 
Section 1, Clause 6 provides in relevant part: 
 
 110. Presidential Succession Act of 1792, ch. 8, § 9, 1 Stat. 239, 240 (repealed 1886). 
 111. Presidential Succession Act of 1886, ch. 4, 24 Stat. 1, 1 (repealed 1947). 
 112. Presidential Succession Act of 1947, 3 U.S.C. § 19 (2006). 
 113. See infra Appendix C. 
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In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, 
Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said 
Office . . . the Congress may by Law . . . declar[e] what Officer shall then 
act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the 
Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.114 
Congressional leaders and scholars have interpreted the term “Officer” to 
mean “Officer of the United States,”115 which refers only to executive 
branch officers who are nominated by the President and confirmed by the 
Senate.116  Thus, some argue that legislators are not qualified under the 
Constitution to act as President.117 
Some commentators have also contended that, based on the description 
of the executive branch and the use of the term “Officer” elsewhere in the 
Constitution, the Framers did not anticipate legislators succeeding to the 
presidency.  For example, in 1864, Senator James Bayard of Delaware 
referred to Article II, Section 1, Clause 2, which provides for the election of 
presidential electors, as an instance in which the term “Officer” is placed in 
opposition to those holding legislative positions.118  This clause 
distinguishes between Senators and Representatives and persons “holding 
an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States.”119  Based on this 
distinction, Senator Bayard concluded that Senators and Representatives are 
not “Officers,” nor do they “hold[] office under the United States”; rather, 
they hold a position of “trust,” and therefore are not qualified to succeed to 
the presidency under the Constitution.120  Furthermore, Senator Bayard 
argued that legislators are not “officers of the United States” because 
citizens from individual states or districts elect them, rather than citizens 
throughout the country.121 
Similar arguments arise from the language in Article II, Section 1, Clause 
1, which states in relevant part that “[the President] shall hold his Office 
during the Term of four Years.”122  Moreover, Article I, Section 2, Clause 1 
states, “[t]he House of Representatives shall be composed of Members 
 
 114. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6. 
 115. Goldstein, supra note 9, at 1020; see also CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, 
PRESERVING OUR INSTITUTIONS:  THE SECOND REPORT OF THE CONTINUITY OF GOVERNMENT 
COMMISSION 26 (2009) (noting that “[a] line of thought running from James Madison to 
Akhil Amar holds that it is unconstitutional to have congressional leaders in the line of 
succession”). 
 116. CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, supra note 115, at 26–27 (noting that one side of 
the debate believed “the word ‘Officer’ clearly meant ‘Officer of the United States’ and thus 
expressly forbade leaders of Congress”). 
 117. See CONG. GLOBE, 38TH CONG., 1ST SESS. app. 35–37 (1864). 
 118. 13 CONG. REC. 128 (1881); see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (“Each State shall 
appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal 
to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in 
the Congress:  but no Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or 
Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector.”). 
 119. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. 
 120. 13 CONG. REC. 128 (statement of Sen. James A. Bayard). 
 121. Id. 
 122. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
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chosen every second Year by the People of the several States,”123 and 
Article I, Section 3, Clause 1 states, “[t]he Senate of the United States shall 
be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature 
thereof, for six Years.”124  If the Framers intended legislative members to 
fill “Officer” positions, then they presumably would have used the same 
language in the Constitution for both the executive and legislative branches; 
however, the Framers refer to legislators as “chosen” for either two or six 
years, and they omitted the language “hold his Office.”125 
Additionally, the 1947 Act may violate the Incompatibility Clause of 
Article I, Section 6, Clause 2.126  The Constitution makes clear that sitting 
members of Congress cannot hold “any civil Office under the Authority of 
the United States.”127  Therefore, the clause “civil Office under the 
Authority of the United States”128 must refer exclusively to the members of 
the executive and judicial branches because the Constitution does not say 
any “other” civil office.  Language within the same clause provides that “no 
Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of 
either House during his Continuance in Office,”129 again suggesting that a 
legislator is not an “Officer.”  The language of Article I, Section 6 thus 
appears to exclude legislators from those who are “Officers.”130 
The constitutional provisions governing impeachment also raise issues 
related to the definition of “Officer.”  Article II, Section 4 provides for the 
impeachment of the President, Vice President, and “all civil Officers of the 
United States.”131  Over time, the interpretation of the words “all civil 
Officers” has come to exclude legislators,132 and thus supports the 
argument that legislators are not “Officers” and are therefore not eligible to 
succeed to the presidency.  Other provisions of the Constitution also 
support this view.  Specifically, Article II, Section 3 gives the President the 
authority to “Commission all the Officers of the United States.”133  
However, members of Congress do not receive commissions to serve in the 
 
 123. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 1. 
 124. Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 1. 
 125. Compare id. art. I, § 2, cl. 1, and id. art. I, § 3, cl. 1, with id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
 126. Id. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 (“No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which 
he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States, 
which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased during 
such time; and no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of 
either House during his Continuance in Office.”). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. See 13 CONG. REC. 128 (1881) (statement of Sen. James A. Bayard) (arguing that 
these “Officers” are not included in the line of succession). 
 131. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 (“The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the 
United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, 
Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”). 
 132. See Appendix C for a discussion of this interpretation related to the impeachment 
trial of Senator William Blount. 
 133. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“[The President] shall Commission all the Officers of the 
United States.”). 
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House of Representatives or the Senate, thus supporting the argument that 
legislators are not “Officers of the United States.”134 
On the other hand, some scholars note that the Framers used the term 
“Officers” in Article II, Section 1 instead of the term “Officers of the 
United States.”135  Thus, it is argued that the ratifying states may have 
found the distinction important because the Speaker and the President pro 
tempore are described as “Officers” of their houses elsewhere in the 
Constitution.136 
Yet, even if members of Congress are deemed “Officers” and are eligible 
to act as President, their inclusion in the line of succession raises issues 
about separation of powers.  As President James Madison noted in 1792, an 
Acting President from the legislative branch would blur the lines of 
separation of powers.137  In addition, the Speaker participates in the 
impeachment process, and the President pro tempore votes in removal 
proceedings, which presents an obvious conflict of interest since the 1947 
Act places both in the line of succession.  In fact, this conflict of interest 
was present in the 1868 effort to remove President Andrew Johnson for 
violating the Tenure of Office Act.138  Johnson succeeded to the presidency 
after the assassination of President Abraham Lincoln and carried on as 
President with no Vice President.139  When then-President pro tempore 
Benjamin F. Wade voted in the removal trial of President Johnson, he 
effectively voted for his own succession to the presidency by voting 
“guilty” to remove President Johnson, because, under the 1792 Act, the 
President pro tempore was next in the line of succession after the Vice 
President.140  Ultimately, the effort to remove President Johnson failed by 
one vote, but the incident cast light on the issue of potential conflicts of 
interest in the context of a legislative line of succession.141 
Moreover, the historical record reveals the political maneuvering that led 
to the insertion of legislators into the 1792 Act.  The Federalists and Anti-
Federalists were engaged in a power struggle.142  The Federalists did not 
want the line of succession to run through the Cabinet because Thomas 
Jefferson, an Anti-Federalist, was Secretary of State at the time.143  
Alexander Hamilton, leader of the Federalist Party, persuaded his fellow 
Federalists in the Senate to overlook the constitutional questions about the 
 
 134. See, e.g., 13 CONG. REC. 127–28 (statement of Sen. James A. Bayard). 
 135. Goldstein, supra note 9, at 1020–21. 
 136. Id. at 1021; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; id. art. I, § 3, cl. 5. 
 137. Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton, supra note 137. 
 138. See JOHN D. FEERICK, FROM FAILING HANDS:  THE STORY OF PRESIDENTIAL 
SUCCESSION 113–14 (1965). 
 139. See Feerick, supra note 36, at 934 (noting that there was a vice presidential vacancy 
from 1865 to 1869 when Vice President Jackson became President upon the death of 
President Lincoln). 
 140. See id. at 114. 
 141. See id. 
 142. Id. at 60–62. 
 143. Id. at 60–61. 
40 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
1792 Act in order to establish a legislative line of succession that would 
exclude Jefferson.144 
Although the arguments outlined above cast doubt on the 
constitutionality of the legislative line of succession, other arguments 
support its constitutionality.  The primary support comes from the text of 
Article I, Sections 2 and 3,145 which provides for the House of 
Representatives and the Senate to choose their “other Officers,” in addition 
to the two legislative positions referred to by name in the Constitution, 
Speaker and President pro tempore.146  Thus, if the Speaker and President 
pro tempore are referred to as “Officers” in Article I, Sections 2 and 3,147 
and the word “Officer” in Article II, Section 1148 refers to all “Officers,” 
then members of Congress are arguably eligible to be included in the line of 
succession. 
Furthermore, historical practice supports the constitutionality of the 
legislative line of succession.  The Second Congress, which passed the 1792 
Act placing legislators in the line of succession, included six members149 of 
the Constitutional Convention who approved the final language of the 
Constitution,150 and thus were uniquely qualified to interpret the Framers’ 
intent.  However, four of the six members151 present in the 2nd Congress 
voted against the 1792 Act, including future President James Madison, who 
at the time was a Representative from Virginia.152  As noted previously, 
President Madison believed that the inclusion of the President pro tempore 
and the Speaker in the line of succession was not constitutional because 
they were not “Officers” in the constitutional sense and that any other 
reading of the Constitution would violate the separation of powers.153  
Additionally, President Madison believed that the forced resignation of the 
President pro tempore or Speaker under the 1792 Act would remove any 
authority those individuals might previously have held in order to act as 
President.154 
 
 144. Id. at 60–62. 
 145. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; id. art. I, § 3, cl. 5. 
 146. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (“The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and 
other Officers . . . .”); id. art. I, § 3, cl. 5 (“The Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and 
also a President pro tempore . . . .”). 
 147. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; id. art. I, § 3, cl. 5. 
 148. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 6. 
 149. These members were Abraham Baldwin, Elbridge Gerry, Thomas Fitzsimons, 
Nicholas Gilman, James Madison, and Hugh Williamson. See 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 417–18 
(1791). 
 150. FEERICK, supra note 138, at 60. 
 151. Those voting against the 1792 Act were Abraham Baldwin, Nicholas Gilman, James 
Madison, and Hugh Williamson. Id. 
 152. 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 417–18. 
 153. See Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton, supra note 137. 
 154. See id. 
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2.  Presidential Qualifications 
Constitutional considerations also arise regarding other kinds of 
qualifications for those in the line of succession.  Article II, Section 1, 
Clause 5 provides: 
No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, 
at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the 
Office of President; neither shall any Person be eligible to that Office who 
shall not have attained to the Age of thirty five Years, and been fourteen 
Years a Resident within the United States.155 
The 1947 Act confirmed that this provision would apply to those in the 
line of succession with the language, “this section shall apply only to such 
officers as are eligible to the office of President under the Constitution.”156  
While these requirements are clear, the question remains whether an 
individual who may be constitutionally qualified to act as President is 
“qualified” in the eyes of the national electorate.  For example, 
notwithstanding that the President pro tempore is third in line of succession 
after the President, that position is traditionally filled by the Senator with 
“the longest record of continuous service,”157 rather than by a Senator who 
is being evaluated as a possible successor to the President.  If the Senate’s 
only criterion for nominating a President pro tempore is the length of a 
Senator’s service, we respectfully suggest that the Senate should change its 
practice or the position should be removed from the line of succession. 
The qualifications of cabinet members raise other issues.  From time to 
time, the policies of department secretaries have generated considerable 
controversy, which may lead some to question their presidential pedigree.  
In addition, the electorate may be unfamiliar with cabinet secretaries (or for 
that matter, legislative leaders).158  Therefore, when considering whether 
the legislative or executive line of succession is appropriate, the issue of 
qualifications must be considered both in the constitutional sense and as 
seen through the eyes of the electorate. 
 
 155. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. 
 156. Presidential Succession Act of 1947, 3 U.S.C. § 19(e) (2006). 
 157. President Pro Tempore, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/reference/glossary_
term/president_pro_tempore.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2012).  In a recent article, Professor 
Amar also argues that “most Speakers are un-presidential.” Akhil Reed Amar, Why Speakers 
of the House Should Never Be President, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 12, 2012 (“Speakers of both 
parties have typically been unfit for the presidency.”), available at http://www.tnr.com/
print/article/politics/99509/presidential-succession-speaker-house. 
 158. For example, a survey of 1,000 “likely voters” on April 1–2, 2011 discussed whether 
the American public is knowledgeable of the current Cabinet.  For a more detailed 
explanation of the survey, see Locke, Solis Are Least Known of Obama Cabinet Members, 
RASMUSSEN REP. (Apr. 9, 2011), http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/
politics/obama_administration/april_2011/locke_solis_are_least_known_of_obama_cabinet_
members.  Similarly, on March 17–20, 2011, a Pew Research Center survey found that only 
43 percent of Americans knew that John Boehner was the Speaker of the House. See Bruce 
Drake, What Does John Boehner Do for a Living? Less Than Half in Poll Know, POLL 
WATCH DAILY (Apr. 1, 2011), http://www.pollwatchdaily.com/2011/04/01/what-does-john-
boehner-do-for-a-living-less-than-half-in-poll-know/. 
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3.  “Bumping” Provision 
“Bumping” is a term that has come to describe cases in which 
legislators—not the President or Vice President—replace a cabinet member 
who is an Acting President.  Under the 1947 Act, cabinet members who 
have succeeded to the powers and duties of the office of President in the 
absence of a Speaker or President pro tempore may be displaced or bumped 
from the presidency once a Speaker or President pro tempore is elected or 
qualifies for office.  This provision does not allow for cabinet members to 
bump one another or for a Speaker to bump the President pro tempore or 
vice versa, but it does create a scenario for several officeholders to serve as 
President in a short time. 
The possibility of multiple successors in a short period appears to violate 
Article II, Section 1, which authorizes Congress only to enact a law that 
would declare what “Officer” would act as President until “a President shall 
be elected,” and not a law that would allow others to bump Acting 
Presidents from office.159  Furthermore, Article II, Section 1 states that the 
Acting President “shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or 
a President shall be elected.”160 
The rationale behind inclusion of the bumping provision is not well 
documented in the legislative history of the 1947 Act.  The debates on the 
1886 Act, however, do include references to bumping.161  In 1883, Senator 
George Edmunds of Vermont first proposed having the Secretary of State 
act as President, should no Speaker or President pro tempore be available, 
and then relinquish the office once a Speaker or President pro tempore was 
available to act as President.162  Senator George Hoar opposed this, stating 
that it is not within Congress’s power under the Constitution to provide for 
two or three officers in succession to act as President.163  The 1886 Act did 
not provide for bumping. 
 
 159. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6; see also Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, 
Is the Presidential Succession Law Constitutional?, 48 STAN. L. REV. 113, 135 (1995) 
(noting this discrepancy and discussing further the problems created by bumping). 
 160. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6. 
 161. See, e.g., 17 CONG. REC. 676–77 (1886) (statement of Sen. George Everett Adams); 
17 CONG. REC. 220 (1885) (debate on Dec. 16, 1885); 14 CONG. REC. 880 (1883) (debate on 
Jan. 5, 1883). 
 162. 14 CONG. REC. 880. 
 163. Id. 
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C.  Uncertainty in Times of Presidential Succession164 
1.  Acting Secretaries in the Line of Succession165 
It is unclear whether the acting cabinet secretaries are in the line of 
succession under the 1947 Act.166  During congressional debates leading up 
to the 1947 Act, the topic of their inclusion did not come up once.167  
Senator Kenneth Wherry, who introduced Senate Bill 564, which was later 
passed into law as the 1947 Act, said, “[T]he bill accomplishes what I want 
to do, and that is to make the Speaker always the man that is to be the 
Acting President.”168  Senator Wherry thought that, other than the President 
and the Vice President, the Speaker was the closest official to the 
electorate.169  He stated: 
My theory is that as long as they all are elected officers I would much 
rather it would go to the Speaker first; then to the President pro tempore 
as the next closest to the Speaker, maybe.  But in the event neither one of 
them is available, then go down through the line we have now, and they 
act as President only until either the President, Vice President, the 
Speaker, or the President pro tempore qualifies.  In that order they can 
supplant the Secretary of State.170 
Thus, it is unlikely that Senator Wherry intended to include acting 
secretaries.  They are more removed from the electorate than the Speaker, 
 
 164. It is highly unlikely but not unquestionably clear that the Speaker of the House pro 
tempore and the Acting President pro tempore of the Senate are not currently included in the 
line of succession. See infra Appendix E.  There have been two bills introduced by 
Congressman Brad Sherman since September 11, 2001, that specifically state that the 
Speaker of the House pro tempore is not considered the Speaker of the House for the 
purposes of presidential succession.  Both of these bills are silent with regard to the Acting 
President pro tempore of the Senate.  The Clinic, recognizing that this is a point that has not 
previously been discussed in the literature on presidential succession, does not find a 
convincing argument for the inclusion of these legislators in the current line of succession.  
For a discussion of Congressman Sherman’s bills, see infra Appendix D.  The Clinic, 
however, recommends that Congress explicitly clarify whether acting secretaries and 
substitute congressional leadership are included in the line of succession.  We think it 
inappropriate to include the latter—interim legislative officials—in the line of succession. 
 165. An acting secretary is an officer who was not appointed as a cabinet secretary by the 
President, but who nonetheless now holds the powers of a cabinet secretary.  By contrast, a 
cabinet secretary is an individual who was appointed by the President with the advice and 
consent of the Senate for the position of cabinet secretary.  For a discussion of the bills 
introduced since September 11, 2001, see infra Appendix D. 
 166. See CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, supra note 115, at 34 (“We have spoken to 
acting secretaries who told us they had been placed in the line of succession.”). 
 167. See Succession to the Presidency:  Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Rules and 
Admin., 80th Cong. (1947) [hereinafter Succession to the Presidency]; To Determine 
Presidential Succession:  Before Subcomm. No. 1 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 80th 
Cong. (1947); Selection of an Acting President in the Case of Failure to Qualify of Both 
President-Elect and Vice-President Elect:  Hearing Before Subcomm. No. 1 of the H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 80th Cong. (1947); H.R. REP. NO. 80-80 (1947); H.R. DOC. NO. 80–89 
(1947); H.R. REP. NO. 80–817  (1947). 
 168. Succession to the Presidency, supra note 167, at 42 (statement of Sen. Kenneth S. 
Wherry). 
 169. Id. at 43. 
 170. Id. at 61 (emphasis added). 
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President pro tempore, and cabinet secretaries.  Further, Senator Wherry 
advocated for succession to run, after the Speaker and President pro 
tempore, “through the line we have now,” which under the 1886 Act was 
only the cabinet secretaries confirmed as such, thus excluding acting 
secretaries.171  However, the language of the 1947 Act itself is ambiguous. 
The inclusion of acting secretaries in the line of succession is supported 
by a comparison of the language in the 1947 Act and the 1886 Act.172  The 
1886 Act explicitly included only cabinet secretaries confirmed as such.173  
After enumerating the list of cabinet secretaries who were included in the 
line of succession, section 2 of the 1886 Act provided “[t]hat the preceding 
section shall only be held to describe and apply to such officers as shall 
have been appointed by the advice and consent of the Senate to the offices 
therein named.”174  In contrast, the language of the 1947 Act is less clear.  
Section 19(d)(1) of the 1947 Act provides that “the officer of the United 
States who is highest on the following list [referring to a list of cabinet 
secretaries], and who is not under disability to discharge the powers and 
duties of the office of President shall act as President.”175  Section 19(e) 
goes on to state, “Subsection (d) of this section shall apply only to officers 
appointed, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.”176  The lack 
of language in the 1947 Act explicitly limiting succession to cabinet 
secretaries, “confirmed as such,” raises the question of whether the acting 
secretaries are in the line of succession.  However, the 1886 Act’s omission 
of the acting secretaries, Senator Wherry’s likely exclusion of acting 
secretaries, and a complete absence of discussion of acting secretaries in the 
legislative history of the 1947 Act weigh against any interpretation of the 
1947 Act that would include acting secretaries in the line of succession. 
If acting secretaries are in the line of succession, then section 19(d)(1) of 
the 1947 Act means that an acting secretary in a higher-listed department 
may become Acting President ahead of the lower-listed cabinet 
secretaries.177  Section 19(d)(1) states only that  “the officer of the United 
States who is highest on the following list . . . shall act as President.”178  
There is no distinction made between an acting secretary or a cabinet 
secretary who was appointed and confirmed as such.  Thus, under one 
interpretation, an acting Secretary of State would have a valid claim to 
become Acting President ahead of the Secretary of the Treasury.179 
Whatever Congress’ intent in passing the 1947 Act, the Clinic has 
grappled with the soundness of including acting secretaries in the line of 
 
 171. Presidential Succession Act of 1886, ch. 4, § 2, 24 Stat. 1 (repealed 1947). 
 172. See CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, supra note 115, at 34.  The Continuity of 
Government Commission has confirmed with some acting secretaries that they were placed 
in the line of succession. See id. 
 173. See infra note 174. 
 174. Presidential Succession Act of 1886 § 2. 
 175. Presidential Succession Act of 1947, 3 U.S.C. § 19(d)(1) (2006). 
 176. Id. § 19(e). 
 177. Id. § 19(d)(1). 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. § 19. 
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succession.  Their inclusion greatly expands the line of succession, but it 
also raises several concerns about the implementation of the line of 
succession and the qualifications of the individuals who could assume the 
powers and duties of the presidency.180 
D.  Additional Concerns 
1.  Democratic Pedigree 
Commentators most often defend placing members of Congress in the 
line of succession before cabinet members on the basis of democratic 
pedigree, arguing that members of Congress are elected officials, and thus 
most representative of the national electorate after the President and Vice 
President.181  It is argued that cabinet members, on the other hand, are not 
elected but are only appointed by the President.182  Although they are not 
chosen by the electorate, cabinet members do represent the electorate’s 
mandate as designees of the President, who is the most politically 
representative of the national constituency.183  Furthermore, cabinet 
members, other than interim appointments, are not only appointed by the 
President but also must be confirmed by the Senate, which places them in 
the unique position of having been confirmed by “two continental 
institutions,”184 in contrast to the Speaker of the House and the President 
pro tempore, who are selected only by their local constituency and then by 
their respective houses.185 
2.  Party Continuity 
The current line of succession can effectuate a change of party in the 
White House if the legislative leader who assumes the powers and duties of 
the presidency belongs to the party opposite that of the elected President.  
Because a party shift could occur at any time during a presidential term, and 
the 1947 Act does not provide for special elections, the party which was not 
elected to the presidency could control the office of the President for up to 
four years (should a dual inability and/or vacancy occur, for example, on or 
after Inauguration Day), contrary to the electorate’s mandate.  Such a shift 
may be viewed as illegitimate in the eyes of the electorate. 
 
 180. For further discussion on the effect acting secretaries might have on implementing 
the line of succession, as well as the concerns regarding their presidential qualifications, see 
infra Appendix E. 
 181. See Amar & Amar, supra note 159, at 130 (noting that this argument is often made). 
 182. President Truman, in his address to Congress, criticized a cabinet line of succession, 
where the President has the ability to nominate the person who would be the “immediate 
successor in the event of [the President’s] own death or inability to act.” H.R. DOC. NO.79-
246, at 1 (1945). 
 183. See id.; see also Steven G. Calabresi, The Political Question of Presidential 
Succession, 48 STAN. L. REV. 155, 172–73 (1995). 
 184. Amar & Amar, supra note 159, at 131. 
 185. Id. at 130–31. 
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3.  Historical Precedent 
There is historical precedent for a legislative line of succession.  Scholars 
such as James E. Fleming argue that if the question of the constitutionality 
of a legislative line of succession were to come before the Supreme Court, 
the burden of proof would be on those arguing against the constitutionality 
of the 1792 and 1947 Acts.186 
E.  Recommendations For Future Action 
1.  Executive Line of Succession187 
The Clinic recommends an executive line of succession that would 
include all cabinet secretaries in the order in which their departments were 
established.  Cabinet secretaries should be required to resign from their 
positions if they act as President in cases of death, resignation, or removal, 
not because of a separation of powers issue, but so that their offices can be 
filled with a new secretary and so that there will be a full Cabinet.  As a 
matter of constitutional law, an executive line of succession cannot be 
challenged because cabinet secretaries, unlike legislative leaders, are clearly 
“Officers” under Article II, Section 1, Clause 6.  Furthermore, cabinet 
secretaries, by virtue of their position in government and day-to-day 
involvement in the administration of the executive branch, are more likely 
than legislators to run the executive branch consistent with the views held 
by the former or unable President. 
Finally, an executive line of succession moots the bumping provision.  If 
legislators are no longer in the line of succession, they cannot bump an 
executive officer acting as President. 
2.  Binary Line of Succession 
As an alternative to an executive line of succession, the Clinic proposes 
that, in cases of presidential inability and vice presidential inability or 
vacancy, the line of succession should temporarily run through the cabinet 
secretaries.  Under this proposal, cabinet secretaries should not be required 
 
 186. James E. Fleming, Presidential Succession:  The Art of the Possible, 79 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 951, 952–56 (2010). 
 187. The Clinic also discussed maintaining the current legislative-cabinet line of 
succession, but to modify it to maintain party continuity by placing the leaders of the 
President’s party in the House of Representatives and the Senate in the line of succession, 
rather than the Speaker and President pro tempore regardless of their party affiliation.  The 
Clinic does not support this recommendation.  First, the question remains unanswered as to 
whether the Speaker and President pro tempore are “Officers” in the constitutional sense.  
The creation of additional offices within the House of Representatives and the Senate would 
create positions that are even less clearly “Officers” because these new positions are not 
specifically enumerated in the Constitution.  Second, because the proposed positions within 
Congress are not constitutionally mandated—unlike the Speaker and President pro 
tempore—they may be revoked based on a simple vote within each House, which would add 
to the uncertainty in the line of succession.  For a thoughtful discussion and contrary 
recommendations on this subject, see Goldstein, supra note 9, at 1038–39. 
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to resign from their positions because no separation of powers issues are 
implicated and cabinet secretaries can return to their former offices without 
a second presidential nomination and subsequent Senate confirmation.  This 
approach promotes party continuity during times of temporary presidential 
inability.  In the event of a dual presidential and vice presidential vacancy 
due to death, resignation, or removal from office, under this binary 
approach the line of succession would continue as it currently stands under 
the 1947 Act, with successors running first to the legislative leaders and 
then to cabinet secretaries.188 
F.  Recommendations For Immediate Action 
1.  Acting Secretaries 
The Clinic recommends that Congress confirm whether acting secretaries 
are included in the line of succession and, if so, either remove them from 
the line, or alternatively, amend the 1947 Act so that acting secretaries can 
assume the powers and duties of the presidency, in the order of their 
departments’ creation, but only after succession has passed through all of 
the cabinet secretaries.  Greater clarity is needed on the subject of their 
inclusion.  We are aware that the Continuity in Government Commission 
and various legislative proposals189 suggest that acting secretaries be 
excluded altogether, reflecting to some extent a doubt as to their 
qualifications to serve in the highest office.  However, we do not rush to 
this conclusion even in the face of such impressive authority, believing that 
a number of individuals who serve in these positions are highly qualified 
and have been confirmed by the Senate.  Their inclusion in the line of 
succession does have the benefit of deepening the line of succession in the 
event of a catastrophe.  Finally, if acting secretaries are included in the line 
of succession, then the departmental lines of succession need to be more 
carefully studied to determine the qualifications of the individuals in those 
lines of succession for possible presidential service.  Either explicitly 
excluding acting secretaries from the line of succession, or allowing acting 
secretaries to assume the powers and duties of the presidency only after all 
succession has run through all of the cabinet secretaries, would greatly 
reduce confusion were statutory succession triggered in the event of a mass 
catastrophe and, in particular, were an unknown acting secretary of 
questionable presidential pedigree to succeed to the presidency. 
VII.  PRE-INAUGURAL SUCCESSION CONTINGENCIES 
A.  Introduction 
The peaceful and orderly transfer of executive power, beginning with the 
popular election and culminating with the inauguration of the new 
 
 188. See infra Appendix D for Congressman Brad Sherman’s similar proposal. 
 189. For a more complete discussion of the Continuity of Government’s proposal and the 
proposed legislation, see infra Appendix D. 
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President, is crucial to the continuity of a democratic government that is 
responsive and accountable to the electorate.  Lack of clarity in the 
constitutional provisions, federal statutes, state laws, and party rules 
governing candidate succession during the pre-inaugural period threatens 
the orderly transfers of presidential power.190  The contingencies raised 
below therefore merit attention, are ripe for reform, and are no less 
important than post-inaugural contingencies. 
B.  Legal Framework 
Constitutional provisions, federal and state statutes, and political party 
rules govern the modern system of pre-inaugural presidential succession.191  
This section identifies the sources of law that are applicable at specific 
junctures in the pre-inaugural period and the relationships among them. 
Contingencies that may occur prior to a general election—during which 
prospective candidates campaign for their parties’ nominations in primaries, 
caucuses, and party conventions—are governed almost exclusively by party 
rules and state law.  The Rules of the Republican Party, adopted at the 40th 
Republican National Convention held August 27–30, 2012, state: 
The Republican National Committee is hereby authorized and empowered 
to fill any and all vacancies which may occur by reason of death, 
declination, or otherwise of the Republican candidate for President of the 
United States or the Republican candidate for Vice President of the 
United States, as nominated by the national convention, or the Republican 
National Committee may reconvene the national convention for the 
purpose of filling any such vacancies.192 
Similarly, the Democratic National Committee has the responsibility of 
filling vacancies on the party’s national ticket that occur prior to the general 
election.  The Charter and the Bylaws of the Democratic Party of the United 
States, as amended by the Democratic National Committee on August 20, 
2010, provide: 
The Democratic National Committee shall have general responsibility for 
the affairs of the Democratic Party between National Conventions, subject 
to the provisions of this Charter and to the resolutions or other actions of 
the National Convention.  This responsibility shall include . . . (c) filling 
vacancies in the nominations for the office of President and Vice 
President.193 
 
 190. This discussion is limited to death or resignation of a candidate or nominee.  The 
possible contingencies arising from temporary or permanent inability, though worthy of 
prompt attention and scrutiny, are numerous and largely beyond the scope of this inquiry in 
the pre-inaugural period. 
 191. See infra Appendix A for the text of these constitutional provisions, federal statutes, 
and political party rules.  See infra Appendix F, Chart 5 for the text of the state statutes. 
 192. REPUBLICAN NAT’L COMM., THE RULES OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY 8 (2012), 
available at http://www.gop.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/2012_RULES_Adopted.pdf). 
 193. DEMOCRATIC NAT’L COMM., THE CHARTER & THE BYLAWS OF THE DEMOCRATIC 
PARTY OF THE UNITED STATES 3 (2010), available at http://www.democrats.org/files/misc/
pdf/Charter_and_Bylaws_8_20_10.php. 
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The Democratic National Committee, in the Call for the 2012 
Democratic National Convention, stipulates: 
In the event of death, resignation or disability of a nominee of the Party 
for President or Vice President after the adjournment of the National 
Convention, the National Chairperson of the Democratic National 
Committee shall confer with the Democratic leadership of the United 
States Congress and the Democratic Governors Association and shall 
report to the Democratic National Committee, which is authorized to fill 
the vacancy or vacancies.194 
The Constitution provides in Article II, Section 1, Clause 4 that “[t]he 
Congress may determine the Time of chusing the Electors, and the Day on 
which they shall give their Votes; which Day shall be the same throughout 
the United States.”195  In 1845, Congress established the date for the 
general election in a presidential year to be the first Tuesday after the first 
Monday in November.  The general election is the process whereby 
presidential electors are chosen by popular vote in each state.196  In the 
event of a mass catastrophe, such as a terrorist attack that prevents citizens 
from going to the polls or the death of a party’s nominee in the period prior 
to the general election, Congress is constitutionally authorized to delay the 
date of the election.197  Fortunately, Congress has never had to act on this 
authority.198 
Prior to the general election, each state is responsible for selecting its 
presidential electors.199  Generally, candidates for presidential Elector are 
nominated by the state political parties, which are responsible for filing the 
electors’ names with the Secretary of State of their respective states.200  
Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 provides the manner in which these 
selections are to be made: 
 
 194. DEMOCRATIC NAT’L COMM., CALL FOR THE 2012 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL 
CONVENTION 18 (2012), available at http://www.thegreenpapers.com/P12/2010-08-20-
DRAFT_2012_Call_for_Convention_8_19_10.pdf. 
 195. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4. 
 196. See Act of Jan. 23, 1845, ch. 1, 5 Stat. 721 (current version at 3 U.S.C. § 1 (2006)) 
(“[T]he electors of President and Vice President shall be appointed in each State on the 
Tuesday next after the first Monday in November in every fourth year succeeding every 
election of a President and Vice President.”). 
 197. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4. 
 198. In contrast, local governments have postponed elections in emergency situations.  
The terrorist attack in New York City on September 11, 2001, resulted in the postponement 
of citywide primary elections scheduled that day and which were already underway at the 
time of the attack.  A New York Supreme Court order canceling the election was followed 
by an executive order by Governor George E. Pataki temporarily suspending the election. 
Jerry H. Goldfeder, Could Terrorists Derail a Presidential Election?, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
523, 525–26 (2005). 
 199. See 3 U.S.C. § 1.  Under the Twenty-Third Amendment, the District of Columbia is 
also entitled to appoint electors.  The Amendment provides:  “The District . . . shall appoint 
. . . [a] number of electors of President and Vice President equal to the whole number of 
Senators and Representatives in Congress to which the District would be entitled if it were a 
State, but in no event more than the least populous State.” U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII, § 1. 
 200. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 103.021 (West 2012). 
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Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may 
direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and 
Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress:  but 
no Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or 
Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector.201 
After the general election, the electors are required to meet and are 
expected to cast their electoral votes for the candidates to whom they are 
pledged.202  Under current law, the presidential electors meet in their 
respective state capitals and in the District of Columbia forty-one days 
following the general election.203  At these fifty-one separate meetings, the 
electors cast their electoral votes in the manner required by the Twelfth 
Amendment, which states: 
The Electors shall meet in their respective states and vote by ballot for 
President and Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shall not be an 
inhabitant of the same state with themselves; they shall name in their 
ballots the person voted for as President, and in distinct ballots the person 
voted for as Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of all 
persons voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as Vice-
President, and of the number of votes for each, which lists they shall sign 
and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the government of the 
United States, directed to the President of the Senate.204 
Federal law does not require electors in each state to vote for any 
particular candidate.205  Many states, however, mandate by statute that 
electors vote for candidates to whom they have pledged their votes.206  
These statutory mandates create a potential crisis if a presidential or vice 
presidential candidate dies between Election Day in November and the 
meeting of the Electoral College in mid-December.  In such a case, 
“[t]heoretically, the electors would be free to vote for anyone they pleased.  
But the national party rules for the filling of vacancies by the national 
committees would still be in effect, and the electors would probably respect 
the decision of their national committee on a new nominee.”207  The 
political parties, relying on the authority granted to them in their respective 
party rules and bylaws, likely would recommend a replacement candidate 
for whom the electors should vote. 
 
 201. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. 
 202. THOMAS H. NEALE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 20273, THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE:  
HOW IT WORKS IN CONTEMPORARY PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 1, 3–4 (2003), available at 
fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/28109.pdf. 
 203. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 644, 62 Stat. 673 (current version at 3 U.S.C. § 7 (2006)) 
(“The electors of President and Vice President of each State shall meet and give their votes 
on the first Monday after the second Wednesday in December next following their 
appointment at such place in each State as the legislature of such State shall direct.”). 
 204. U.S. CONST. amend. XII. 
 205. See Beverly J. Ross & Michael Josephson, The Electoral College and the Popular 
Vote, 12 J.L. & POL. 665, 671–73 (1996). 
 206. See infra Appendix F, Chart 5 (setting out the text of these state statutes). 
 207. Presidential Succession Between the Popular Election and the Inauguration:  
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d 
Cong. 44 (1994) (statement of Prof. Lawrence D. Longley). 
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After the electoral votes are cast by the electors and certified by the 
appropriate state official, the votes are sealed and transmitted to the 
President of the U.S. Senate, the Vice President.208  The Twelfth 
Amendment provides that “[t]he President of the Senate shall, in the 
presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the 
certificates and the votes shall then be counted.”209  By federal statute, the 
joint session of Congress is required to take place at 1:00 p.m. on January 6 
in the calendar year following the meetings of the Electoral College.210  The 
person receiving the greatest number of votes for President becomes 
President, provided he receives a majority of the electoral votes.211  
Likewise, the person receiving the greatest number of votes for Vice 
President becomes Vice President, provided he receives a majority of the 
electoral votes.212 
If no candidate for President receives a majority, the House of 
Representatives is required, pursuant to the Twelfth Amendment, to go into 
session and choose the President “from the persons having the highest 
numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for as President.”213  
The state delegations cast their votes for President “by states,” with each 
state having one vote; a candidate must receive the votes of an absolute 
majority of state delegations—twenty-six—in order to become President-
elect.214 
Similarly, if no candidate for Vice President receives a majority of the 
electoral votes, then, pursuant to the Twelfth Amendment, the Senate is 
required to go into session and choose the Vice President “from the two 
highest numbers on the list.”215  A candidate must receive the vote of the 
“majority of the whole number” of Senators—fifty-one—in order to 
become Vice President elect.216 
Section 4 of the Twentieth Amendment provides that, in the event of the 
death of any of the candidates from whom the respective Houses may 
choose the President or Vice President, Congress retains the authority to 
provide for a possible solution: 
The Congress may by law provide for the case of the death of any of the 
persons from whom the House of Representatives may choose a President 
whenever the right of choice shall have devolved upon them, and for the 
case of the death of any of the persons from whom the Senate may choose 
 
 208. U.S. CONST. amend. XII. 
 209. Id.; see also Nathan L. Colvin & Edward B. Foley, Lost Opportunity:  Learning the 
Wrong Lesson from the Hayes-Tilden Dispute, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1043, 1045 (2010) 
(discussing the ambiguity of the constitutional language with regard to who and how the 
count is conducted because of the constitutional provision’s passive voice). 
 210. 3 U.S.C. § 15 (2006). 
 211. U.S. CONST. amend. XII.   
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
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a Vice President whenever the right of choice shall have devolved upon 
them.217 
If the House of Representatives fails to choose a President-elect in time 
for the inauguration on January 20,218 then Section 3 of the Twentieth 
Amendment specifies that the Vice President elect becomes Acting 
President until the House chooses a President when the right of choice 
devolves upon it.219  If the Senate has also failed to choose a Vice President 
elect by Inauguration Day, then, under the 1947 Act, the next in the line of 
succession, currently the Speaker of the House, becomes Acting President 
until either the House selects a President or the Senate selects a Vice 
President.220 
If the President-elect dies between the counting of the electoral votes by 
Congress on January 6 and Inauguration Day on January 20, then under the 
Twentieth Amendment the Vice President elect becomes President.221  In 
the event of the death of the Vice President elect during this period, the 
President, at the beginning of his term of office, must nominate a new Vice 
President for congressional confirmation pursuant to Section 2 of the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment.222  In the event that both the President-elect and 
Vice President elect die during this same period, the statutory line of 
succession goes into effect on Inauguration Day, placing the Speaker, the 
President pro tempore, and then cabinet secretaries—in the order of their 
departments’ creation—in the line for the presidency.223  The Speaker then 
becomes the Acting President for the full presidential term; but, if neither a 
Speaker nor a President pro tempore is available, the cabinet member next 
in line of succession would become Acting President until a Speaker or 
President pro tempore becomes available.224 
C.  Succession Prior to the General Election 
If death or resignation occurs prior to the general election, the political 
party of the candidate can fill the vacancy in the ticket.225  As stated above, 
 
 217. U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 4. 
 218. Id. amend. XX, § 1. 
 219. Id. amend. XX, § 3 (“If a President shall not have been chosen before the time fixed 
for the beginning of his term, or if the President elect shall have failed to qualify, then the 
Vice-President elect shall act as President until a President shall have qualified.”).  The 
Twelfth Amendment confirms the elevation of the Vice President to Acting President if the 
House fails to select a President. Id. amend. XII (“And if the House of Representatives shall 
not choose a President whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon them . . . then the 
Vice President shall act as President, as in the case of the death or other constitutional 
disability of the President.”). 
 220. Presidential Succession Act of 1947, 3 U.S.C. § 19(a) (2006). 
 221. U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 3 (“If, at the time fixed for the beginning of the term of 
the President, the President elect shall have died, the Vice President elect shall become 
President.”). 
 222. Id. amend. XXV, § 2. 
 223. 3 U.S.C. § 19; Richard Albert, The Constitutional Politics of Presidential 
Succession, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 497, 536 (2011) (noting that “departmental seniority 
determines the order of precedence among cabinet secretaries”). 
 224. Id. 
 225. See supra notes 192–94 and accompanying text. 
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Congress can also delay the date of the presidential election.226  In the rare 
instances in which a vice presidential candidate has died or resigned, the 
national party executive committees, usually in consultation with the 
presidential candidate, convened to select a replacement candidate in 
accordance with the party rules.  For example, President William Howard 
Taft’s incumbent Vice President, James S. Sherman, died on October 30, 
1912, just days before the national popular election.227  Vice President 
Sherman’s name remained on the ballot because his death occurred so close 
to the election.228  On November 12, 1912, the Republican National 
Committee selected Columbia University President Nicholas Murray Butler 
as Sherman’s replacement.229 Electors for Sherman voted for Butler when 
the Electoral College met.230 
In 1972, Democratic presidential nominee George McGovern selected 
Senator Thomas Eagleton as his vice presidential candidate, and the party 
subsequently nominated him at the national party convention.231  Senator 
Eagleton withdrew his name from the ticket on July 31, 1972, after he 
disclosed that he had been hospitalized three times for the treatment of 
depression.232  The Democratic National Committee nominated 
McGovern’s replacement choice for Vice President—Sargent Shriver—on 
August 8, 1972, in a meeting open to the press.233 
The rules of both major political parties delegate a great deal of 
discretion to their executive committees for selecting replacement 
candidates.234  In exercising this discretion, the parties should fulfill the 
electorate’s expectations of transparency, process, and certainty by 
clarifying the procedure for selecting replacement candidates in the party 
rules and bylaws.  As necessary, these changes should be adopted before 
the national party conventions. 
 
 226. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4. 
 227. Sherman is Dead, Hurt by Speech, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1912, at 1. 
 228. No Provision for Sherman’s Successor, N.Y. TRIBUNE, Oct. 31, 1912, at 2. 
 229. THOMAS H. NEALE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34692, PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION:  
PERSPECTIVES, CONTEMPORARY ANALYSIS, AND 110TH CONGRESS PROPOSED LEGISLATION 13 
(2008) (“The Republican National Committee met after election day and appointed Nicholas 
M. Butler to replace Sherman on the ticket . . . .”), available at www.fas.org/sgp/
crs/misc/RL34692.pdf. 
 230. See FEERICK, FROM FAILING HANDS, supra note 138, at 161. 
 231. James N. Naughton, Shriver Is Named for Second Place by the Democrats, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 9, 1972, at 1. 
 232. Id.; see also James N. Giglio, The Eagleton Affair:  Thomas Eagleton, George 
McGovern, and the 1972 Vice Presidential Nomination, 39 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 647, 658, 
669–71 (2009). 
 233. Naughton, supra note 231. 
 234. REPUBLICAN NAT’L COMM., supra note 192, at 8; DEMOCRATIC NAT’L COMM., supra 
note 193, at 3. 
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1.  Succession Prior to the National Party Convention 
If the death or resignation of a presidential candidate occurs prior to the 
national party convention,235 the party executive committee determines the 
obligation of the pledged delegates, if any, won through primary 
elections.236  Parties should consider two possible amendments to their 
rules:  releasing the pledged delegates from their obligation to vote for 
certain candidates, and awarding the pledged delegates won by the absent 
candidate to another candidate. 
2.  Succession After the National Party Convention 
The death or resignation of a presidential or vice presidential candidate 
after the national political party convention, but prior to the general 
election, poses additional concerns.  The national party executive 
committee has the authority to name a replacement candidate here as 
well.237  The primary voters and the convention delegates have already 
fulfilled their duties.  While not impossible, recalling the thousands of 
convention delegates would present an enormous financial and logistical 
burden and may not prove to be more transparent, democratic, or certain 
than a meeting of the national party executive committee. 
3.  Recommendations 
The national party committees should examine the need for criteria and 
procedures to guide the selection process in the event of the death, 
resignation, or inability of a candidate prior to the general election.  For 
instance, in the case of vacancy caused by death or resignation, the party 
executive committee could meet to select a replacement candidate, in 
consultation with members of Congress and governors from the same 
party,238 and together lay out criteria for replacement candidates.  The 
criteria should vary to account for the many circumstances leading to the 
succession of a presidential candidate and might include national security 
experience, previous exposure to the electorate, or continuity of policy 
 
 235. If the death or resignation of a candidate occurs before any primary elections are 
held, there may still be issues concerning state qualifying periods, names printed on ballots, 
early voting, and absentee voting.  These merit attention but are outside the scope of this 
Clinic. 
 236. But see H.R. REP. NO. 72-345, at 5 (1932) (“A constitutional amendment is not 
necessary to provide for the case of the death of a party nominee before the November 
elections.  Presidential electors, and not the President, are chosen at the November election. 
. . .  The electors, under the present Constitution, would be free to choose a President, 
notwithstanding the death of a party nominee.”) (citation omitted). 
 237. See supra notes 227–34 and accompanying text. 
 238. The national political party conventions are held in the summer, leaving anywhere 
from two to three months between the convention and the national popular election on the 
first Tuesday after the first Monday in November.  Members of Congress and governors are 
usually granted unpledged delegate status and may vote as they wish for the party nominees 
during the party conventions.  Therefore, consultation with these individuals will provide the 
parties with guidance similar to that given by the unpledged delegates at the party 
conventions. 
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positions with the deceased or resigned candidate.  The national party 
executive committee could also create expedited timelines for recalling 
convention delegates. 
Where a running mate has died or withdrawn, we would expect the 
presidential candidate to have a major role in the process of selecting a 
replacement.  Conversely, we would expect the vice presidential running 
mate to receive every appropriate consideration as the replacement 
candidate for a presidential nominee who had died or resigned before the 
general election.  This consideration would have different weight if the 
succession event occurred after the election when the electorate has 
expressed itself. 
The value of transparency suggests that the meetings of the national party 
committees when considering replacement candidates should be open to the 
public and the press and should be televised.  When a national party 
committee takes on the extraordinary role of selecting a replacement 
candidate, the privacy ordinarily afforded to internal party decisions should 
be sacrificed to ensure that the public’s confidence is served by the party’s 
process and the results of its deliberations.239 
D.  Succession After the General Election but Before the Meetings of 
the Electoral College 
Replacement of a candidate, who has died or resigned during the forty-
one day period between the general election on the first Tuesday after the 
first Monday in November, and the casting of votes by the Electoral 
College in mid-December, must respect the fact that the electorate has 
spoken through a national election.  Historically, the national party 
committees have instructed each party’s electors how to cast their electoral 
votes in the event of the death of a candidate.240  However, whether there is 
a legal obligation for a presidential elector to vote according to party 
instructions, including a vote for a replacement nominee, is a question that 
“cannot be answered with any certainty.”241 
Speaking to this contingency, a 1932 House Report interpreting Article 
II, Section 3 and the Twelfth Amendment stated that electors are free 
agents:  “Presidential electors, and not the President, are chosen at the 
 
 239. The Charter and the Bylaws of the Democratic Party provide that “[a]ll meetings of 
the Democratic National Committee, the Executive Committee, and all other official Party 
committees, commissions and bodies shall be open to the public, and votes shall not be taken 
by secret ballot.” DEMOCRATIC NAT’L COMM., supra note 193, at 7.  The Rules of the 
Republican Party provide that “[a]ll meetings of the Republic National Committee and all of 
its committees shall be open meetings, except as provided for by Robert’s Rules of Order,” 
and that “[n]o votes (except elections to office when properly ordered pursuant to the 
provisions of Robert’s Rules of Order) shall be taken by secret ballot in any open meeting of 
the Republic National Committee or of any committee thereof.” REPUBLICAN NAT’L COMM., 
supra note 192, at 6, 7. 
 240. See supra notes 231–33 and accompanying text. 
 241. Memorandum from John D. Feerick to Hon. Richard H. Poff on the “Legal 
Obligation” of a Presidential Elector to Vote for his Party Nominee 1 (Feb. 29, 1968) (on file 
with the Fordham Law Review). 
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November election.  The electors, under the present Constitution, would be 
free to choose a President, notwithstanding the death of a party 
nominee.”242  Under this interpretation, electors cannot be compelled to 
vote for their party’s nominees.243  Several historical instances of 
“unfaithful” electors have not stopped Congress from counting those 
electors’ votes,244 supporting the view that presidential electors are free 
agents.245 
Yet, history and custom also indicate that Congress can invalidate 
electoral votes cast against party instructions in the case of a nominee’s 
death.  Horace Greeley, the 1872 presidential nominee for the Democratic 
and Liberal Republican parties, died on November 29, 1872, a few weeks 
after the national popular election held on November 5, 1872.  Sixty-three 
of the sixty-six presidential electors whom Greeley won voted for other 
candidates in accordance with party instructions.  Congress declined to 
count the three votes from Georgia cast for Greeley against party 
instructions on the ground that electoral votes cast for a dead person246 were 
invalid.247  Congress, however, grouped those three electoral votes with all 
other electoral votes cast for the purpose of determining the number needed 
for an electoral majority.248 
According to the law of some states, presidential electors are held 
accountable if they do not vote as instructed by the party at the meeting of 
the Electoral College.249  More than half the states and the District of 
Columbia have adopted laws aimed at deterring unfaithful electors.250  In a 
majority of these states, an elector pledges to vote for his party’s nominee 
for President and Vice President when the Electoral College meets to cast 
 
 242. H.R. REP. NO. 72-345, at 5 (1932); see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; id. amend. XII. 
 243. See U.S. CONST. amend. XII. 
 244. Over the history of the United States, eighty-two electoral votes have been changed 
on the initiative of the individual elector. See Faithless Electors, FAIRVOTE ARCHIVES, 
http://archive.fairvote.org/faithless.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2012). 
 245. See JOHN C. FORTIER  ET AL., AFTER THE PEOPLE VOTE:  A GUIDE TO THE ELECTORAL 
COLLEGE 8 (John C. Fortier ed., AEI Press 3d ed. 2004); Akhil Reed Amar, Presidents, Vice 
Presidents, and Death:  Closing the Constitution’s Succession Gap, 48 ARK. L. REV. 215, 
230 (1995). 
 246. As recounted in the congressional debates: 
Mr. Hoar objects that the votes reported by the tellers as having been cast by the 
electors of the State of Georgia for Horace Greeley, of New York, cannot lawfully 
be counted because said Horace Greeley, for whom they appear to have been cast, 
was dead at the time said electors assembled to cast their votes, and was not a 
“person” within the meaning of the Constitution, this being an historic fact of 
which the two Houses may properly take notice. 
COUNTING ELECTORAL VOTES:  PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF CONGRESS RELATING TO 
COUNTING THE ELECTORAL VOTES FOR PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED 
STATES, H.R. MISC. DOC. NO. 44-13, at 372 (1877) [hereinafter COUNTING ELECTORAL 
VOTES]. 
 247. See id. at 363–80; see also THOMAS H. NEALE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 22992, 
THE PRESIDENT-ELECT:  SUCCESSION AND DISABILITY ISSUES DURING THE TRANSITION 
PERIOD 3 (2008), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS22992.pdf. 
 248. COUNTING ELECTORAL VOTES, supra note 246, at 407. 
 249. Six states have enacted civil and criminal penalties for faithless electors.  See infra 
Appendix F, Chart 5 for the text of these states’ statutes. 
 250. See infra Appendix F, Chart 5 for the text of these state statutes. 
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its votes.  In the other states, electors are obligated to vote for the winners 
of the state’s popular election.251  Although the courts have never addressed 
the question whether state laws binding electors are enforceable, the courts 
have upheld the constitutionality of these laws.  In Ray v. Blair, the 
Supreme Court held that it is constitutional for states to allow parties to 
require pledges from the electors,252 as the electors are actors on behalf of 
their respective states.253  Moreover, the Court held that a state has the right 
to reject the appointment of an elector who refuses to take the pledge 
required by his party.254 
The result of a national popular election presumably cements in the 
minds of the voters the expectation that the successor to the incoming 
President will be the newly-elected Vice President.  Of course, under the 
Twentieth Amendment, this would not occur until Inauguration Day.255  
Nevertheless, to fulfill voters’ expectations after a presidential election, the 
successful vice presidential nominee should be assured of succession if the 
successful presidential nominee dies or resigns after Election Day, even if 
the electors have the power to cast their votes for someone else in the period 
before Inauguration Day, when the Twentieth Amendment would take 
effect.256  Since voters would expect the electors to vote for the winners of 
each state’s popular vote, the party executive committees should exercise 
their discretion to instruct the electors to vote for the successful vice 
presidential nominee to replace a deceased presidential nominee and to 
recommend, not instruct, a vote by the electors for a new vice presidential 
nominee. 
1.  Recommendations 
In the event of the death of a successful presidential nominee after the 
general election but before the meeting of the Electoral College, we urge 
the parties to adopt rules that automatically elevate the vice presidential 
nominee to the position of presidential nominee.257  In addition, the party 
 
 251. See infra Appendix A. 
 252. Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 231 (1952). 
 253. Id. at 224. 
 254. Id. at 225. 
 255. U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 3. 
 256. The nominees for President and Vice President, of course, are not “elected” on 
Election Day.  Rather, voters elect electors on Election Day, and the electors in turn elect a 
President and Vice President when they meet in December to cast their electoral votes.  Even 
at this point, the nominees for President and Vice President are not yet “elected” because 
Congress must validate and count the electoral votes.  A presidential nominee becomes the 
President-elect and a vice presidential nominee becomes the Vice President elect upon the 
count and declaration of electoral votes by Congress. See generally NEALE, supra note 247, 
at 3–4. But see H.R. REP. NO. 72-345, at 5 (1932) (“[V]otes which were cast for a person, 
who was eligible at the time the votes were cast but who has died before the votes are 
counted by Congress . . . .  must be counted by Congress.”). 
 257. The general notion of elevating the candidate for Vice President of the same party to 
the presidential spot has some support in Congress, although the means identified for 
effectuating this are different from the recommendation in this Report. See Presidential 
Succession Act of 2010, H.R. 6557, 111th Cong. § 3 (2010) (suggesting the elevation of the 
vice presidential candidate of the same party to the presidential slot and the selection of the 
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should issue recommendations to the electors for whom they should vote 
for Vice President.258  To the extent that state laws binding presidential 
electors conflict with the above recommendation, state legislatures should 
amend those statutes and release electors from an obligation to cast an 
electoral vote for a dead nominee.259 
E.  Succession After the Electoral College Vote but Before the Counting and 
Declaration of Electoral Votes by Congress 
Congress is the ultimate arbiter of electoral votes in the event of the death 
or resignation of a successful presidential or vice presidential nominee, or 
both, during the period between the meeting of the Electoral College and 
January 6, when Congress counts the electoral votes.260  The Twelfth 
Amendment states that “[t]he President of the Senate shall . . . open all the 
certificates and the votes shall then be counted.”261  It is unclear whether 
Congress can invalidate electoral votes cast for a presidential or vice 
presidential nominee who dies after the meeting of the Electoral College.262 
As in other pre-inaugural periods, the death or resignation of a 
presidential or vice presidential nominee poses less urgent problems than in 
the case of double death or double resignation.263  There are two outcomes 
if Congress counts the votes for a nominee who has won a majority of the 
electoral votes but dies or resigns after the votes have been cast.  First, in 
the event of death or resignation of the presidential nominee, the vice 
presidential nominee would become President upon taking the presidential 
oath of office on Inauguration Day.264  Second, in the event of the death of 
the vice presidential nominee, the President, after assuming office, must 
nominate a new Vice President pursuant to Section 2 of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment.265 
 
replacement vice presidential candidate via predetermined contingent choices by presidential 
electors). 
 258. Because it would be non-binding, this specific recommendation likely would play an 
important role in limiting the political jockeying by electors to put the election before 
Congress.  If a sufficient number of electors feel forced to vote in a way with which they 
disagree, they may switch their electoral votes for President and thereby deny all of the 
candidates a majority of the electoral votes, throwing the election to the House of 
Representatives.  While a non-binding suggestion carries the authoritative weight of the 
party, the ultimate election of the replacement Vice President should be left up to the 
individual electors. See generally Amar, supra note 245, at 219.  Of course, in the event that 
the presidential election is thrown into the House or the vice presidential election into the 
Senate, Congress would have the authority to disregard party recommendations or 
instructions. See U.S. CONST. amend XX, § 4. 
 259. Apparently, only Wisconsin’s statute regarding presidential electors explicitly 
releases electors from their statutory obligation upon the death of the candidate to whom 
they are pledged. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 7.75 (West 2004). 
 260. U.S. CONST. amend. XII. 
 261. Id.; see also 3 U.S.C. § 15 (2006). 
 262. See H.R. REP. NO. 72-345, at 4–5 (1932) (supporting the proposition that Congress 
must count electoral votes cast for nominees alive at the time of the meeting of the Electoral 
College); Amar, supra note 245, at 218. 
 263. See Amar, supra note 245, at 234. 
 264. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 1. 
 265. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 2. 
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If Congress counts the electoral votes for the successful presidential and 
vice presidential nominees who both had died after the meeting of the 
Electoral College, the next person in the line of succession would become 
Acting President upon taking the oath of office on January 20.266  Thus, if 
the next in line is a member of a different party from that of the deceased 
President-elect and Vice President elect, the result would be a change in the 
party of the President-elect, contrary to the expressed will of the electorate.  
This would present a politically difficult situation for members of Congress 
charged with determining the outcome of a presidential election.  The 
alternative—the refusal of Congress to count votes cast for nominees living 
at the time of the Electoral College vote—would run afoul of the Twelfth 
Amendment. 
1.  Recommendation 
Ultimately, in light of the constitutional mandate in the Twelfth 
Amendment to count all electoral votes and the statutory provision267 
disfavoring objections to electoral votes cast for living nominees, we 
believe that Congress lacks the authority to refuse to count electoral votes 
cast for nominees who were living at the time of the meeting of the 
Electoral College.  Congress must count those votes, regardless of 
subsequent death or resignation.268 
F.  Succession After the Count and Declaration of Electoral Votes by 
Congress but Before Inauguration Day 
As noted previously, the death of either a President-elect or Vice 
President elect during the fourteen days between the congressional count 
and declaration of the electoral votes on January 6 and the inauguration on 
January 20 is addressed by the Twentieth and Twenty-Fifth Amendments, 
respectively. 
How to address the death or resignation or inability of both the President-
elect and Vice President elect during this period may present complications 
if there is no Speaker or President pro tempore.  The 1947 Act contains the 
list of officers eligible to act as President in these circumstances, which 
would trigger the cabinet line of succession.269  However, there may not 
 
 266. 3 U.S.C. § 19 (2006). 
 267. 3 U.S.C. § 15 (2006). 
 268. Furthermore, objections to electoral votes are prohibited by statute if those votes 
were “regularly given by electors whose appointment has been lawfully certified.” Id.  
Although the Greeley precedent would invalidate electoral votes cast for candidates who 
died before the meeting of the Electoral College, this does not mean that Congress can 
invalidate electoral votes cast for qualified nominees who were alive at the time of the 
Electoral College vote.  A “qualified” nominee is one who meets the Article II, Section 1 
requirements to run for President:  “No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of 
the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the 
Office of President; neither shall any Person be eligible to that Office who shall not have 
attained to the Age of thirty-five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the 
United States.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. 
 269. 3 U.S.C. § 19. 
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have been any cabinet nominations made by the outgoing President for the 
Senate to confirm at the request of a newly-elected President.270  Thus, the 
outgoing President’s cabinet members would be in the line of succession to 
act as President if they had not yet resigned. 
Recent practice has been for the President-elect to release the names of 
his cabinet nominees and for Senate committees to hold confirmation 
hearings for uncontroversial nominees before January 20.  The term 
“confirmation hearing” is not fully accurate because there is no presidential 
nominee for the Senate committee to confirm prior to January 20.  Rather, 
Senate committees hold such hearings to decide whether to recommend 
confirmation of the nominees to the full Senate, a vote which usually can 
only occur after the newly-inaugurated President officially nominates his 
cabinet selections, unless the outgoing President has agreed to do so or an 
existing cabinet member continues to serve in the position.271 
1.  Recommendations 
To ensure an orderly transition in a time of crisis, the Clinic recommends 
adopting the Continuity of Government Commission’s recommendation272 
for cooperation between the outgoing and incoming presidential 
administrations to expedite the confirmation of incoming cabinet 
members.273  The outgoing President and Congress have affirmative duties 
in this regard under the Presidential Transition Act of 1963.274  The Clinic 
 
 270. The Constitution provides that only a President, not a President-elect, “shall 
nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . all other 
Officers of the United States . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 271. See Nina Rastogi, Aren’t These Confirmation Hearings a Bit Early?, SLATE (Jan. 15, 
2009, 6:31 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2208771. 
 272. CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, supra note 115, at 49. 
 273. The proposed cooperation between outgoing and incoming administrations to 
expedite the confirmation of cabinet members and secure the continuity of government has 
support in Congress. See Presidential Succession Act of 2010, H.R. 6557, 111th Cong. § 4 
(2010) (supporting the Continuity of Government Commission’s seventh recommendation). 
 274. Act of Mar. 7, 1964, 78 Stat. 153 (1948) (current version at 3 U.S.C. § 102 (2006)) 
(setting out the Presidential Transition Act of 1963 in the notes to 3 U.S.C. § 102).  The 
statute provides as follows: 
The Congress declares it to be the purpose of this Act to promote the orderly 
transfer of the executive power in connection with the expiration of the term of 
office of a President and the inauguration of a new President.  The national interest 
requires that such transitions in the office of President be accomplished so as to 
assure continuity in the faithful execution of the laws and in the conduct of the 
affairs of the Federal Government, both domestic and foreign.  Any disruption 
occasioned by the transfer of the executive power could produce results 
detrimental to the safety and well-being of the United States and its people.  
Accordingly, it is the intent of the Congress that appropriate actions be authorized 
and taken to avoid or minimize any disruption.  In addition to the specific 
provisions contained in this Act directed toward that purpose, it is the intent of the 
Congress that all officers of the Government so conduct the affairs of the 
Government for which they exercise responsibility and authority as (1) to be 
mindful of problems occasioned by transitions in the office of President, (2) to take 
appropriate lawful steps to avoid or minimize disruptions that might be occasioned 
by the transfer of the executive power, and (3) otherwise to promote orderly 
transitions in the office of President.   
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suggests that the outgoing President consider promptly nominating cabinet 
nominees that the President-elect submits to him prior to Inauguration 
Day.275  Congress should confirm as many of these nominees as possible 
prior to Inauguration Day, consistent with the proper discharge of its advice 
and consent responsibility.276  As is now the practice, one or more of these 
individuals should not attend the presidential inauguration and should be 
located away from Washington, D.C., to ensure a line of succession that 
reflects the results of the most recent presidential election.277 
VIII.  SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.  Presidential and Acting Presidential Inability Recommendations 
1.  Statutory Action 
1. Acknowledge that the President or Acting President, upon 
declaration of his own inability, can transfer his powers voluntarily to the 
next in the line of succession in instances of vice presidential inability or 
vacancy. 
2.  Authorize the person next in the line of succession after the Vice 
President, together with a majority of the Cabinet, to declare the inability of 
the President or Acting President in instances of vice presidential inability 
or vacancy. 
2.  Executive Contingency Planning 
3. The President or Acting President should prepare a prospective 
executive declaration of inability at the beginning of his service, in which 
he would define the situations that in his view would render him unable to 
discharge the powers and duties of the presidency in the future and would 
provide that the declaration of his inability goes into effect based upon a 
review process set out by the President or Acting President. 
 
Id.; see also Jack M. Beermann & William P. Marshall, The Constitutional Law of 
Presidential Transitions, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1253, 1276–80 (2006) (discussing the possibility 
that the Take Care Clause places affirmative duties on the outgoing President in relation to 
presidential transitions). 
 275. We believe that such an action by a sitting President would set a positive and 
powerful precedent to be followed by future Presidents.  If this recommendation is not 
adopted, however, the current practice of holding hearings before Inauguration Day should 
continue. 
 276. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 277. We recognize that under a cabinet line of succession, the death, resignation, or 
failure to qualify of the President-elect and Vice President elect before cabinet nominations 
are submitted to the outgoing President is a gap that is not addressed by these 
recommendations.  Under a legislative line of succession, the contingency does not create a 
gap because the Speaker becomes Acting President upon taking the oath of office on January 
20.  Because the Clinic recommends the adoption of a cabinet line of succession, the cabinet 
selection process should be expedited and should be one of the first items addressed by the 
President-elect and the presidential transition team. 
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B.  Vice Presidential Inability Recommendation 
1.  Executive Contingency Planning 
4.  The Vice President should prepare a prospective executive 
declaration of inability at the beginning of his service, in which he would 
define the situations that in his view would render him unable to discharge 
the powers and duties of the vice presidency in the future and would 
provide that the declaration of his inability goes into effect based upon a 
review process set out by the Vice President. 
C.  Line of Succession Recommendations 
1.  Statutory Action 
5. Establish an executive line of succession that runs exclusively 
through the Cabinet after the President and Vice President.  In the case of 
removal, death, or resignation of the President, the cabinet member 
assuming the powers and duties of the presidency should be required to 
resign from the Cabinet.  In a case of inability, the cabinet member 
assuming the powers and duties of the presidency should not be required to 
resign. 
6. In the event an executive line of succession is not adopted, establish 
a binary line of succession that first runs through Congress, and then the 
Cabinet, in instances of death, resignation, and removal.  Successors would 
be required to resign in these circumstances.  The line of succession would 
run solely through the Cabinet in instances of presidential and vice 
presidential inability or failure to qualify.  Under this proposal, when a 
cabinet member assumes the powers and duties of the presidency, that 
cabinet member would not be required to resign. 
7.  Confirm whether acting secretaries are included in the line of 
succession and, if so, either remove them from the line, or alternatively, 
amend the 1947 Act so that acting secretaries can assume the powers and 
duties of the presidency, in the order of the departments’ creation, only after 
succession has passed through all of the cabinet secretaries. 
D.  Pre-inaugural Period Recommendations 
1.  Political Party Rules 
8. In the event of the death or resignation of a presidential candidate 
before the political party conventions, require the parties to hold an open 
meeting to decide which replacement candidate(s) will receive the 
delegates’ votes. 
9. In the event of the death or resignation of a presidential nominee 
between the political party conventions and the general election, require the 
parties to either hold an open meeting to select a replacement candidate or 
recall the convention delegates. 
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10. During the period between the general election and the meeting of 
the Electoral College, provide that the vice presidential candidate replaces a 
deceased or resigned presidential candidate of the same ticket and that the 
candidate’s party issue recommendations to the presidential electors as to a 
new candidate for the office of Vice President. 
2.  Congressional Rules 
11. In the event of the death or resignation of a presidential or vice 
presidential candidate between the meeting of the Electoral College and the 
counting and declaration of the Electoral College votes by Congress, 
require Congress to count votes cast for a candidate if he was alive at the 
time of the Electoral College vote. 
3.  Executive Contingency Planning 
12. During the period between the counting and declaration of Electoral 
College votes by Congress and Inauguration Day, the outgoing President 
should consider promptly nominating any cabinet nominees that the 
President-elect submits to him, and Congress should confirm as many 
nominees as possible prior to Inauguration Day, consistent with the proper 
discharge of Congress’s advice and consent responsibility.  One or more 
newly confirmed cabinet secretaries should remain at a secure location 
outside of Washington, D.C., on Inauguration Day.  This recommendation 
is particularly important in the case of an exclusively executive line of 
succession, as the Clinic recommends. 
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APPENDICES 
A.  Constitutional, Statutory, and Party Rule Provisions278 
1.  Article I, Section 2, Clause 1 
The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen 
every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in 
each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most 
numerous Branch of the State Legislature.279 
2.  Article I, Section 2, Clause 2 
No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the 
Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United 
States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in 
which he shall be chosen.280 
3.  Article I, Section 2, Clause 3 
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several 
States which may be included within this Union, according to their 
respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole 
Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of 
Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons. The 
actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the first Meeting 
of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent Term of 
ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct.  The Number of 
Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty Thousand, but each 
State shall have at Least one Representative; and until such enumeration 
shall be made, the State of New Hampshire shall be entitled to chuse three, 
Massachusetts eight, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations one, 
Connecticut five, New York six, New Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight, 
Delaware one, Maryland six, Virginia ten, North Carolina five, South 
Carolina five, and Georgia three.281 
4.  Article I, Section 2, Clause 4 
When vacancies happen in the Representation from any State, the 
Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fill such 
Vacancies.282 
 
 278. This Appendix contains constitutional provisions without noting whether the 
provision has been subsequently amended. 
 279. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1. 
 280. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 2. 
 281. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. 
 282. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 4. 
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5.  Article I, Section 2, Clause 5 
The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and other 
Officers; and shall have the sole Power of Impeachment.283 
6.  Article I, Section 3, Clause 2 
Immediately after they shall be assembled in Consequence of the first 
Election, they shall be divided as equally as may be into three Classes.  The 
Seats of the Senators of the first Class shall be vacated at the Expiration of 
the second Year, of the second Class at the Expiration of the fourth Year, 
and of the third Class at the Expiration of the sixth Year, so that one third 
may be chosen every second Year; and if Vacancies happen by Resignation, 
or otherwise, during the Recess of the Legislature of any State, the 
Executive thereof may make temporary Appointments until the next 
Meeting of the Legislature, which shall then fill such Vacancies.284 
7.  Article I, Section 3, Clause 3 
No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of 
thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who 
shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be 
chosen.285 
8.  Article I, Section 3, Clause 4 
The Vice President of the United States shall be President of the Senate, 
but shall have no Vote, unless they be equally divided.286 
9.  Article I, Section 3, Clause 5 
The Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and also a President pro 
tempore, in the Absence of the Vice President, or when he shall exercise the 
Office of President of the United States.287 
10.  Article I, Section 3, Clause 6 
The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments.  When 
sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation.  When the 
President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside:  And 
no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the 
Members present.288 
 
 283. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 5. 
 284. Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 2. 
 285. Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 3. 
 286. Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 4. 
 287. Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 5. 
 288. Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. 
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11.  Article I, Section 3, Clause 7 
Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to 
removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of 
honor, Trust or Profit under the United States:  but the Party convicted shall 
nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and 
Punishment, according to Law.289 
12.  Article I, Section 5, Clause 1 
Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and 
Qualifications of its own Members, and a Majority of each shall constitute a 
Quorum to do Business; but a smaller Number may adjourn from day to 
day, and may be authorized to compel the Attendance of absent Members, 
in such Manner, and under such Penalties as each House may provide.290 
13.  Article I, Section 5, Clause 2 
Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its 
Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two 
thirds, expel a Member.291 
14.  Article I, Section 5, Clause 3 
Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to 
time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment 
require Secrecy; and the Yeas and Nays of the Members of either House on 
any question shall, at the Desire of one fifth of those Present, be entered on 
the Journal.292 
15.  Article I, Section 5, Clause 4 
Neither House, during the Session of Congress, shall, without the 
Consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other 
Place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting.293 
16.  Article II, Section 1, Clause 1 
The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of 
America.  He shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years, and, 
together with the Vice President, chosen for the same Term, be elected, as 
follows294 
 
 289. Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 7. 
 290. Id. art. I, § 5, cl. 1. 
 291. Id. art. I, § 5, cl. 2. 
 292. Id. art. I, § 5, cl. 3. 
 293. Id. art. I, § 5, cl. 4. 
 294. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
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17.  Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 
Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may 
direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and 
Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress:  but no 
Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit 
under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector.295 
18.  Article II, Section 1, Clause 4 
The Congress may determine the Time of chusing the Electors, and the 
Day on which they shall give their Votes; which Day shall be the same 
throughout the United States.296 
19.  Article II, Section 1, Clause 5 
No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United 
States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to 
the Office of President; neither shall any Person be eligible to that Office 
who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty five Years, and been 
fourteen Years a Resident within the United States.297 
20.  Article II, Section 1, Clause 6 
In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, 
Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said 
Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may 
by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, 
both of the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then 
act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability 
be removed, or a President shall be elected.298 
21.  Article II, Section 1, Clause 7 
The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services, a 
Compensation, which shall neither be encreased nor diminished during the 
Period for which he shall have been elected, and he shall not receive within 
that Period any other Emolument from the United States, or any of them.299 
22.  Article II, Section 1, Clause 8 
Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, he shall take the 
following Oath or Affirmation:—“I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I 
will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will 
 
 295. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. 
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to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of 
the United States.”300 
23.  Article II, Section 3 
He shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State 
of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he 
shall judge necessary and expedient; he may, on extraordinary Occasions, 
convene both Houses, or either of them, and in Case of Disagreement 
between them, with Respect to the Time of Adjournment, he may adjourn 
them to such Time as he shall think proper; he shall receive Ambassadors 
and other public Ministers; he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed, and shall Commission all the Officers of the United States.301 
24.  Article II, Section 4 
The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, 
shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, 
Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.302 
25.  Twelfth Amendment 
The Electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote by ballot for 
President and Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shall not be an 
inhabitant of the same state with themselves; they shall name in their ballots 
the person voted for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for 
as Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for 
as President, and of all persons voted for as Vice-President, and of the 
number of votes for each, which lists they shall sign and certify, and 
transmit sealed to the seat of the government of the United States, directed 
to the President of the Senate;—The President of the Senate shall, in the 
presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the 
certificates and the votes shall then be counted;—The person having the 
greatest number of votes for President, shall be the President, if such 
number be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed; and if no 
person have such majority, then from the persons having the highest 
numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for as President, the 
House of Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the 
President.  But in choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by states, 
the representation from each state having one vote; a quorum for this 
purpose shall consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the states, 
and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to a choice.  And if the 
House of Representatives shall not choose a President whenever the right of 
choice shall devolve upon them, before the fourth day of March next 
following, then the Vice-President shall act as President, as in the case of 
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the death or other constitutional disability of the President.—The person 
having the greatest number of votes as Vice-President, shall be the Vice-
President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors 
appointed, and if no person have a majority, then from the two highest 
numbers on the list, the Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum 
for the purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number of Senators, 
and a majority of the whole number shall be necessary to a choice.  But no 
person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be eligible 
to that of Vice-President of the United States.303 
26.  Twentieth Amendment 
SECTION 1.  The terms of the President and Vice President shall end at 
noon on the 20th day of January, and the terms of Senators and 
Representatives at noon on the 3d day of January, of the years in which 
such terms would have ended if this article had not been ratified; and the 
terms of their successors shall then begin.  
SEC. 2.  The Congress shall assemble at least once in every year, and 
such meeting shall begin at noon on the 3d day of January, unless they shall 
by law appoint a different day. 
SEC. 3.  If, at the time fixed for the beginning of the term of the 
President, the President elect shall have died, the Vice President elect shall 
become President.  If a President shall not have been chosen before the time 
fixed for the beginning of his term, or if the President elect shall have failed 
to qualify, then the Vice President elect shall act as President until a 
President shall have qualified; and the Congress may by law provide for the 
case wherein neither a President elect nor a Vice President elect shall have 
qualified, declaring who shall then act as President, or the manner in which 
one who is to act shall be selected, and such person shall act accordingly 
until a President or Vice President shall have qualified. 
SEC. 4. The Congress may by law provide for the case of the death of any 
of the persons from whom the House of Representatives may choose a 
President whenever the right of choice shall have devolved upon them, and 
for the case of the death of any of the persons from whom the Senate may 
choose a Vice President whenever the right of choice shall have devolved 
upon them. 
SEC. 5. Sections 1 and 2 shall take effect on the 15th day of October 
following the ratification of this article. 
SEC. 6. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified 
as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of 
the several States within seven years from the date of its submission.304 
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27.  Twenty-Fifth Amendment 
SECTION 1. In case of the removal of the President from office or of his 
death or resignation, the Vice President shall become President. 
SEC. 2. Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the Vice President, 
the President shall nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon 
confirmation by a majority vote of both Houses of Congress. 
SEC. 3. Whenever the President transmits to the President pro tempore of 
the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written 
declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his 
office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, 
such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice President as Acting 
President. 
SEC. 4. Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either the 
principal officers of the executive departments or of such other body as 
Congress may by law provide, transmit to the President pro tempore of the 
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written 
declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties 
of his office, the Vice President shall immediately assume the powers and 
duties of the office as Acting President. 
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President pro tempore of 
the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written 
declaration that no inability exists, he shall resume the powers and duties of 
his office unless the Vice President and a majority of either the principal 
officers of the executive department or of such other body as Congress may 
by law provide, transmit within four days to the President pro tempore of 
the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written 
declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties 
of his office.  Thereupon Congress shall decide the issue, assembling within 
forty-eight hours for that purpose if not in session.  If the Congress, within 
twenty-one days after receipt of the latter written declaration, or, if 
Congress is not in session, within twenty-one days after Congress is 
required to assemble, determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the 
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the 
Vice President shall continue to discharge the same as Acting President; 
otherwise, the President shall resume the powers and duties of his office.305 
28.  Presidential Succession Act of 1792 
Chap. VIII.—An Act relative to the Election of a President and Vice 
President of the United States, and declaring the Officer who shall act as 
President in case of Vacancies in the offices both of President and Vice 
President. 
SECTION 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That except in case of 
an election of a President and Vice President of the United States, prior to 
 
 305. Id. amend. XXV. 
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the ordinary period as herein after specified, electors shall be appointed in 
each state for the election of a President and Vice President of the United 
States, within thirty-four days preceding the first Wednesday in December, 
one thousand seven hundred and ninety-two, and within thirty-four days 
preceding the first Wednesday in December in every fourth year succeeding 
the last election, which electors shall be equal to the number of Senators 
and Representatives, to which the several states may by law be entitled at 
the time, when the President and Vice President, thus to be chosen, should 
come into office:  Provided always, That where no apportionment of 
Representatives shall have been made after any enumeration, at the time of 
choosing electors, then the number of electors shall be according to the 
existing apportionment of Senators and Representatives. 
SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That the electors shall meet and give 
their votes on the said first Wednesday in December, at such place in each 
state as shall be directed, by the legislature thereof; and the electors in each 
state shall make and sign three certificates of all the votes by them given, 
and shall seal up the same certifying on each that a list of the votes of such 
state for President and Vice President is contained therein, and shall by 
writing under their hands, or under the hands of a majority of them, appoint 
a person to take charge of and deliver to the President of the Senate, at the 
seat of government, before the first Wednesday in January then next 
ensuing, one of the said certificates, and the said electors shall forthwith 
forward by the post-office to the President of the Senate, at the seat of 
government, one other of the said certificates, and shall forthwith cause the 
other of the said certificates to be delivered to the judge of that district in 
which the said electors shall assemble. 
SEC. 3. And be it further enacted, That the executive authority of each 
state shall cause three lists of the names of the electors of such state to be 
made and certified and to be delivered to the electors on or before the said 
first Wednesday in December, and the said electors shall annex one of the 
said lists to each of the lists of their votes. 
SEC. 4. And be it further enacted, That if a list of votes, from any state, 
shall not have been received at the seat of government on the said first 
Wednesday in January, that then the Secretary of State shall send a special 
messenger to the district judge in whose custody such list shall have been 
lodged, who shall forthwith transmit the same to the seat of government. 
SEC. 5. And be it further enacted, That Congress shall be in session on 
the second Wednesday in February, one thousand seven hundred and 
ninety-three, and on the second Wednesday in February succeeding every 
meeting of the electors, and the said certificates, or so many of them as shall 
have been received, shall then be opened, the votes counted, and the 
persons who shall fill the offices of President and Vice President 
ascertained and declared, agreeably to the constitution. 
SEC. 6. And be it further enacted, That in case there shall be no President 
of the Senate at the seat of government on the arrival of the persons 
entrusted with the lists of the votes of the electors, then such persons shall 
deliver the lists of votes in their custody into the office of the Secretary of 
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State, to be safely kept and delivered over as soon as may be, to the 
President of the Senate. 
SEC. 7. And be it further enacted, That the persons appointed by the 
electors to deliver the lists of votes to the President of the Senate, shall be 
allowed on the delivery of the said lists twenty-five cents for every mile of 
the estimated distance by the most usual road, from the place of meeting of 
the electors, to the seat of government of the United States. 
SEC. 8. And be it further enacted, That if any person appointed to deliver 
the votes of the electors to the President of the Senate, shall after accepting 
of his appointment neglect to perform the services required of him by this 
act, he shall forfeit the sum of one thousand dollars. 
SEC. 9. And be it further enacted, That in case of removal, death, 
resignation or inability both of the President and Vice President of the 
United States, the President of the Senate pro tempore, and in case there 
shall be no President of the Senate, then the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, for the time being shall act as President of the United 
States until the disability be removed or a President shall be elected. 
SEC. 10. And be it further enacted, That whenever the offices of 
President and Vice President shall both become vacant, the Secretary of 
State shall forthwith cause a notification thereof to be made to the executive 
of every state, and shall also cause the same to be published in at least one 
of the newspapers printed in each state, specifying that electors of the 
President of the United States shall be appointed or chosen in the several 
states within thirty-four days preceding the first Wednesday in December 
then next ensuing:  Provided, There shall be the space of two months 
between the date of such notification and the said first Wednesday in 
December, but if there shall not be the space of two months between the 
date of such notification and the first Wednesday in December; and if the 
term for which the President and Vice President last in office were elected 
shall not expire on the third day of March next ensuing, then the Secretary 
of State shall specify in the notification that the electors shall be appointed 
or chosen within thirty-four days preceding the first Wednesday in 
December in the year next ensuing, within which time the electors shall 
accordingly be appointed or chosen, and the electors shall meet and give 
their votes on the said first Wednesday in December, and the proceedings 
and duties of the said electors and others shall be pursuant to the directions 
prescribed in this act. 
SEC. 11. And be it further enacted, That the only evidence of a refusal to 
accept or of a resignation of the office of President or Vice President, shall 
be an instrument in writing declaring the same, and subscribed by the 
person refusing to accept or resigning, as the case may be, and delivered 
into the office of the Secretary of State. 
SEC. 12. And be it further enacted, That the term of four years for which 
a President and Vice President shall be elected shall in all cases commence 
on the fourth day of March next succeeding the day on which the votes of 
the electors shall have been given. 
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APPROVED, March 1, 1792.306 
29.  Presidential Succession Act of 1886 
CHAP. 4.—An act to provide for the performance of the duties of the 
office of President in case of the removal, death, resignation, or inability 
both of the President and Vice-President. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled, That in case of removal, death, 
resignation, or inability of both the President and Vice-President of the 
United States, the Secretary of State, or if there be none, or in case of his 
removal, death, resignation, or inability, then the Secretary of the Treasury, 
or if there be none, or in case of his removal, death, resignation, or inability, 
then the Secretary of War, or if there be none, or in case of his removal, 
death, resignation, or inability, then the Attorney-General, or if there be 
none, or in case of his removal, death, resignation, or inability, then the 
Postmaster-General, or if there be none, or in case of his removal, death, 
resignation, or inability, then the Secretary of the Navy, or if there be none, 
or in case of his removal, death, resignation, or inability, then the Secretary 
of the Interior, shall act as President until the disability of the President or 
Vice-President is removed or a President shall be elected:  Provided, That 
whenever the powers and duties of the office of President of the United 
States shall devolve upon any of the persons named herein, if Congress be 
not then in session, or if it would not meet in accordance with law within 
twenty days thereafter, it shall be the duty of the person upon whom said 
powers and duties shall devolve to issue a proclamation convening 
Congress in extraordinary session, giving twenty days’ notice of the time of 
meeting. 
SEC. 2. That the preceding section shall only be held to describe and 
apply to such officers as shall have been appointed by the advice and 
consent of the Senate to the offices therein named, and such as are eligible 
to the office of President under the Constitution, and not under 
impeachment by the House of Representatives of the United States at the 
time the powers and duties of the office shall devolve upon them 
respectively. 
SEC. 3. That sections one hundred and forty-six, one hundred and forty-
seven, one hundred and forty-eight, one hundred and forty-nine, and one 
hundred and fifty of the Revised Statutes are hereby repealed. 
Approved, January 19, 1886.307 
30.  Presidential Succession Act of 1947 (As Amended) 
§ 19. Vacancy in offices of both President and Vice President; officers 
eligible to act 
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(a)(1) If, by reason of death, resignation, removal from office, inability, 
or failure to qualify, there is neither a President nor Vice President to 
discharge the powers and duties of the office of President, then the Speaker 
of the House of Representatives shall, upon his resignation as Speaker and 
as Representative in Congress, act as President. 
(2) The same rule shall apply in the case of the death, resignation, 
removal from office, or inability of an individual acting as President under 
this subsection. 
(b) If, at the time when under subsection (a) of this section a Speaker is 
to begin the discharge of the powers and duties of the office of President, 
there is no Speaker, or the Speaker fails to qualify as Acting President, then 
the President pro tempore of the Senate shall, upon his resignation as 
President pro tempore and as Senator, act as President. 
(c) An individual acting as President under subsection (a) or subsection 
(b) of this section shall continue to act until the expiration of the then 
current Presidential term, except that— 
(1) if his discharge of the powers and duties of the office is founded in 
whole or in part on the failure of both the President-elect and the Vice-
President-elect to qualify, then he shall act only until a President or Vice 
President qualifies; and 
(2) if his discharge of the powers and duties of the office is founded in 
whole or in part on the inability of the President or Vice President, then he 
shall act only until the removal of the disability of one of such individuals. 
(d)(1) If, by reason of death, resignation, removal from office, inability, 
or failure to qualify, there is no President pro tempore to act as President 
under subsection (b) of this section, then the officer of the United States 
who is highest on the following list, and who is not under disability to 
discharge the powers and duties of the office of President shall act as 
President:  Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of 
Defense, Attorney General, Secretary of the Interior, Secretary of 
Agriculture, Secretary of Commerce, Secretary of Labor, Secretary of 
Health and Human Services, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, 
Secretary of Transportation, Secretary of Energy, Secretary of Education, 
Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Secretary of Homeland Security. 
(2) An individual acting as President under this subsection shall continue 
so to do until the expiration of the then current Presidential term, but not 
after a qualified and prior-entitled individual is able to act, except that the 
removal of the disability of an individual higher on the list contained in 
paragraph (1) of this subsection or the ability to qualify on the part of an 
individual higher on such list shall not terminate his service. 
(3) The taking of the oath of office by an individual specified in the list in 
paragraph (1) of this subsection shall be held to constitute his resignation 
from the office by virtue of the holding of which he qualifies to act as 
President. 
(e) Subsections (a), (b), and (d) of this section shall apply only to such 
officers as are eligible to the office of President under the Constitution. 
Subsection (d) of this section shall apply only to officers appointed, by and 
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with the advice and consent of the Senate, prior to the time of the death, 
resignation, removal from office, inability, or failure to qualify, of the 
President pro tempore, and only to officers not under impeachment by the 
House of Representatives at the time the powers and duties of the office of 
President devolve upon them. 
(f) During the period that any individual acts as President under this 
section, his compensation shall be at the rate then provided by law in the 
case of the President.308 
31.  Rule Number 9 of the Republican Party 
Filling Vacancies in Nominations 
(a) The Republican National Committee is hereby authorized and 
empowered to fill any and all vacancies which may occur by reason of 
death, declination, or otherwise of the Republican candidate for President of 
the United States or the Republican candidate for Vice President of the 
United States, as nominated by the national convention, or the Republican 
National Committee may reconvene the national convention for the purpose 
of filling any such vacancies. 
(b) In voting under this rule, the Republican National Committee 
members representing any state shall be entitled to cast the same number of 
votes as said state was entitled to cast at the national convention. 
(c) In the event that the members of the Republican National Committee 
from any state shall not be in agreement in the casting of votes hereunder, 
the votes of such state shall be divided equally, including fractional votes, 
among the members of the Republican National Committee present or 
voting by proxy. 
(d) No candidate shall be chosen to fill any such vacancy except upon 
receiving a majority of the votes entitled to be cast in the election.309 
32.  Selected Sections of the Charter and Bylaws of the Democratic Party 
The Charter 
 
ARTICLE 3—Democratic National Committee 
Section 1. The Democratic National Committee shall have general 
responsibility for the affairs of the Democratic Party between National 
Conventions, subject to the provisions of this Charter and to the Resolutions 
or other actions of the National Convention.  This responsibility shall 
include: 
. . . . 
(c) filling vacancies in the nominations for the office of President and 
Vice President. . . . 
 
 
 308. Presidential Succession Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-199, 61 Stat. 380 (codified as 
amended at 3 U.S.C. § 19 (2006)). 
 309. REPUBLICAN NAT’L COMM., supra note 192, at 8–9. 
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ARTICLE 9—General Provisions 
Section 8. To assure that the Democratic nominee for the office of 
President of the United States is selected by a fair and equitable process, the 
Democratic National Committee may adopt such statements of policy as it 
deems appropriate with respect to the timing of Presidential nominating 
processes and shall work with state Parties to accomplish the objectives of 
such statements. 
Section 12. All meetings of the Democratic National Committee, the 
Executive Committee, and all other official Party committees, commissions 
and bodies shall be open to the public, and votes shall not be taken by secret 
ballot. 
 
The Bylaws 
 
ARTICLE 2—Democratic National Committee 
Section 8. Attendance and Quorum and Voting. 
 (g) Proxy voting shall be permitted.  Proxies may be either general or 
limited and either instructed or uninstructed.  All proxies shall be in writing 
and transferable if so specified.  No DNC member may at any one time hold 
or exercise proxies for more than one other DNC member; provided, 
however, that proxy voting shall not be permitted in voting to fill a vacancy 
on the National ticket.310 
B.  Executive Declarations of Inability, Letter Agreements, and Section 3 
Letter Precedents 
1.  Past Presidential Letter Agreements 
President Eisenhower and Vice President Nixon entered into a letter 
agreement that provided for President Eisenhower or Vice President Nixon 
to initiate a transfer of presidential powers to Vice President Nixon on a 
temporary basis.311  President Eisenhower would retain the right to resume 
those powers upon a simple declaration that he was ready to do so.312 
Later administrations followed President Eisenhower and Vice President 
Nixon’s precedent by entering into letters providing for instances of 
presidential inability.  They existed between President Kennedy and Vice 
President Johnson,313 and between President Johnson and Speaker of the 
House of Representatives John McCormack,314 because President 
Johnson’s ascension to the presidency following President Kennedy’s 
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 311. Letter from Pres. Dwight D. Eisenhower to Vice Pres. Richard Milhous Nixon (Feb. 
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assassination left the vice presidency vacant.  President Reagan and Vice 
President Bush also executed declarations of inability pursuant to Section 3 
of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.315  Several of these letters appear below. 
a.  Letter Agreement During the Eisenhower Administration 
Letter from President Eisenhower to Vice President Nixon, February 5, 
1958: 
Dear Dick:  As both of us know, there are differences of opinion as to the 
exact meaning of that feature of the Constitution which provides that the 
Vice President will have the powers and the duties of the President when 
the President is unable to discharge them.  There is uncertainty expressed 
as to how there could be determined the degree of the President’s 
disability that would justify transferring his powers and duties to the Vice 
President. 
An inability to discharge properly the powers and duties of the Presidency 
could come about in several ways.  One would be disease or accident that 
would prevent the President from making important decisions.  Such 
periods of inability could be prolonged but, even if only the length of 
hours, could require action should there be any question of real 
importance and urgency to be decided without delay. 
Another form of inability could come about through a failure of 
communications between the President and the Capital at any time that he 
might be absent therefrom.  A somewhat similar case might be an 
uncertainty about the whereabouts of the President, occasioned by a 
forced landing of the Presidential airplane. 
Other types of inability could unquestionably arise. 
There have been many proposals for clarifying this situation, some by 
law, others by Constitutional Amendment.  My own opinion is that it 
would be difficult to write any law or an Amendment in such fashion as to 
take care of every contingency that might possibly occur.  While the great 
area of uncertainty now existing could and should be drastically reduced, 
I am not sure that even the most carefully devised plan, objectively 
arrived at, could remove doubt in every instance. 
However, it seems to me that so far as you and I are concerned in the 
offices we now respectively hold, and particularly in view of our mutual 
confidence and friendship, we could do much to eliminate all these 
uncertainties by agreeing, in advance, as to the proper steps to be taken at 
any time when I might become unable to discharge the powers and duties 
of the President.  Based upon my studies of the history of the Constitution 
 
 315. Letter from Pres. Ronald Reagan to Sen. Strom Thurmond, Pres. pro tempore of the 
Senate and Rep. Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House (July 13, 1985) [hereinafter 
Reagan Letter to Sen. Thurmond], available at http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/
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President Pro Tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House on the Discharge of the 
President’s Powers and Duties During His Surgery, 2 PUB. PAPERS 919 (July 13, 1985), 
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accompanying text. 
78 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
and upon the advice of Constitutional authorities, I am of the opinion that 
this agreement would not in any way contravene the clear intention of the 
Constitution; on the contrary, it is rather a statement of our common 
intention to act completely according to the spirit of this portion of the 
Constitution. 
Through such an agreement, we can assure that the best interests of the 
country would not be damaged by the doubts and indecisions that have at 
times existed in similar cases in the past.  Moreover with this advance 
agreement, you could without personal or official embarrassment, make 
any decisions that seemed to you proper in cases where my ability to 
discharge my powers and duties may be in serious question. 
This note, which I have been planning for some time to write, is merely to 
confirm, in writing, the gist of the agreement that you and I have reached 
between ourselves. 
It is simply stated: 
In any instance in which I could clearly recognize my own inability to 
discharge the powers and duties of the Presidency I would, of course, so 
inform you and you would act accordingly. 
With the exception of this one kind of case, you will be the individual 
explicitly and exclusively responsible for determining whether there is 
any inability of mine that makes it necessary for you to discharge the 
powers and duties of the Presidency, and you will decide the exact timing 
of the devolution of this responsibility on you.  I would hope that you 
would consult with the Secretary of State, Governor Adams and General 
Heaton, and if feasible, with medical experts assembled by him, but the 
decision will be yours only. 
I will be the one to determine if and when it is proper for me to resume 
the powers and duties of the Presidency. 
I know, of course, that you would make any decision for taking over the 
presidential powers and duties only when you feel it necessary.  I have no 
fear that you, for any fleeting or inconsequential purpose, would do so 
and thereby create confusion in the government.  Circumstances would 
have to guide you, and if the imminence or occurrence of any world or 
domestic emergency demanded, you would have to act promptly. 
There is always the possibility that, as in the cases of Garfield and 
Wilson, I might, without warning, become personally incapable of 
making a decision at the moment when it should be made.  The existence 
of this agreement recognizing your clear and exclusive responsibility for 
deciding upon the inability of the President to perform his duties and 
exercise his powers will remove any necessity or desire on the part of 
friends and staffs to impede the right and authority of the Vice President 
in reaching his decision on the matter. 
There is only one final thought I would like to add. If any disability of 
mine should, in the judgment of any group of distinguished medical 
authorities that you might assemble, finally become of a permanent 
character, I would, of course, accept their decision and promptly resign 
my position.  But if I were not able to do so, and the same group of 
consultants would so state, then you would take over not only the powers 
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and duties but the perquisites of the Presidency, including the White 
House itself.  In temporary cases of my “inability,” we agree that you 
should act for the necessary period in your capacity as Vice President and, 
additionally, as “Acting President.” 
With warm regard, As ever316 
Letter Agreement from President Eisenhower to Vice President Nixon 
The President and the Vice President have agreed that the following 
procedures are in accord with the purposes and provisions of Article 2, 
Section 1, of the Constitution, dealing with Presidential inability.  They 
believe that these procedures, which are intended to apply to themselves 
only, are in no sense outside or contrary to the Constitution but are 
consistent with its present provisions and implement its clear intent. 
 (1) In the event of inability the President would—if possible—so 
inform the Vice President, and the Vice President would serve as Acting 
President, exercising the powers and duties of the office until the inability 
had ended. 
 (2) In the event of an inability which would prevent the President from 
so communicating with the Vice President, the Vice President, after such 
consultation as seems to him appropriate under the circumstances, would 
decide upon the devolution of the powers and duties of the Office and 
would serve as Acting President until the inability had ended. 
 (3) The President, in either event, would determine when the inability 
had ended and at that time would resume the full exercise of the powers 
and duties of the Office.317 
b.  Letter Agreement During the Kennedy Administration 
In August 1961 President Kennedy and Vice President Johnson agreed to 
follow the procedures set forth below: 
 (1) In the event of inability the President would—if possible—so 
inform the Vice President, and the Vice President would serve as Acting 
President, exercising the power and duties of the Office until the inability 
had ended. 
 (2) In the event of an inability which would prevent the President from 
so communicating with the Vice President, the Vice President, after such 
consultation as seems to him appropriate under the circumstances, would 
decide upon the devolution of the powers and duties of the Office and 
would serve as Acting President until the inability had ended. 
 (3) The President, in either event, would determine when the inability 
had ended and at that time would resume the full exercise of the powers 
and duties of the Office.318 
 
 316. Letter from Pres. Dwight D. Eisenhower to Vice Pres. Richard Milhous Nixon, 
supra note 311. 
 317. See White House Statement on Agreement Between the President and the Vice 
President as to Procedures in the Event of Presidential Disability, supra note 311, at 196. 
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c.  Letter Agreement From President Johnson to 
Speaker John W. McCormack 
President Lyndon Johnson sent a signed letter agreement to Speaker 
McCormack on December 23, 1963, which Speaker McCormack signed as 
well.  It was accompanied by a fifteen-page explanatory memorandum.  The 
letter and memorandum were not released publicly.  The Clinic obtained a 
copy of the letter from the Lyndon Johnson Presidential Library. 
December 23, 1963 
Dear Mr. Speaker: 
Confirming our oral agreement regarding the procedures to be followed in 
the event of my inability to exercise the powers and duties of the 
Presidency, I am reducing the agreement to writing and would appreciate 
your signing the original of this letter and returning it to me for 
safekeeping in the Presidential files.  Enclosed for your use is a signed 
duplicate original.  The terms of the agreement are as follows: 
1. In the event of inability, the President would—if possible—so inform 
the Speaker of the House, and the Speaker of the House would serve as 
Acting President, exercising the powers and duties of the Office until the 
inability had ended. 
2. In the event of an inability which would prevent the President from 
communicating with the Speaker of the House, the Speaker of the House, 
after such consultation as seemed to him appropriate under the 
circumstances, would decide upon the devolution of the powers and duties 
of the Office and would serve as Acting President until the inability had 
ended. 
3. The President, in either event, would determine when the inability had 
ended and at that time would resume the full exercise of the powers and 
duties of the Office. 
4. After being informed by the President of his inability or, in the event of 
an inability which would prevent the President from communicating with 
the Speaker of the House, after the latter satisfies himself that such 
inability exists, the Speaker of the House will resign as Speaker and as 
Representative in Congress before undertaking to act as President. 
Sincerely, 
LYNDON B. JOHNSON319 
President Johnson did not enter into a signed letter agreement with Vice 
President Hubert H. Humphrey, but instead had an oral agreement.320 
 
 318. White House Statement and Text of Agreement Between the President and the Vice 
President on Procedures in the Event of Presidential Inability, PUB. PAPERS 561 (Aug. 10, 
1961) , available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=8277. 
 319. Letter, President Johnson to Speaker John W. McCormack, 12/23/63, Ex FG 1, 
WHCF, Box 9, LBJ Library. 
 320. See Arthur Crock, In the Nation:  The Johnson-Humphrey Agreement Mystery, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 27, 1965, at 28 (noting a statement by the White House that, sometime before the 
Inauguration, President Johnson and Vice President Humphrey “reached a verbal 
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d.  Letter Declarations During the Reagan Administration 
President Reagan signed a letter to the President pro tempore and the 
Speaker of the House in 1985, which transferred presidential power to Vice 
President Bush, pursuant to their longstanding agreement, for the duration 
of his intestinal surgery. 
 
July 13, 1985 
Dear Mr. President:  (Dear Mr. Speaker:) 
 I am about to undergo surgery during which time I will be briefly and 
temporarily incapable of discharging the Constitutional powers and duties 
of the Office of the President of the United States. 
 After consultation with my Counsel and the Attorney General, I am 
mindful of the provisions of Section 3 of the 25th Amendment to the 
Constitution and of the uncertainties of its application to such brief and 
temporary periods of incapacity.  I do not believe that the drafters of this 
Amendment intended its application to situations such as the instant one. 
 Nevertheless, consistent with my longstanding arrangement with Vice 
President George Bush, and not intending to set a precedent binding 
anyone privileged to hold this Office in the future, I have determined and 
it is my intention and direction that Vice President George Bush shall 
discharge those powers and duties in my stead commencing with the 
administration of anesthesia to me in this instance. 
 I shall advise you and the Vice President when I determine that I am 
able to resume the discharge of the Constitutional powers and duties of 
this Office. 
 May God bless this Nation and us all. 
 Sincerely, 
 RONALD REAGAN321 
Upon resuming his powers and duties following surgery, President 
Reagan’s letter to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker 
of the House was as follows: 
 
July 13, 1985 
Dear Mr. President:  (Dear Mr. Speaker:) 
 Following up on my letter to you of this date, please be advised I am 
able to resume the discharge of the Constitutional powers and duties of 
the Office of the President of the United States.  I have informed the Vice 
 
understanding to extend the same arrangement for the continuity of executive government 
during President Johnson’s tenure that was first put in writing in the Eisenhower 
Administration.”); see also FEERICK, supra note 138, at 229 (noting that “[t]he oral nature of 
[President Johnson’s] agreement with Humphrey received some criticism”). 
 321. Reagan Letter to Sen. Thurmond, supra note 315.  After he left office, President 
Reagan acknowledged invoking the Twenty-Fifth Amendment at this time. See REAGAN, 
supra note 31, at 500. 
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President of my determination and my resumption of those powers and 
duties. 
 Sincerely, 
 RONALD REAGAN322 
2.  Letters Pursuant to Section 3 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment 
a.  Letters During the George W. Bush Administration 
President George W. Bush sent two letters to the President pro tempore 
and the Speaker of the House temporarily transferring his powers to Vice 
President Cheney during his presidency, once in 2002 and again in 2007.  
The text of these letters follows: 
 
June 29, 2002 
Dear Mr. Speaker:  (Dear Mr. President:) 
 As my staff has previously communicated to you, I will undergo this 
morning a routine medical procedure requiring sedation.  In view of 
present circumstances, I have determined to transfer temporarily my 
Constitutional powers and duties to the Vice President during the brief 
period of the procedure and recovery. 
 Accordingly, in accordance with the provisions of Section 3 of the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, this letter 
shall constitute my written declaration that I am unable to discharge the 
Constitutional powers and duties of the office of President of the United 
States.  Pursuant to Section 3, the Vice President shall discharge those 
powers and duties as Acting President until I transmit to you a written 
declaration that I am able to resume the discharge of those powers and 
duties. 
 Sincerely, 
 GEORGE W. BUSH323 
 
June 29, 2002 
Dear Mr. Speaker:  (Dear Mr. President:) 
 In accordance with the provisions of Section 3 of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, this letter shall constitute 
my written declaration that I am presently able to resume the discharge of 
the Constitutional powers and duties of the office of President of the 
United States.  With the transmittal of this letter, I am resuming those 
powers and duties effective immediately. 
 Sincerely, 
 GEORGE W. BUSH324 
 
 322. Reagan Letter, supra note 29, at 919. 
 323. 2002 Bush Letter on Temporary Transfer of Powers, supra note 34, at 1083. 
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July 21, 2007 
Dear Madame Speaker:  (Dear Mr. President:) 
This morning I will undergo a routine medical procedure requiring 
sedation.  In view of present circumstances, I have determined to transfer 
temporarily my Constitutional powers and duties to the Vice President 
during the brief period of the procedure and recovery. 
In accordance with the provisions of Section 3 of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, this letter shall constitute 
my written declaration that I am unable to discharge the Constitutional 
powers and duties of the office of the President of the United States.  
Pursuant to Section 3, the Vice President shall discharge those powers and 
duties as Acting President until I transmit to you a written declaration that 
I am able to resume the discharge of those powers and duties. 
Sincerely, 
GEORGE W. BUSH325 
 
July 21, 2007 
Dear Madame Speaker:  (Dear Mr. President:) 
In accordance with the provisions of Section 3 of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, this letter shall constitute 
my written declaration that I am presently able to resume the discharge of 
the Constitutional powers and duties of the office of the President of the 
United States.  With the transmittal of this letter, I am resuming those 
powers and duties effective immediately. 
Sincerely, 
GEORGE W. BUSH326 
3.  Sample Executive Declarations of Inability 
The Clinic has prepared a sample presidential executive declaration of 
inability and a sample vice presidential executive declaration of inability. 
a.  Sample Presidential Executive Declaration of Inability 
To the President pro tempore and the Speaker of the House: 
As you are aware, there is currently no constitutional or legal provision by 
which my inability can be declared in the event of a vice presidential 
vacancy or vice presidential inability.  Through this document, I wish to 
express situations which, if they were to arise, would result in my view in 
a declaration of my inability.  This advance declaration, by providing for 
 
 324. 2002 Bush Letter Resuming Powers, supra note 35, at 1084. 
 325. 2007 Bush Letter on Temporary Transfer of Powers, supra note 34, at 1003. 
 326. 2007 Bush Letter Resuming Powers, supra note 35, at 1004. 
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the declaration of my inability in described circumstances, will allow for 
the smooth transfer of presidential power. 
An inability to properly discharge the powers and duties of my office 
could arise in several ways.  One would be disease or accident that would 
prevent me from making important decisions.  Another form of inability 
could arise through a breakdown of communications from me at a time of 
increased urgency, uncertainty as to my whereabouts, or any such similar 
scenarios involving a lapse or breakdown in communication. 
Upon execution, this declaration will trigger the statutory line of 
succession pursuant to Article II of the Constitution, permitting the person 
next in the line of succession to act as President until my recovery or the 
earlier recovery of the Vice President, should he be disabled. 
The individuals I authorize to make the determination as to my inability 
declaration are as follows: 
[To be determined by the sitting President] 
Sincerely, 
President [  ] 
b.  Sample Vice Presidential Executive Declaration of Inability 
To the President pro tempore and the Speaker of the House: 
As you are aware, there is no specific constitutional or legal provision by 
which I can declare my own inability to perform the powers and duties of 
the vice presidency.  I believe I have the right to do so and, indeed, the 
responsibility in circumstances where the President is disabled or a 
vacancy in the presidency has arisen. 
Through this document, I wish to express my view of situations, if they 
were to arise, that would constitute a basis for me to declare my own 
inability.  An inability to properly discharge the powers and duties of my 
office could arise in several ways.  One would be disease or accident that 
would prevent me from making important decisions.  Another form of 
inability could arise through a breakdown of communications between the 
President and me at a time of increased urgency, uncertainty as to my 
whereabouts, or any such similar scenarios involving a lapse or 
breakdown in communication. 
This prospective declaration of inability will allow for the smooth 
transition of power to the person next in line of succession were the 
President to become unable to discharge the powers and duties of his 
office, or died, resigned, or was removed, all contingencies appearing in 
Article II, Section 1, Clause 6 of the Constitution.  Obviously, I hope 
none of these occasions occurs during our term in office, but prudence 
dictates that I contemplate such possibilities and act accordingly. 
The individuals I authorize to make the determination as to my inability 
declaration are as follows: 
[To be determined by the sitting Vice President] 
Sincerely, 
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Vice President [  ] 
C.  Legislative History of the Presidential Succession Acts 
1.  The Presidential Succession Act of 1792 
On December 20, 1790, the 1st Congress addressed the issue of 
presidential succession.327  A bill was presented to the House of 
Representatives providing that an “officer” shall act as President when 
vacancies arise in both the offices of President and Vice President.328  This 
bill was referred to the Committee of the Whole on the next day but was not 
considered until January 10, 1791.329  The debates reveal considerable 
controversy surrounding the question as to which “officers” should be 
included in the line of succession.  Suggestions ranged from the President 
pro tempore of the Senate to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the 
United States.330  No consensus was reached.331 
The 2nd Congress first addressed the matter of presidential succession on 
November 15, 1791.332  On November 30, 1791, the Senate passed a bill 
entitled “An act relative to the election of a President and Vice President of 
the United States, and declaring the officer who shall act as President in 
case of vacancies in the offices both of President and Vice President” and 
sent it to the House of Representatives for debate.333  The bill placed the 
President pro tempore ahead of the Speaker of the House in the line of 
succession.  Representatives initially rejected the placement of legislative 
officers in the line of succession because it might lead to “caballing” and 
“electioneering” in the choice of a Speaker.334  Representative Hugh 
Williamson contended that an “extensive construction” of the word 
“officer” would allow for any individual in the United States to be properly 
placed in the line of succession.335  While Representatives Theodore 
Sedgwick and Elbridge Gerry argued that the Speaker was an “officer,”336 
Representative Gerry argued that a legislative line of succession might 
violate separation of powers by blending the executive and legislative 
branches.337 
By February 9, 1792, the Committee of the Whole was considering 
placing the Secretary of State in the line of succession.338  The House 
approved the proposal by a vote of 32 to 22,339 with five members of the 
 
 327. FEERICK, supra note 138, at 57; see also 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1813 (1790). 
 328. FEERICK, supra note 138, at 57; see also 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1813. 
 329. FEERICK, supra note 138, at 57. 
 330. Id. 
 331. Id. at 58. 
 332. Id. 
 333. 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 36 (1791). 
 334. FEERICK, supra note 138, at 59. 
 335. 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 282. 
 336. Id. at 281. 
 337. FEERICK, supra note 138, at 59. 
 338. 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 401. 
 339. Id. at 402. 
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Constitutional Convention voting with the majority340 and one voting 
against the proposal.341  Then-Representative James Madison, among 
others, supported placing the Secretary of State in the line of succession 
during times of a dual vacancy and/or inability for a number of reasons.342  
Madison questioned the constitutionality of including the President pro 
tempore and the Speaker in the line of succession because they were not 
“officers” within the meaning of the Constitution.343  Moreover, Madison 
believed that if the Framers had contemplated the President pro tempore 
and Speaker as possible successors to the presidency, then “they would 
probably have been there designated . . . instead of being left to Legislative 
selection.”344  Finally, Madison believed the inclusion of the President pro 
tempore and Speaker violated the Incompatibility Clause and separation of 
powers.345 
The Senate subsequently rejected the bill because the Federalists 
successfully lobbied their supporters in order to prevent Thomas Jefferson, 
then Secretary of State, from becoming eligible to succeed to the 
presidency.346  As a result, on February 20, 1792, the Senate reinserted the 
President pro tempore of the Senate and Speaker of the House in place of 
the Secretary of State into the line of succession.347  Additionally, the 1792 
Act provided for a special election for President348 in the case of a dual 
vacancy and called for the Secretary of State, in such an instance, to notify 
the executive of every state that electors for the President should be 
appointed within “thirty-four days preceding the first Wednesday in 
December,” provided that there were at least two months between the 
notification and the first Wednesday in December.349  The Senate then 
referred the bill to the House and, the following day, the House approved 
the amendment by a vote of 31 to 24.350  The 1792 Act included a provision 
for holding a special election, and it appears that Congress contemplated a 
 
 340. These members included Abraham Baldwin of Georgia, Nicholas Gilman of New 
Hampshire, Thomas Fitzsimons of Pennsylvania, James Madison of Virginia, and Hugh 
Williamson of North Carolina. Id. at 402; see also America’s Founding Fathers:  Delegates 
to the Constitutional Convention, CHARTERS OF FREEDOM, http://www.archives.gov/
exhibits/charters/constitution_founding_fathers.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2012) (providing 
the state for the delegates to the Constitutional Convention). 
 341. 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 402; see also America’s Founding Fathers:  Delegates to the 
Constitutional Convention, supra note 340 (noting that this member was Elbridge Gerry of 
Massachusetts). 
 342. Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton, supra note 137. 
a2_1_6s3.html. 
 343. Id. 
 344. Id. 
 345. Id. 
 346. FEERICK, supra note 138, at 60. 
 347. Id. at 60; see 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 90 (1792). 
 348. Presidential Succession Act of 1792, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 239 (repealed 1886).  The special 
election provision applied only if “the term for which the President and Vice President last in 
office were elected [did] not expire on the third day of March next ensuing.” Id. § 10. 
 349. Id. 
 350. 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 417–18. 
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full four-year term for a new President and Vice President selected under 
this statute.351  The bill was signed into law on March 1, 1792.352 
2.  The Presidential Succession Act of 1886 
Ninety-four years later, on January 19, 1886, Congress superseded the 
1792 Act when President Grover Cleveland signed the 1886 Act.353  Vice 
President Thomas Hendricks had died in Indianapolis in November 1885.354  
President Cleveland’s message to Congress on December 8, 1885, 
regarding the death of the new Vice President called for a constitutional 
amendment to clarify the line of succession should both the President and 
Vice President die or become unable to serve.355  While the Presidential 
Succession Act that was proposed and passed shortly afterward was 
primarily the work of the Congress, President Cleveland supported the 
legislation and signed the bill into law.356 
The House Select Committee on the Election of President and Vice 
President (Select Committee) submitted a report concluding, among other 
things, that legislators were not “officers” as envisioned by the Framers, 
and that an executive line of succession would remove many of the 
questions arising from a legislative line of succession.  For instance, an 
executive line of succession would remove the possible violation of 
separation of powers and conflicts of interest in the event of impeachment 
proceedings and trials in the House and Senate.357 
Moreover, the drafters of the 1886 Act made it clear that they intended to 
supersede the special election provision of the 1792 Act.  The Select 
Committee believed that in times of presidential inability, an Acting 
President was only to act as the locum tenens, or placeholder, until the 
inability terminated.358  If the President died, the Acting President was to 
fill the position “for the remainder of the term of the removed President, 
and upon the occurring of the next regular quadrennial election for 
President and Vice-President and their inauguration on the succeeding 4th 
of March the term of the officer acting as President should end.”359  
Although the Select Committee’s Report clearly stated its intent to revoke 
the special election provision, the language of the 1886 Act is unclear:  it 
provides that “[the statutory successor] shall act as President until the 
disability of the President or Vice-President is removed or a President shall 
be elected,” and “it shall be the duty of the person upon whom said powers 
and duties shall devolve to issue a proclamation convening Congress in 
 
 351. See Charles S. Hamlin, The Presidential Succession Act of 1886, 18 HARV. L. REV. 
182, 183 (1905). 
 352. 1 Stat. 239. 
 353. Presidential Succession Act of 1886, ch. 4, 24 Stat. 1 (repealed 1947). 
 354. FEERICK, supra note 138, at 141. 
 355. Id. at 142. 
 356. Id. at 143. 
 357. See H.R. REP. NO. 49–26, pt. 1 (1886). 
 358. Id. at 4. 
 359. Id. 
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extraordinary session, giving twenty days’ notice of the time of the 
meeting.”360  Thus, there is a lack of agreement as to whether the 1886 Act 
did in fact supersede the special election provision of the 1792 Act.361 
The 1886 Act did not pass without dissent.  Many members writing for 
the minority of the Select Committee believed that the 1886 Act did not go 
far enough to address future issues pertaining to presidential succession.362  
Specifically, those in the minority identified three distinct periods in which 
a presidential vacancy might arise that remained unaddressed: 
(1) Where the President-elect dies or becomes constitutionally disabled 
(for “inability” and “disability” are used interchangeably) before 
inauguration. 
(2) Where there is a failure of election of both President and Vice-
President, when the election is thrown into the House . . . . 
(3) Where there is a failure to count the vote and declare the result “in the 
presence of the Senate and House of Representatives”; as, if one House or 
the other should fail, for any cause, to meet the other, and our recent 
history more than suggests the possibility of this contingency.363 
a.  Debates Leading Up To the 1886 Act 
Members of Congress proposed several changes to the 1792 Act during 
the ninety-four years before Congress ultimately amended the Act in 
1886.364  The first significant analysis of the constitutionality of the 1792 
Act took place in 1856.365  On June 26, 1856, Senator John Crittenden of 
Kentucky made a motion to investigate what would happen when “both the 
President and Vice President were dead, or unable to act” and to address the 
issue of what happens “when the President alone is either dead, removed 
from office, or from any cause is unable to act.”366  On August 5, 1856, the 
Senate Judiciary Committee issued a report on Senator Crittenden’s 
proposal affirming the view that sections 9 and 10 of the 1792 Act,367 
 
 360. Presidential Succession Act of 1886, ch. 4, 24 Stat. 1–2 § 1.  Ultimately, Congress 
revisited the issue of special elections, and they are no longer provided for in the 1947 Act. 
 361. See Hamlin, supra note 351, at 188–91 for a complete discussion regarding the 
proposed amendments of Senator Hoar regarding special elections and the adopted 
amendments included in the 1886 Act. 
 362. H.R. Rep. No. 49-26, pt. 2, at 1. 
 363. Id. at 3. 
 364. 13 CONG. REC. 125 (1881).  The Act of 1792 remained “entirely unaltered, except 
temporarily in 1877, as to some of the electoral provisions.” Id. 
 365. See id. at 121. 
 366. Id. 
 367. Section 9 of the 1792 Act states: 
And be it further enacted, That in case of removal, death, resignation or inability 
both of the President and Vice President of the United States, the President of the 
Senate pro tempore, and in case there shall be no President of the Senate, then the 
Speaker of the House of Representatives, for the time being shall act as President 
of the United States until the disability be removed or a President shall be elected. 
Presidential Succession Act of 1792, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 239 (repealed 1886).  Section 10 of the 
1792 Act states: 
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which provide for a legislative line of succession and a special election, 
were constitutional.368  However, the Judiciary Committee was not 
convinced that the 1792 Act prevented “the mischief of confusion and 
anarchy.”369  Specifically, the report expressed concern regarding the 
potential absence of a President pro tempore and Speaker, and the 
possibility that either the President pro tempore or the Speaker might not 
possess the “requisite qualifications, under the Constitution, to be invested 
with the duties and powers of an acting President.”370 
To remedy these potential problems, the Report analyzed a number of 
possible solutions.371  For example, to guard against the problem of 
vacancies in both the positions of President pro tempore and Speaker, a 
suggestion was made to extend the line of succession to the Cabinet.372  
Although the Judiciary Committee believed an extension of the line of 
succession to the Cabinet would solve the problem of a dual vacancy in the 
offices of President pro tempore and the Speaker by including more 
individuals who would be eligible to qualify to act as President, the 
Judiciary Committee quickly found cause for rejecting the proposal.373  The 
report cites the potential issue of cabinet members being implicated as 
particeps criminis, or participants in a crime, if a President faced 
impeachment and removal.374  Moreover, the Judiciary Committee 
questioned whether cabinet members were truly “officers” under the 
Constitution when their positions had terminated or were suspended.375  For 
example, if an Acting President found a cabinet member to be “obnoxious” 
or to be an individual he disagreed with, he might decide to replace the 
 
And be it further enacted, That whenever the offices of President and Vice 
President shall both become vacant, the Secretary of State shall forthwith cause a 
notification thereof to be made to the executive of every state, and shall also cause 
the same to be published in at least one of the newspapers printed in each state, 
specifying that electors of the President of the United States shall be appointed or 
chosen in the several states within thirty-four days preceding the first Wednesday 
in December then next ensuing:  Provided, There shall be the space of two months 
between the date of such notification and the said first Wednesday in December, 
but if there shall not be the space of two months between the date of such 
notification and the first Wednesday in December; and if the term for which the 
President and Vice President last in office were elected shall not expire on the third 
day of March next ensuing, then the Secretary of State shall specify in the 
notification that the electors shall be appointed or chosen within thirty-four days 
preceding the first Wednesday in December in the year next ensuing, within which 
time the electors shall accordingly be appointed or chosen, and the electors shall 
meet and give their votes on the said first Wednesday in December, and the 
proceedings and duties of the said electors and others shall be pursuant to the 
directions prescribed in this act. 
Id. 
 368. S. REP. NO. 34-260, at 6 (1856). 
 369. Id. at 3. 
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 371. Id. at 4. 
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 373. Id. 
 374. Id. 
 375. Id. 
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cabinet member.376  Ultimately, the Judiciary Committee recommended 
extending the line of succession to the Supreme Court.377  The report stated: 
[A]nd if there be no President of the Senate, then the Speaker of the 
House of Representatives for the time being shall act as President of the 
United States until the disability be removed or a President shall be 
elected; and if there should be no President of the Senate nor Speaker of 
the House of Representatives for the time being, and it be not a case of 
vacancy caused by removal, the chief justice of the Supreme Court of the 
United States, or if there be no chief justice in office, or it be a case of 
vacancy caused by removal, then the associate justices of the said 
Supreme Court, successively, according to seniority of commission, shall 
act as President of the United States until the disability be removed or a 
President shall be elected.378 
Finally, the report concluded that such a “provisional” President would 
only be invested with the executive functions until the “disability” was 
removed or the Electoral College chose a new President.379  While the 
Judiciary Committee did a thorough analysis of the 1792 Act, no further 
legislative action was taken on the basis of the report. 
For the next twenty-five years, there was little or no discussion on 
presidential succession, until the assassination of President James 
Garfield,380 which brought to the nation’s attention the need for reform.  At 
the time of President Garfield’s death, there was neither a President pro 
tempore of the Senate nor a Speaker of the House.381  Upon President 
Garfield’s death, Vice President Chester A. Arthur took the oath of office in 
the early morning of September 20, 1881, by New York State Supreme 
Court Justice, John R. Brady, and then again on September 22, 1881, by 
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Morrison R. Waite.382  President Arthur 
immediately called the Senate into special session in order to elect a 
President pro tempore and to take up the matter of presidential 
succession.383  He wrote to the Senate: 
Questions which concern the very existence of the Government and the 
liberties of the people were suggested by the prolonged illness of the late 
President, and his consequent incapacity to perform the functions of his 
office.  It is provided by the second article of the Constitution . . .  that “in 
case of the removal of the President from office, or of his death, 
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resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said 
office, the same shall devolve on the Vice-President.” 
What is the intendment of the Constitution in its specification of “inability 
to discharge the powers and duties of the said office” as one of the 
contingencies which calls the Vice-President to the exercise of 
Presidential functions? 
Is the inability limited in its nature to long-continued intellectual 
incapacity, or has it a broader import? 
What must be its extent and duration? 
How must its existence be established? 
Has the President whose inability is the subject of inquiry any voice in 
determining whether or not it exists, or is the decision of that momentous 
and delicate question confided to the Vice-President, or is it contemplated 
by the Constitution that Congress should provide by law precisely what 
should constitute inability, and how, and by what tribunal or authority it 
should be ascertained? 
If the inability proves to be temporary in its nature, and during its 
continuance the Vice-President lawfully exercises the functions of the 
Executive, by what tenure does he hold his office? 
Does he continue as President for the remainder of the four years’ term? 
Or would the elected President, if his inability should cease in the 
interval, be empowered to resume his office? 
And if, having such lawful authority, he should exercise it, would the 
Vice-President be thereupon empowered to resume his powers and duties 
as such?384 
On December 6, 1881, Senators James Beck and Samuel Maxey sought 
to answer President Arthur’s questions and proposed resolutions to reform 
the 1792 Act.385  Senator Beck prepared a resolution asking that the 
Judiciary Committee examine the laws enacted pursuant to Article II, 
Section 1 concerning presidential succession so that “all doubts or defects 
which may exist in our present laws on this subject may be remedied and 
future controversy prevented.”386  Similarly, Senator Maxey prepared a 
resolution stating: 
Resolved, That the Committee on the Judiciary be, and is hereby, 
instructed to inquire what legislation, if any, is necessary to carry into 
effect the provision of the Constitution in case of the removal of the 
President from office, or of his death, resignation, or inability to discharge 
the powers and duties of the said office, as well as the provision in case of 
the removal, death, resignation, or inability of both the President and 
Vice-President; and said committee will report by bill or otherwise.387 
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Two days later, on December 8, 1881, Senator Augustus Garland 
introduced a bill388 “to provide for the performance of the duties of the 
Presidential office in case of the removal, death, resignation, or inability of 
the President and Vice-President” with no further details.389 
On December 14, 1881, Congress resumed discussion on presidential 
succession and Senator Beck noted numerous uncertainties surrounding the 
1792 Act, including:  in the case of special elections, the possibility of 
presidential terms beginning and expiring in the middle of congressional 
terms; the expiration of a President pro tempore’s or Speaker’s term of 
office while acting as President; whether the Vice President would hold 
office for the remainder of the term or until an inability was removed; 
separation of powers if the President pro tempore or Speaker were to take 
the office; and the meaning of the term “Officer” in the Constitution.390 
Although all these questions arose in the course of Senator Beck’s 
attempt to revise the 1792 Act, it was the constitutionality of the 1792 Act 
that emerged as the principal issue, specifically whether the President pro 
tempore of the Senate and Speaker of the House are “Officers” under the 
Constitution.391  Senator Beck relied on an 1862 speech by Senator Bayard 
to argue that legislators are not “Officers” under the Constitution able to 
succeed to the presidency.392  Senator Bayard had cited the example of 
Senator William Blount,393 who, during his trial after impeachment, pled he 
was not a “civil officer of the United States”394 and therefore, not liable to 
impeachment.395  This plea was sustained in the Senate and the attempt to 
impeach Senator Blount was abandoned.396  Senator Bayard believed this 
decision made clear that legislative officers were not “Officers of the 
United States,”397 because the decision was made by the Senate “organized 
as a court, sitting under oath, after a public argument and hearing by the 
ablest counsel in the country on both sides,”398 and should stand as 
precedent.399 
Senator Bayard had next looked to the difference in language between 
Article II, Section 1, regarding the presidential term of Office,400 and 
Article I, Sections 2401 and 3,402 regarding the terms of Representatives and 
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Senators.  Senator Bayard suggested that if the positions of Representatives 
or Senators were those of “Officers,” the Framers would have used the 
same constitutional language as applied to the President:  “shall hold his 
Office.”403  Article I, Section 2, for example, could have read, with respect 
to Representatives:  “who shall hold their office for the term of six 
years,”404 rather than the language that was adopted, which reads, “The 
House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every 
second Year . . . .”405  Additionally, Article I, Section 3, referring to 
Senators, states that “[t]he Seats of the Senators of the first Class shall be 
vacated at the Expiration of the second Year . . . .”406  Senator Bayard 
suggested that if the Framers meant for these positions to be those of 
“Officers,” then the Framers would have written “[t]he term of office of 
Senators of the first class shall expire at the expiration of the second 
year.”407  Furthermore, Senator Bayard noted the language of the 
Incompatibility Clause,408 which prevents any Senator or Representative, 
during the time for which he is elected, from holding “any civil Office.”409  
It does not state that these individuals are prevented from holding any 
“other” civil office, which implies that they do not already hold “civil 
Offices.”  Senator Bayard then pointed to Article II, Section 1, providing 
for the election of electors410 and the language distinguishing between 
Senators and Representatives and persons “holding an Office of Trust or 
Profit under the United States.”411  He concluded that Senators and 
Representatives are not “officers of the United States” nor do they hold 
“office under the United States”; rather they hold the position of a “station” 
or “trust.”412  In support of this view, Senator Bayard offered the fact that 
the people of the United States elect neither Senators nor Representatives; 
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rather, state legislatures elected Senators and the people from state districts 
elect members of the House of Representatives.413 
Senator Beck agreed with these points and entered into the record 
additional support for addressing the question of presidential succession, 
including his correspondence with the Official Reporter, D.F. Murphy, in 
1881.414  The correspondence took place four days after President Garfield 
was shot and dealt with the history and issues surrounding presidential 
succession.415  In his correspondence, Murphy pointed to a number of 
provisions of the 1792 Act that concerned him.416  Specifically, Murphy 
noted that the President pro tempore can change on a daily basis, as 
provided for by a Senate resolution dated January 13, 1876, declaring, 
“[t]hat the office of President pro tempore of the Senate is held at the 
pleasure of the Senate.”417  Under the 1792 Act the President pro tempore 
was not required to resign before becoming Acting President, and therefore 
it was unclear whether he would remain Acting President if the Senate 
changed his status as President pro tempore.  This is no longer a concern 
because the 1947 Act requires both the Speaker and the President pro 
tempore to resign before taking the oath as Acting President.418 
Subsequently, Senator Garland of Arkansas introduced a bill repealing 
the legislative line of succession and replacing it with an executive line of 
succession.419  Senator Garland believed that the line of succession should 
go through the Cabinet Departments “commencing with the Secretary of 
State and going down in the order in which they are generally recognized 
and named in our proceedings, our laws, and our correspondence.”420  
Senator Garland recommended the executive line of succession in order to 
maintain separation of powers within the government.421  Just as then-
Representative James Madison believed the extension of the line of 
succession to the judiciary would blur the lines of the separation of powers, 
Senator Garland believed the extension of the line of succession to the 
legislative branch would have the same effect.422  Specifically, Madison 
noted that by including the President pro tempore and the Speaker in the 
line of succession, these individuals would retain their legislative stations 
and “their incompatible functions will be blended; or the incompatibility 
will supersede those stations, and then those being the substratum of the 
adventitious functions, these must fail also.”423  Furthermore, Senator 
Garland believed that the executive line of succession enabled the President 
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to hand over his duties confidently.424  Senator Garland argued that an 
executive line of succession would appeal to the will of the electorate 
because all cabinet secretaries would have received the Senate’s 
endorsement.425  Finally, Senator Garland argued that an executive line of 
succession would dispose of the “Officer” question.426  In his opinion, the 
President pro tempore and Speaker were only “Officers” of their respective 
bodies.427  In support of this argument, he offered Senator Blount’s 
impeachment trial and the case of Senator John Smith from Ohio, who was 
punished by expulsion, not impeachment, because he was held not to be an 
“Officer” within the meaning of the Constitution.428  This bolstered Senator 
Garland’s position because if legislators are not impeachable, then they are 
not “Officers of the United States” under the Constitution.429 
Senator Garland next addressed objections to an executive line of 
succession.  Specifically, in response to objections regarding presidential 
qualifications,430 Senator Garland suggested a clause stating that “each of 
such officers above-named shall have the qualifications prescribed by the 
Constitution of the United States for President and Vice-President.”431  
Other objections to the proposed executive line of succession were based on 
the possible implication of a cabinet officer as particeps criminis in the 
impeachment of the President.432  Senator Garland suggested that this issue 
could be eliminated by a clause providing “that neither of such officers 
above named shall have been implicated, directly or indirectly, in any 
matter for which the President may have been impeached.”433  These two 
suggestions by Senator Garland were included in section 2 of the 1886 Act 
as enacted.434 
Senator Hoar proposed an executive line of succession, which would last 
for the duration of the presidential term, eliminating any special election.435  
Included in this line of succession were all cabinet secretaries, in the order 
in which their departments had been created.436  Senator Hoar appeared to 
firmly believe that the Secretary of State should be in the line of 
succession.437  He described the Secretary of State as “usually the most 
conspicuous representative next to the President of the United States, of the 
same opinions and policies upon which the people put their stamp of 
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approval in the Presidential election.”438  Thus, in his view, the inclusion of 
the Secretary of State and other cabinet members in the line of succession 
would allow for party continuity and the furtherance of the President’s 
policies.  In response to challenges concerning the confirmation process of 
cabinet members—primarily that there is an “unwritten law” that causes the 
Senate to confirm the President’s appointments for the Departments439—
Senator Hoar noted that Senators will need to take into consideration “this 
new possibility” when advising and consenting as to the qualifications of a 
nominated individual, and thus take more seriously the nomination and 
confirmation process.440  However, Senator Hoar did not believe that acting 
secretaries should be in the line of succession.  He stated, “An officer 
holding ad interim, or an officer holding by Presidential appointment 
without the consent of the Senate, is not entitled under this bill to succeed, 
under any circumstances, to the Presidency.”441 
Furthermore, Senator Hoar, like his colleagues, believed constitutional 
questions regarding legislative officers and party continuity were decisive 
reasons to change the line of succession.442  Senator Hoar also identified the 
issue regarding possible simultaneous vacancies in both the positions of the 
President pro tempore and the Speaker as important in his decision to 
propose an executive line of succession.443  Senator Hoar reintroduced his 
bill,444 which the Senate passed and forwarded to the House,445 but the 
House again failed to take further action.446 
The issue of presidential succession did not reemerge as a congressional 
concern until 1885, with the death of Vice President Hendricks and 
President Cleveland’s message to the 49th Congress.447  In his message, 
President Cleveland stated: 
The present condition of the law relating to the succession to the 
Presidency . . .  is such as to require immediate amendment.  This subject 
has repeatedly been considered by Congress, but no result has been 
reached.  The recent lamentable death of the Vice President and vacancies 
at the same time in all other offices the incumbents of which might 
immediately exercise the functions of the Presidential office, have caused 
public anxiety and a just demand that a recurrence of such a condition of 
affairs should not be permitted.448 
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Thus, with President Cleveland’s urging, and on the basis of the previous 
exhaustive debates on the issue of presidential succession on the record, 
Senator Hoar reintroduced a modified bill in the Senate.449  The Senate 
passed the bill on December 17, 1885,450 and upon review the House of 
Representatives also passed the bill.451  The 1886 Act became law on 
January 19, 1886.452 
3.  The Presidential Succession Act of 1947 
After almost sixty years, the issues surrounding presidential succession 
were resurrected following the death of President Franklin D. Roosevelt and 
Vice President Harry S. Truman’s subsequent ascension to the presidency 
in April 1945.453  Members of Congress became concerned at this time 
because of the perceived political inexperience of Secretary of State Edward 
R. Stettinius, Jr., who under the 1886 Act was the next in the line of 
succession.454  Postmaster General James A. Farley raised the additional 
concern that under the 1886 Act, the President would be able to appoint his 
own successor by naming a new Secretary of State.455  According to 
Postmaster General Farley this was undemocratic and should be 
immediately modified.456  These concerns ultimately prompted Congress to 
reexamine presidential succession.457 
On June 19, 1945, President Truman delivered a special message to 
Congress, which echoed Postmaster General Farley’s concerns and urged 
Congress to adopt new legislation to address presidential succession.458  
President Truman argued that his ability to name his own successor was 
contrary to democratic principles and should not be vested with the 
President.459  President Truman believed that the next in the line of 
succession should come as close as possible to being nationally elected.460  
Thus, he recommended the Speaker of the House as next in the line of 
succession.461  President Truman felt that the Speaker was the individual 
who came closest to being nationally elected because not only is the 
Speaker elected as his district’s congressional representative, but also by the 
House of Representatives as its Speaker.462 
President Truman recommended that the Speaker be placed ahead of the 
President pro tempore in the line of succession because, in his view, the 
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Speaker enjoyed a more democratic pedigree, since members of the House 
of Representatives are elected every two years, while Senators are elected 
every six.463  Therefore, the Speaker is more likely to be reflective of the 
national political mandate at the time of succession.  President Truman 
proposed that in times of a dual vacancy and/or inability the individual 
succeeding to the presidency should serve only until the next congressional 
election, at which point a President would be elected, or until a special 
election to replace the President and Vice President was held.464 
In sum, President Truman recommended that Congress enact a law 
providing:  that the Speaker of the House should be first in the line of 
succession in the case of removal, death, resignation, or inability of the 
President and Vice President, and he should resign from the House before 
assuming the powers and duties of the office of President; that if there is no 
qualified Speaker, the President pro tempore should resign from the Senate 
and act as President only until a qualified Speaker is elected; that if there is 
neither a qualified Speaker nor a qualified President pro tempore, the 
cabinet member next in the line of succession should act as President until 
either a qualified Speaker or a qualified President pro tempore is elected; 
and that if Congress decides to enact a special election provision, that the 
election should be held as soon as practicable.465 
Initial responses to President Truman’s proposal were favorable, but as 
time passed the terms stipulated in the plan were questioned on 
constitutional grounds.466  On June 25, 1945, Representative Hatton W. 
Sumners of Texas introduced a bill that reflected all of President Truman’s 
proposals,467 and subsequently the Judiciary Committee found 
Representative Sumner’s bill to be constitutional.468  Sumner’s bill 
provided that if concurrent presidential and vice presidential vacancies 
occurred more than ninety days before the next congressional election, 
presidential electors would be chosen at the coming congressional election, 
and if a simultaneous vacancy did not occur within that ninety-day period, 
no special election would take place.469 
The House debated this bill.  Those in favor believed that it was more 
democratic than the 1886 Act because the Speaker reflected the most recent 
mandate of the national electorate.470  However, Representatives John 
Gwynne, Clarence E. Hancock, and Raymond Springer criticized the bill 
and argued that the Speaker and President pro tempore were not 
constitutional “Officers.”471  Others argued that the bill would inadvertently 
encourage the impeachment and removal of the President, constituting a 
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legislative encroachment on the executive.472  Representative John M. 
Robsion took particular issue with the special election provision, arguing 
that it could lead to four different Presidents in one term and was bad 
policy.473  The House of Representatives ultimately removed the special 
election provision from the bill.474  The House passed the modified 
Sumners bill on June 29, 1945.475 
Once the bill reached the Senate, no further action was taken until 
1947.476  The fact that the Republicans took control of Congress in 1946 did 
not deter Truman, who still advocated for congressional consideration of 
the legislative line of succession.477  The bill, which was introduced by 
Senator Wherry, did not contain a provision for special elections and 
explicitly required the resignation of the Speaker and President pro tempore 
before either could act as President.478  Compulsory resignation received 
much criticism, as many believed that this would discourage a Speaker or 
President pro tempore from acting as President in the event of presidential 
inability.479  Further, the issues regarding whether these legislative leaders 
were even “Officers” under the Constitution reemerged.480  Senator Carl A. 
Hatch of New Mexico argued that “[t]he officer must continue to hold that 
office in order to continue to qualify to act as President.”481  Thus, the 
person is no longer an “Officer” under the Constitution and cannot, having 
resigned his position, act as President.482  As these concerns mounted, the 
Committee on Rules and Administration submitted a report on March 24, 
1947, which contained the “minority view” of various Senators and 
described the bill as “piecemeal legislation,” while insisting that the 
relevant issues had not been thoroughly studied.483 
Representative Robsion submitted a Judiciary Committee report on July 
9, 1947, recommending that the bill be enacted.484  The report included a 
letter dated June 11, 1947, from Attorney General Douglas W. McGregor in 
response to a request by the Judiciary Committee for review of the 
constitutionality of the bill.485  Attorney General McGregor endorsed the 
bill and opined that members of Congress were “Officers” under the 
Constitution.486  McGregor also cited the 1792 Act and the fact that it 
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“represents a construction of article II by an early Congress, whose views of 
the Constitution have long been regarded as authoritative, and reflects a 
long-continued acquiescence in such a construction.”487  Ultimately, the 
Senate passed the bill on June 27, 1947,488 and the House of 
Representatives followed suit on July 10, 1947.489  On July 18, 1947, 
President Truman signed the Presidential Succession Act of 1947 into 
law.490  The 1947 Act, which is still in effect, includes most of Truman’s 
proposals, with the notable exception of his recommendation to provide for 
a special election.491 
D.  Post-9/11 Proposals and Presidential Succession Initiatives 
1.  Proposed Post-9/11 Legislation 
The majority of legislative proposals following the attacks of September 
11, 2001, focus on the inclusion of legislative leaders in the line of 
succession, the bumping provision of the 1947 Act, and mandatory 
resignation.492 
a.  Legislators 
Legislative proposals since 9/11 have sought to address the two principal 
issues regarding the inclusion of legislators in the line of succession:  party 
continuity493 and constitutionality.494 
The potential for a disruption in party continuity is a matter of genuine 
and continuing concern.495  In the ten years since 9/11, the Speaker of the 
House of Representatives and the President have been members of 
opposing political parties for three years,496 and the President pro tempore 
of the Senate has been in the President’s opposing party for four years.497 
Four bills,498 all introduced by Representative Brad Sherman, have 
proposed that the President have the power to designate which party leader 
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 498. Presidential Succession Act of 2010, H.R. 6557, 111th Cong. (2010); Presidential 
Succession Act of 2004, H.R. 5390, 108th Cong. (2004); Presidential Succession Act of 
2003, H.R. 2749, 108th Cong. (2003); Presidential Succession Act of 2002, H.R. 3816, 
107th Cong. (2002). 
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in each House of Congress should be included in the line of succession.499  
In the House, the President could select among the Speaker, the Majority 
Leader, and the Minority Leader.500  In the Senate, the President could 
choose from among the President pro tempore, the Majority Leader, and the 
Minority Leader.501  The President would designate one of these legislators 
for the House and one for the Senate by notifying the Clerk of the House of 
Representatives and the Secretary of the Senate; the leaders specified vary 
depending on the bill.502  Until the President submits a letter designating 
otherwise, the Speaker and Majority Leader of the Senate would be deemed 
successors.503 
Other bills have sought to remove legislators from the line of succession.  
Senator John Cornyn proposed a bill removing legislative officers from the 
line of succession altogether.504  In a separate bill, Representative Sherman 
proposed removing legislators from the line of succession unless there is 
neither a President nor a Vice President to take office on Inauguration 
Day.505  In such an instance, the Speaker of the House and the Majority 
Leader of the Senate would serve as next in line in that order.506  However, 
this legislation explicitly states that the individual in this scenario acting as 
President “may not nominate any individual to serve as Vice President.”507 
Later proposals by Senator Cornyn and Representative Sherman did not 
remove legislators,508 but left the Speaker of the House and the President 
pro tempore in the line of succession.509  Senator Cornyn stated that this 
change was made because he hoped that “Congress [would] enact the 
Presidential Succession Act of 2005 quickly, and that the more 
 
 499. The Presidential Succession Act of 2004 also included this provision for the 
President-elect. See H.R. 5390. 
 500. See H.R. 6557; H.R. 5390; H.R. 2749; H.R. 3816. 
 501. See H.R. 6557; H.R. 5390; H.R. 2749; H.R. 3816. 
 502. H.R. 6557, at 5 (stating that the President would select among “[t]he Majority 
Leader of the Senate, the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, or the Minority Leader of the 
Senate”); H.R. 5390, at 8 (providing that the President-elect would select among “the 
Speaker of the House of Representatives or the minority leader of the House of 
Representatives,” and the “majority leader of the Senate or the minority leader of the 
Senate”); H.R. 2749, at 3–4 (providing for designation of either the office of Majority 
Leader of the Senate or the office of Minority Leader of the Senate, and also of Speaker of 
the House of Representatives or the Minority Leader of the House of Representatives); H.R. 
3816, at 2–3 (providing for the designation of the office of Majority Leader of the Senate or 
the office of Minority Leader of the Senate, and also of Speaker of the House of 
Representatives or the Minority Leader of the House of Representatives). 
 503. H.R. 6557; H.R. 2749; H.R. 3816. 
 504. Presidential Succession Act of 2004, S. 2073, 108th Cong. (2004). 
 505. H.R. 5390. 
 506. Id. 
 507. Id.  The Clinic notes that this proposed restriction raises constitutional concerns that 
are not addressed in this Report.  Specifically at issue is whether the Acting President has the 
authority to appoint a Vice President under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. See Examination 
of the First Implementation of Section Two of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment:  Hearing on S.J. 
Res. 26 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 94th Cong. (1975). 
 508. See Presidential Succession Act of 2005, H.R. 1943, 109th Cong. (2005); 
Presidential Succession Act of 2005, S. 920, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 509. See Presidential Succession Act of 2007, H.R. 540, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 920. 
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controversial but nevertheless critical constitutional issues arising out of 
current law can be addressed as well through separate legislation.”510 
b.  Bumping 
Legislators have attempted to remove the bumping provision in six 
bills.511  Some of these bills provide that the individual who first acts as 
President pursuant to the line of succession may serve for the rest of the 
presidential term “or until the disability of the President or the Vice 
President is removed.”512 
c.  Mandatory Resignation Provision 
Under the 1947 Act, any individual who acts as the President is required 
to resign his current post, prohibiting him from resuming it later.513  As a 
result, potential successors may be unwilling to assume the powers of the 
presidency during a temporary inability.  Only two of the post-9/11 bills 
would have continued the compulsory resignation for executive officers.514  
In contrast, all but one bill provided for mandatory resignation for 
legislators.515  The most recent proposed legislation would not require the 
resignation of either executive or legislative leaders.516 
d.  Acting Secretaries 
It is unclear whether the 1947 Act includes acting secretaries517 in the 
line of succession.518  One post-9/11 bill states that officers can only be in 
the line of succession if the President appointed them to their office.519  
Five other post-9/11 bills state that, to be included in the line of succession, 
 
 510. 151 CONG. REC. S4409 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 2005). 
 511. Presidential Succession Act of 2010, H.R. 6557, 111th Cong. (2010); H.R. 540; S. 
920; H.R. 1943; Presidential Succession Act of 2004, S. 2073, 108th Cong. (2004); H.R. 
5390. 
 512. H.R. 540; H.R. 1943; S. 920; S. 2073. 
 513. Presidential Succession Act of 1947, 3 U.S.C. § 19 (2006). 
 514. Presidential Succession Act of 2004, H.R. 5390, 108th Cong. (2004); Presidential 
Succession Act of 2003, H.R. 2749, 108th Cong. (2003). 
 515. H.R. 540; S. 920; H.R. 1943; Presidential Succession Act of 2002, H.R. 3816, 107th 
Cong. (2002). 
 516. See H.R. 6557.  This proposal raises constitutional issues not addressed in this 
Report, specifically whether a member of the legislature would be able to serve 
simultaneously in the executive branch.  Currently, legislators must resign before becoming 
Acting President. 3 U.S.C. § 19 (2006).  The necessity of that requirement has been debated 
throughout the history of the Succession Acts. 
 517. An “Acting Secretary” is an officer who was not appointed as a principal officer by 
the President, but who nonetheless holds the powers of a cabinet secretary.  In contrast, a 
cabinet secretary is an individual who was appointed by the President to be part of his 
Cabinet and confirmed by the Senate.  Both an acting secretary and a cabinet secretary 
would have been nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate for the positions 
they were originally appointed to before they could become Acting President. See 3 U.S.C. 
§ 19. 
 518. See supra Part VI.C for a discussion of this issue. 
 519. H.R. 5390. 
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officers must have been appointed by the President and confirmed with the 
advice and consent of the Senate to a specific office listed.  Therefore only 
cabinet secretaries confirmed as such would be in the line of succession.520 
e.  Speaker of the House Pro Tempore 
Representative Sherman has proposed two bills that would allow the 
President to choose among various House leaders in selecting a statutory 
successor, but the bills specifically provide that a person acting as Speaker 
pro tempore is not considered the Speaker of the House.521 
f.  Successors Outside the Washington, D.C., Area 
Many commentators suggest that the greatest threat to continuity in the 
presidency in the event of mass catastrophe stems from the concentration of 
individuals in the line of succession present within the Washington, D.C., 
metropolitan area.522 
Five bills have proposed adding the Ambassadors to the United Nations, 
Great Britain, Russia, China, and France to the end of the line of succession 
after the Secretary of Homeland Security.523 
2.  Additional Post-9/11 Proposals 
a.  Introduction 
Others besides legislators have made proposals since 9/11.  The 
Continuity of Government Commission, a joint effort by the American 
Enterprise Institute and the Brookings Institute, has released an evaluation 
of the current system of presidential succession in the event of “a 
catastrophic attack that would kill or incapacitate multiple individuals in the 
line of succession.”524  Other proposals have been advanced by various 
scholars, including Dr. John C. Fortier;525 Professor Akhil Reed Amar;526 
 
 520. H.R. 6557; H.R. 540; S. 920; H.R. 1943; Presidential Succession Act of 2004, S. 
2073, 108th Cong. (2004). 
 521. H.R. 6557; Presidential Succession Act of 2003, H.R. 2749, 108th Cong. (2003). 
 522. Ensuring the Continuity of the United States Government:  The Presidency:  Joint 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary and S. Comm. on Rules and Admin., 108th 
Cong. 9–10, 50–51 (2003) [hereinafter The Presidency:  Joint Hearing] (statement and 
testimony of John C. Fortier, Exec. Dir., Continuity of Gov’t Comm’n, and Research Assoc., 
Am. Enter. Inst.); CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, supra note 115, at 45. 
 523. H.R. 6557; H.R. 540; S. 920; H.R. 1943; H.R. 5390. 
 524. CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, supra note 115, at 6. 
 525. The Presidency:  Joint Hearing, supra note 522, at 9–11, 49–59 (statement and 
testimony of John C. Fortier, Exec. Dir., Continuity of Gov’t Comm’n, and Research Assoc., 
Am. Enterprise Inst.). 
 526. Presidential Succession Act:  Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on the Constitution 
of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 33–36 (2004) [hereinafter Hearing Before the 
H. Subcomm.] (testimony and prepared statement of Akhil Reed Amar, Southmayd Professor 
of Law and Political Sci., Yale Law Sch.); The Presidency:  Joint Hearing, supra note 522, 
at 6–9, 30–32 (statement and testimony of Akhil Reed Amar, Southmayd Professor of Law 
and Political Sci., Yale Law Sch.). 
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Professor Howard Wasserman;527 and M. Miller Baker, Esq.528  These 
proposals provide valuable perspectives on alternative solutions to the 
presidential succession deficiencies present in the current system. 
b.  Recommendations of the Continuity of Government Commission 
The Continuity of Government Commission provides a detailed and 
thorough discussion culminating in seven recommendations addressing 
presidential succession deficiencies in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks.529  Specifically, the Commission recommends:  extending the line 
of succession to individuals living outside of the Washington, D.C., 
metropolitan area; removing legislative officers from the line of succession; 
providing for a special election in the event of a double vacancy occurring 
in the first two years of a presidential term; reordering the line of 
succession; removing acting secretaries from the line of succession; 
supplementing procedures for declaring a President unable to discharge the 
powers and duties of his office; and addressing the contingencies which 
may arise during the inaugural and pre-inaugural periods.530 
i.  Extend the Presidential Line of Succession Outside of Washington, D.C. 
The first recommendation made by the Commission is to extend the 
presidential line of succession to individuals living outside of the 
Washington, D.C., metropolitan area.531  The reason for this 
recommendation is the concern that all of the individuals in the current line 
of succession could be killed or incapacitated by a mass catastrophe 
targeting the nation’s Capital.532  During the Cold War, a nuclear missile 
posed the greatest threat to American security.533  Officials in Washington, 
D.C., assumed that they had the capability to retreat from the Capitol prior 
to an impending attack.534  With the advent of global terrorism and the 
 
 527. The Presidency:  Joint Hearing, supra note 522, at 14–15, 69–77 (statement and 
testimony of Howard M. Wasserman, Assistant Professor of Law, Fla. Int.’l Univ. Coll. of 
Law); Howard M. Wasserman, The Trouble With Shadow Government, 52 EMORY L.J. 281 
(2003). 
 528. Hearing Before the H. Subcomm., supra note 526, at 37–43 (testimony and prepared 
statement of M. Miller Baker, Partner, McDermott Will & Emery); The Presidency:  Joint 
Hearing, supra note 522, at 12–14, 33–43 (statement and testimony of M. Miller Baker, 
Partner, McDermott Will & Emery). 
 529. CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, supra note 115, at 45–49. 
 530. Id. 
 531. Id. at 45. 
 532. Id. 
 533. See CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, PRESERVING OUR INSTITUTIONS:  THE FIRST 
REPORT OF THE CONTINUITY OF GOVERNMENT COMMISSION 17 (2003) (“The concerns of that 
era were similar to today, but with some important differences.  The primary fear then was of 
a massive nuclear strike from the Soviet Union . . . .”). 
 534. See id. at 11 (“The secret creation of a bomb and radiation-proof bunker for 
Congress at the Greenbrier resort in West Virginia during the Cold War was based on the 
assumption that a nuclear attack on Washington would kill, not incapacitate most members 
of Congress.  The objective then was assuring, with the notice available from the time 
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portability of weapons of mass destruction, the potential threats have 
intensified. 
To accomplish its goal of extending the line of succession to individuals 
living outside Washington, D.C., the Commission proposes two solutions.  
The first proposal would add ambassadors or governors to the line of 
succession.535  The Commission ultimately recommends that Congress 
establish four or five new federal officer positions, requiring appointment 
by the President and confirmation by the Senate, each of which would be in 
the line of succession.536  The Commission contemplates that the 
individuals nominated to these offices would primarily be high government 
officials,537 such as former Presidents,538 former cabinet members, or even 
current and former governors.539 
ii.  Remove Legislators From the Line of Succession 
The second recommendation is to remove legislators from the line of 
succession.540  Party continuity would thus be maintained.541  The question 
whether legislators are “Officers” within the meaning of Article II, Section 
1, Clause 6 would become moot.  The bumping provision contained in 3 
U.S.C. § 19(d)(2) would become ineffective and unnecessary.542  Finally, 
this would address the concern that during times of temporary inability 
legislative leaders may not wish to resign their posts to act as President, as 
is currently required. 543 
Recognizing that it would be difficult to obtain legislative support for a 
bill that removes legislators, the Commission makes four additional 
recommendations in the event that legislators remain in the line of 
succession.  First, remove the bumping provision of § 19(d)(2).544  Second, 
change the criteria for selecting the President pro tempore or replace the 
President pro tempore in the line of succession with the Majority Leader of 
 
missiles were launched in Siberia until they arrived in Washington, that Congress could 
evacuate the 200 miles or so to the Greenbrier.”). 
 535. CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, supra note 115, at 45.  The inclusion of governors 
in the line of succession raises some constitutional concerns that are not addressed in this 
Report.  Specifically at issue is whether governors can be federalized under the Commander-
in-Chief Clause and what federalism implications may arise from such an inclusion. See 
infra note 612. 
 536. See id. 
 537. See id. 
 538. Former Presidents who have served two terms are not precluded from the line of 
succession by reason of the Constitution’s limitations on the length of service.  A president 
cannot be elected to more than two terms of office, U.S. CONST. amend. XXII, § 1, but 
arguably could serve by virtue of appointment, ascending to the office through the line of 
succession. See The Presidency:  Joint Hearing, supra note 522, at 59 n.1 (testimony of John 
C. Fortier, Exec. Dir., Continuity of Gov’t Comm’n, and Research Assoc., Am. Enter. Inst.). 
 539. CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, supra note 115, at 45; see infra note 612. 
 540. Id. at 46. 
 541. Id. 
 542. Id. 
 543. Id. 
 544. Id. 
106 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
the Senate.545  Third, allow legislative leaders to act only in the event of the 
death of a President and not during times of presidential inability.546  
Fourth, address problems concerning the continuity of Congress within the 
House of Representatives.547 
iii.  Provide for a Special Presidential Election 
The Commission recommends that special presidential elections be held 
within five months if a double vacancy occurs in the first two years of a 
presidential term.548 
iv.  Reorder the Line of Succession 
The Commission recommends reordering the line of succession.549  The 
Commission argues that, in determining the order of succession, Congress 
should consider not only the year in which a cabinet level position was 
created, but also the likely qualifications of a Secretary who serves a given 
department.550  The line of succession deemed appropriate by the 
Commission is:  Secretary of State; Secretary of Defense; Attorney 
General; Secretary of the Treasury; and new officers created by Congress 
who are located outside of Washington, D.C. in accordance with the 
Commission’s first proposal.551 
v.  Remove Acting Secretaries 
The Commission recommends explicitly removing acting secretaries 
from the line of succession,552 as was provided for in the 1886 Act.553 
vi.  Supplement Inability Procedures 
Another of the Commission’s recommendations is to supplement the 
procedures for determining presidential inability by officials who are in the 
line of succession after the Vice President.554  The Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment establishes procedures both for filling a vacancy in the office 
of the Vice President as well as for addressing presidential inability, but 
does not address how this might be accomplished in the absence of an able 
Vice President.  The Commission suggests that Congress create a 
procedural framework whereby an officer lower in the line of succession 
can declare the inability of an officer higher in the line555 and that Congress 
 
 545. Id. at 47. 
 546. Id. 
 547. Id. 
 548. Id. 
 549. Id. 
 550. Id. at 47–48. 
 551. Id. at 45, 48. 
 552. Id. at 48. 
 553. Id.; cf. Presidential Succession Act of 1886, ch. 4, 24 Stat. 1 (repealed 1947). 
 554. CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, supra note 115, at 48. 
 555. Id. 
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could provide guidance on how a transfer might take place and how 
Congress is to be notified.556  Additionally, the Commission recommends 
that Congress, using its authority under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment,557 
create an alternative body that the Vice President can convene in order to 
declare a presidential inability in the event that a majority of the Cabinet 
cannot convene.558  Such a body could be comprised of a majority of 
governors or some other group of individuals from outside of Washington, 
D.C.559  If no alternative body is created and a majority of the Cabinet is 
rendered unable by reason of a mass attack, then the possibility remains that 
a surviving Vice President will have no constitutional means for declaring 
the President unable to perform the duties of his office.560 
vii.  Address Inaugural and Pre-inaugural Contingencies 
The seventh and final recommendation made by the Commission is to 
address inaugural and pre-inaugural contingencies.  The Commission 
recommends the adoption of three proposals.561 
First, Congress and the political parties would take care to secure the line 
of succession during these times.562  This could be accomplished primarily 
with a change in custom.563  The outgoing and incoming administrations 
could work together so that the outgoing President could nominate 
members of the President-elect’s Cabinet.564  Then, before the inauguration, 
the Senate could confirm the new nominees.565  Second, the Commission 
recommends shortening the time between the casting and counting of the 
Electoral College votes in order to identify the President-elect as soon as 
possible.566  Finally, the Commission recommends that the political parties 
plan for the possibility of the deaths of both the President-elect and Vice 
President elect.567 
 
 556. Id. 
 557. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4. 
 558. CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, supra note 115, at 48. 
 559. See id. 
 560. A majority of “the principal officers of the executive departments,” as set out in the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment, Section 4, was not thought of as a quorum but as a majority of 
the cabinet positions. FEERICK, supra note 5, at 202–03 (1976).  Acting secretaries were 
thought to be the members acting for their respective departments and, thus, would be among 
the principal officers to participate in declaring a President unable. See id.  See infra 
Appendix E of this Report for a discussion of the departmental lines of succession. 
 561. See CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, supra note 115, at 49. 
 562. Id. 
 563. Id. 
 564. Id. 
 565. Id. 
 566. Id. 
 567. Id.  This proposal from the Commission would implicate the Twentieth Amendment. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 3. 
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c.  Proposals by Dr. John C. Fortier 
Dr. Fortier568 has made numerous thoughtful proposals concerning 
presidential succession, some of which overlap with the Commission’s 
proposals.569  Additional proposals include creating a binary line of 
succession and removing the bumping provision in § 19(d)(2).570  The latter 
suggestions are discussed below. 
i.  Binary Line of Succession 
In his 2003 testimony before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Dr. 
Fortier proposed creating two lines of succession.  First, in cases of 
presidential inability, impeachment and removal, and death and resignation, 
he recommends that presidential powers and duties should devolve upon the 
cabinet members.571  Second, if a President and Vice President both fail to 
qualify, Dr. Fortier recommends that it is both constitutional and practical 
to have the presidential powers devolve upon qualified legislative 
officers.572 
According to Dr. Fortier, the powers of the President should also flow to 
the Cabinet in the event of a double vacancy.573  This recommendation 
addresses the conflicts of interest that may arise in cases of impeachment 
and removal.574 
In the case of death or resignation, Dr. Fortier also proposes removing 
legislative officers from the line of succession.575  This section of his 
proposal, however, does not specifically address post-9/11 concerns.  This 
proposal reflects Dr. Fortier’s opinion on the question whether legislators 
 
 568. Dr. John C. Fortier has been the Executive Director of the Continuity of Government 
Commission since 2002.  He has testified before the House of Representatives and the 
Senate concerning the continuity of government.  Dr. Fortier has held teaching positions at 
the University of Pennsylvania, University of Delaware, Boston College, and Harvard 
University. 
 569. The Presidency:  Joint Hearing, supra note 522, at 9–11, 49–59 (statement and 
testimony of John C. Fortier, Exec. Dir., Continuity of Gov’t Comm’n, and Research Assoc., 
Am. Enter. Inst.).   
 570. Id. 
 571. See id. at 10–11, 51–53. 
 572. See id.  A legislator is arguably not an “Officer” within the meaning of Article II, but 
a legislative officer is a “person” as used in the Twentieth Amendment. U.S. CONST. art. II, 
§ 1, cl. 6; id. amend. XX, § 3.  The Twentieth Amendment states in part:  “The Congress 
may by law provide for the case wherein neither a President elect nor a Vice President elect 
shall have qualified, declaring who shall then act as President, or the manner in which one 
who is to act shall be selected, and such person shall act accordingly until a President or Vice 
President shall have qualified.” Id. amend. XX, § 3 (emphasis added).  However, concerns 
about including a legislator in the line of succession through the Twentieth Amendment may 
still raise separation of powers concerns. 
 573. The Presidency:  Joint Hearing, supra note 522, at 51–52 (statement and testimony 
of John C. Fortier, Exec. Dir., Continuity of Gov’t Comm’n, and Research Assoc., Am. 
Enter. Inst.). 
 574. Id. at 52. 
 575. Id. at 53. 
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qualify as “Officers” within the meaning of Article II, Section 1, Clause 6 
of the Constitution.576 
According to Dr. Fortier, in the event that a President-elect or Vice 
President elect fails to qualify, it would be appropriate for legislators to be 
in the line of succession.577  This situation would most likely result from an 
election controversy or a terrorist attack resulting in the death of the 
President-elect and Vice President elect shortly before the inauguration, 
leaving no one to qualify as President and Vice President.578  Since 
members of the House of Representatives are elected in the same general 
election as the President-elect and Vice President elect, the Speaker of the 
House would arguably best reflect the political sentiment of the country as a 
whole as of Inauguration Day, and is the best person to assume the 
presidency.  If legislators were not included in the line of succession before 
cabinet members in a failure-to-qualify scenario, the powers of the 
President would flow to the previous administration’s Cabinet or even to 
the previous administration’s acting secretaries.579  This result would be 
unlikely to reflect the political will of the electorate. 
ii.  Remove the Bumping Provision 
Dr. Fortier recommends removing the bumping provision of 
§ 19(d)(2).580  He points out that a bumping provision, particularly in the 
event of a catastrophic attack, could create several negative consequences 
including:  having multiple Presidents over a short period of time; the 
possession of potentially extortionary power by legislators to affect the 
policy decisions of an Acting President; and the election of a new Speaker 
of the House by a constitutionally questionable quorum in the event that a 
mass catastrophe kills or incapacitates a significant number of 
Representatives.581 
d.  Proposal by Professor Akhil Reed Amar:  New Position of 
Assistant Vice President  
Professor Amar582 has proposed creating a new cabinet position of 
Assistant Vice President.583  According to Professor Amar, the creation of 
 
 576. See supra Part VI.B for a discussion of this issue. 
 577. The Presidency:  Joint Hearing, supra note 522, at 10, 52–53. 
 578. Id. 
 579. Id. 
 580. Id. at 53–54. 
 581. Id. 
 582. Professor Amar is the Sterling Professor of Law and Political Science at Yale 
University and has written extensively on presidential succession. See, e.g., Amar & Amar, 
supra note 159, at 113. 
 583. The Presidency:  Joint Hearing, supra note 522, at 6, 30–32 (statement and 
testimony of Akhil Reed Amar, Southmayd Professor of Law and Political Sci., Yale Law 
Sch.). 
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this position would solve a number of problems inherent in the current 
succession laws.584 
The primary responsibility of the Assistant Vice President would be “to 
receive regular briefings preparing him or her to serve at a moment’s notice, 
and to lie low until needed:  in the line of succession but out of the line of 
fire . . . .”585  Professor Amar intends this office to be highly visible to the 
American people, proposing that the assistant vice presidential nominee be 
announced well before the November election so that a vote for the 
presidential nominee would also signal an endorsement of the Assistant 
Vice President.586  The office would require Senate confirmation.587  In 
addition, the line of succession following the Assistant Vice President 
would run directly to cabinet members.588  Finally, Professor Amar 
suggests that if creating a new office is not politically viable, Congress 
could name one of the current cabinet members to be next in line after the 
Vice President in a purely executive line of succession.589 
Under this proposal, the bumping provision would become unnecessary, 
mandatory resignations would not be required, the Assistant Vice President 
would certainly be an “Officer” within the meaning of Article II, 
congressional conflicts of interest would be avoided, power transfers in 
times of inability would be seamless, party and policy continuity would be 
maintained, and democratic legitimacy would be ensured through the 
Senate confirmation process.590 
Professor Amar’s proposal is not without complications.  First, the office 
of Assistant Vice President could erode the political status of the Vice 
President.  Second, there is no guarantee that the assistant vice presidential 
candidate, announced prior to an election, would assume that office, 
because the Senate could refuse to confirm him or the President could 
change his nominee after the election.  Third, having to judge a third 
individual when evaluating a presidential ticket may confuse the electorate 
and complicate the selection of running mates. 
e.  Proposals by Professor Howard Wasserman 
Professor Wasserman,591 in addition to making proposals that overlap 
with those discussed above, has proposed a unique solution to the problem 
 
 584. Id. at 9, 31. 
 585. Id. at 8, 31. 
 586. Id. at 8–9, 31. 
 587. Id. at 8, 31. 
 588. Id. at 9, 31 
 589. Hearing Before the H. Subcomm., supra note 526, at 34, 36 (testimony and prepared 
statement of Akhil Reed Amar, Southmayd Professor of Law and Political Sci., Yale Law 
Sch.). 
 590. Id. at 34, 36; The Presidency:  Joint Hearing, supra note 522, at 9, 31 (statement and 
testimony of Akhil Reed Amar, Southmayd Professor of Law and Political Sci., Yale Law 
Sch.). 
 591. Professor Wasserman is an Associate Professor of Law at Florida International 
University and has written on presidential succession. See, e.g., Howard M. Wasserman, 
2012] PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION IN THE MODERN ERA 111 
of presidential succession in the post-9/11 era that draws from the shadow 
government implemented by President George W. Bush.592  Professor 
Wasserman’s proposal lays out a framework defining the role and 
composition of a shadow government.593 
i.  Reorder the Line of Succession 
First, Professor Wasserman advocates reordering the line of 
succession.594  He places cabinet members immediately after the Vice 
President in the line of succession.595  The Speaker of the House and the 
President pro tempore are not removed under this proposal but are placed at 
the end of the line of succession.596  Professor Wasserman would have the 
line run first through the Cabinet, because an Acting President coming from 
the Cabinet would have been a top official in the executive branch, a 
member of the President’s party, and chosen by the President to further his 
policies.597  Including legislative leaders at the end of the line of succession 
is a way to respond to possible catastrophic events.  According to Professor 
Wasserman, one lesson of 9/11 “is that the line of succession should contain 
everyone who constitutionally may be an officer under the Succession 
Clause and who, as a normative policy matter, should be included in the 
line.”598  As long as a House of Congress is functioning, one of these 
legislative leaders can be elected and assume the presidency, should 
everyone else in the line be incapacitated.599 
ii.  Create the Position of First Secretary 
Professor Wasserman suggests creating a new cabinet member, the First 
Secretary, who would be nominated by the President and confirmed by the 
Senate to lead a shadow government.600  The First Secretary is different 
from the Assistant Vice President suggested by Professor Amar.  The First 
Secretary would play an important role in the daily operations of the 
government.  While running the shadow government, the First Secretary 
would “be in contact with the President and the administration, as an active 
member of the Cabinet, aware of and involved in the creation and execution 
 
Structural Principles and Presidential Succession, 90 KY. L.J. 345 (2001); Wasserman, 
supra note 527, at 281. 
 592. See Francie Grace, The Shadow Government, CBS NEWS (Feb. 11, 2009, 9:13 PM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/03/02/attack/main502695.shtml. 
 593. See Hearing Before the H. Subcomm., supra note 526, at 33–36 (testimony and 
prepared statement of Akhil Reed Amar, Southmayd Professor of Law and Political Sci., 
Yale Law Sch.); The Presidency:  Joint Hearing, supra note 522, at 14–15,  (statement and 
testimony of Howard M. Wasserman, Assistant Professor of Law, Fla. Int’l Univ. Coll. of 
Law); Wasserman, supra note 527. 
 594. The Presidency:  Joint Hearing, supra note 522, at 72 (testimony of Howard M. 
Wasserman, Assistant Professor of Law, Florida Int’l University College of Law). 
 595. See id. 
 596. See id. 
 597. See id. 
 598. See id. 
 599. See id. at 73. 
 600. See id. at 72, 75. 
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of public policy.”601  The shadow government would be comprised of high-
ranking members of each executive agency and department, with the First 
Secretary at its head, and would function in a secure location outside of 
Washington, D.C.602  Professor Wasserman’s conception of a shadow 
government would allow for continuity within the executive branch after a 
catastrophic attack.603 
Professor Wasserman identifies several benefits of a shadow government.  
The First Secretary would be intimately involved in the administration and 
in a position to assume power seamlessly in the event of a double vacancy 
or catastrophic attack.604  In addition, Professor Wasserman’s proposal for a 
shadow government ensures that the public knows the identity of the 
individual at its head.605 
iii.  Allow for Change in the Seat of Government 
Professor Wasserman proposes a statute that would allow the seat of 
government to function in a location other than Washington, D.C.606  The 
need for such a move could arise following a catastrophic attack, which 
renders the government unable to function in Washington, D.C. 
f.  Proposals by M. Miller Baker 
Miller Baker607 has made several proposals overlapping with those 
discussed above, but with modifications.  These are:  to reorder the line of 
succession; to remove the bumping provision; to provide for cabinet 
bumping; and to allow the President to determine the order of succession 
for cabinet members after those specifically enumerated in the Act.608 
i.  Reorder the Line of Succession 
Baker proposes reordering the line of succession by removing the lower 
listed cabinet members, with the exception of the Secretary of Homeland 
Security.609  He also proposes amending the 1947 Act to allow the 
 
 601. Id. at 72. 
 602. Id. at 14, 72, 75. 
 603. Id. at 72. 
 604. Id. 
 605. See id.  The public would know who is heading the shadow government because the 
First Secretary would be a position in the Cabinet with the specific task of assuming the 
presidency in the case of a double vacancy. 
 606. Wasserman, supra note 527, at 321–22. 
 607. Baker is a partner at the law firm of McDermott Will & Emery LLP.  Baker 
appeared before the House of Representatives and the Senate to testify about presidential 
succession after 9/11. 
 608. Hearing Before the H. Subcomm., supra note 526, at 37–43 (testimony and prepared 
statement of M. Miller Baker, Partner, McDermott Will & Emery); The Presidency:  Joint 
Hearing, supra note 522, at 12–14, 33–43 (statement and testimony of M. Miller Baker, 
Partner, McDermott Will & Emery). 
 609. Hearing Before the H. Subcomm., supra note 526, at 37, 39 (testimony and prepared 
statement of M. Miller Baker, Partner, McDermott Will & Emery); The Presidency:  Joint 
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President, at his discretion, to nominate cabinet members after those 
specifically enumerated in the line of succession.610  Baker also suggests 
that the President should have the power to nominate individuals to be in 
the line of succession who are neither cabinet members nor legislators—
such as governors—subject to Senate confirmation.611  To address 
questions regarding this proposal’s constitutionality, Baker suggests that 
governors be “federalized” pursuant to the Commander-in-Chief Clause.612  
Under this proposal, the line would be as follows:  Secretary of State; 
Secretary of the Treasury;613 Secretary of Defense; Attorney General; 
Secretary of Homeland Security; and other individuals that the President 
would nominate and who would be confirmed by the Senate.614 
ii.  Remove the Bumping Provision 
Baker proposes the removal of bumping when legislators decline to act as 
President or when legislators are appointed after another officer or 
individual has assumed the powers of the President.615 
iii.  Create a Cabinet Bumping Provision 
Finally, Baker proposes a cabinet bumping provision.  He suggests that a 
cabinet member higher in the line of succession should have the ability to 
assume the powers of the President from a cabinet member lower in the line 
of succession once the former recovers from an inability.616  The purpose of 
 
Hearing, supra note 522, at 13, 41 (statement and testimony of M. Miller Baker, Partner, 
McDermott Will & Emery). 
 610. Hearing Before the H. Subcomm., supra note 526, at 37, 39–40 (testimony and 
prepared statement of M. Miller Baker, Partner, McDermott Will & Emery). 
 611. See infra note 612; see also The Presidency:  Joint Hearing, supra note 522, at 41, 
42 (testimony of M. Miller Baker, Partner, McDermott Will & Emery). 
 612. The Presidency:  Joint Hearing, supra note 522, at 41 (testimony of M. Miller 
Baker, Partner, McDermott Will & Emery).  The theory is that the Commander-in-Chief 
Clause allows the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the “Army and Navy of the United 
States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the 
United States,” U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 1, to “federalize” a governor who is the 
Commander–In-Chief of his state’s militia, since the President has the authority to call the 
militia into the service of the United States. 
 613. Although in House hearings in 2004 Baker did not include the Secretary of Treasury 
in his proposed line of succession, he had done so at the Senate hearing in 2003. Compare 
The Presidency:  Joint Hearing, supra note 522, at 41 (testimony of M. Miller Baker, 
Partner, McDermott Will & Emery), with Hearing Before the H. Subcomm., supra note 526, 
at 39 (prepared statement of M. Miller Baker, Partner, McDermott Will & Emery). 
 614. Hearing Before the H. Subcomm., supra note 526, at 39 (prepared statement of M. 
Miller Baker, Partner, McDermott Will & Emery). 
 615. See id. at 40, 42 (prepared statement of M. Miller Baker, Partner, McDermott Will & 
Emery); see also The Presidency:  Joint Hearing, supra note 522, at 42 (testimony of M. 
Miller Baker, Partner, McDermott Will & Emery). 
 616. See Hearing Before the H. Subcomm., supra note 526, at 40–42 (prepared statement 
of M. Miller Baker, Partner, McDermott Will & Emery); see also The Presidency:  Joint 
Hearing, supra note 522, at 12–13, 42 (statement and testimony of M. Miller Baker, Partner, 
McDermott Will & Emery). 
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a cabinet bumping provision is to have the highest-ranking cabinet member 
assume the powers of the President.617 
E.  Acting Cabinet Secretaries and Acting Legislative Leadership 
1.  Acting Secretaries 
The manner through which staff may rise through a given executive 
department to become an acting secretary is not consistent within the 
various departments.  Departmental lines of succession are established 
through statutes, executive orders, and in some instances at the discretion of 
the current cabinet secretary.  Including acting secretaries in the line of 
succession causes major complications arising from the length of the line 
succession, and the differences and inconsistencies in the order of 
succession within agencies, and the fact that the order within any agency 
can be changed at any moment. 
The Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 establishes the order in 
which an individual working in a cabinet department becomes acting 
secretary.618  In addition to setting time and other limitations for service of 
acting secretaries, the Federal Vacancies Reform Act allows the President 
to direct who shall serve as acting secretary for most of his cabinet 
positions.619  Presidents have done this through executive orders, which in 
some instances operate in conjunction with statutes creating the lines of 
succession.620  Currently, executive orders and statutes establish the lines of 
 
 617. Hearing Before the H. Subcomm., supra note 526, at 40 (prepared statement of M. 
Miller Baker, Partner, McDermott Will & Emery) (“In my view, the overriding goal of the 
Succession Clause is the smooth and seamless transfer of Executive authority to the most 
senior successor authorized and available to exercise such power.”). 
 618. The Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998, 5 U.S.C. §§ 3345–48, 3349, 3349d 
(2006). 
 619. § 3345 (setting out the authority for the President to direct appointment of acting 
secretaries); § 3346 (setting out time limitations).  The Secretaries of the Department of 
Justice, 28 U.S.C. § 508 (2006), Department of Energy, 42 U.S.C. § 7132 (2006), and 
Department of Education, 20 U.S.C. § 3412 (2006), have authority to implement their own 
lines of succession with officers in their respective departments.  The President retains 
authority, however, to establish an executive order creating a deeper line of succession than 
the department heads have chosen. 5 U.S.C. § 3345 (2006). 
 620. The following Departments have had their orders of succession set by Executive 
Order:   
 Dep’t of State:  Exec. Order No. 13,251, 67 Fed. Reg. 1599 (Dec. 28, 2001) (as 
amended by Exec. Order No. 13,261, § 4(i), 67 Fed. Reg. 13,243 (Mar. 19, 2002)). 
 Dep’t of Treasury:  Exec. Order No. 13,246, 66 Fed. Reg. 66,270 (Dec. 18, 2001) (as 
amended by Exec. Order No. 13,261, § 4(f), 67 Fed. Reg. 13,244 (Mar. 19, 2002)). 
 Dep’t of Defense:  Exec. Order No. 13,533, 75 Fed Reg. 10,163 (Mar. 1, 2010). 
 Dep’t of Justice:  Exec. Order No. 13,557, 75 Fed. Reg. 68,679 (Nov. 4, 2010); see 
also 28 U.S.C. § 508 (2006); Authority of the President to Name an Acting 
Attorney General, 2007 WL 5334854 (Op. O.L.C. Sept. 17, 2007). 
 Dep’t of Interior:  Exec Order. No. 13,244, 66 Fed. Reg. 66,267 (Dec. 18, 2001) (as 
amended by Exec Order No. 13,261, § 4(d), 67 Fed. Reg. 13,243 (Mar. 19, 2002)). 
 Dep’t of Agriculture:  Exec. Order No. 13,542, 75 Fed. Reg. 27,921 (May 13, 2010). 
 Dep’t of Commerce:  Exec. Order No. 13,242, 66 Fed. Reg. 66,260 (Dec. 18, 2001) 
(as amended by Exec Order No. 13,261, § 4(b), 67 Fed. Reg. 13,243 (Mar. 19, 
2002)). 
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succession for all cabinet positions except the Department of Energy and 
the Department of Education.621  In total, there are over 400 positions from 
which an individual can become an acting secretary and, by virtue of having 
been confirmed by the Senate, become the Acting President if the 1947 Act 
is interpreted to include acting secretaries.622  Most notably, over 200 
officers are eligible to become the acting secretary of State alone.623 
Since Presidents can easily issue, revoke, or amend executive orders, the 
lines of succession within most departments are flexible and can change 
dramatically in an instant.  For example, on December 18, 2001, President 
George W. Bush issued seven executive orders changing the internal lines 
of succession for the Departments of State, Treasury, Interior, Agriculture, 
Commerce, Labor, and Veterans Affairs.624  Thus, if a catastrophic attack 
were to occur on the same day as such a vast restructuring, uncertainty 
would surely ensue.  With so many officers in the line eligible to become 
acting secretaries, it would be difficult to establish just who is properly in 
the line of succession and in what order.  The nation may be faced with an 
 
 Dep’t of Labor:  Exec. Order No. 13,245, 66 Fed. Reg. 66,268 (Dec. 18, 2001) (as 
amended by Exec. Order No. 13,261, § 4(e), 67 Fed. Reg. 13,243 (Mar. 19, 2002)). 
 Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.:  Exec. Order No. 13,461, 73 Fed. Reg. 9437 (Feb. 
15, 2008). 
 Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev.:  Exec Order. No. 13,243, 66 Fed. Reg. 66,262 (Dec. 
18, 2001) (as amended by Exec Order No. 13,261, § 4(c), 67 Fed. Reg. 13,244 
(Mar. 19, 2002)). 
 Dep’t of Transp.:  Exec. Order No. 13,485, 74 Fed. Reg. 2287 (Jan. 9, 2009); see also 
49 U.S.C. § 102(e) (2006). 
 Dep’t of Veterans Affairs:  Exec. Order No. 13,247, 66 Fed. Reg. 66,271 (Dec. 18, 
2001) (as amended by Exec. Order No. 13,261, § 4(g), 67 Fed. Reg. 13,244 (Mar. 
19, 2002)); see also Memorandum on Designation of Officers of the Department 
of Veterans Affairs to Act As Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 39 WEEKLY COMP. 
PRES. Doc. 195 (Feb. 13, 2003). 
 Dep’t of Homeland Sec.:  Exec. Order No. 13,286, 68 Fed. Reg. 10,619 (Feb. 28, 
2003) (as amended by Exec. Order No. 13,442, 72 Fed. Reg. 45,877 (Aug. 13, 
2007)). 
 621. The Secretary of Energy set the Department’s line of succession by order.  See 
Secretarial Succession, Threat Level Notification, and Successor Tracking, DOE O 100.1D 
(Apr. 20, 2007), available at https://www.directives.doe.gov/directives/current-directives/
100.1-BOrder-1d/view (acting pursuant to authority granted by 42 U.S.C. § 7132(a) (2006)).  
The Secretary of Education has the authority to designate the Department’s line of 
succession. 20 U.S.C. § 3412(a)(1) (2006).  The current line of succession is available at 
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/om/fs_po/osods/intro.html#3. 
 622. Positions requiring Senate confirmation were established by comparing the current 
Congressional Research Service (CRS) publication declaring which positions require Senate 
confirmation, HENRY B. HOGUE ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 30959, PRESIDENTIAL 
APPOINTEE POSITIONS REQUIRING SENATE CONFIRMATION AND COMMITTEES HANDLING 
NOMINATIONS (2008), the officers listed in the various lines of succession, supra notes 619–
21, and the current officers listed in the lines of succession who have been confirmed by the 
Senate despite not being listed by the CRS report on thomas.loc.gov/home/nomis.html. 
 623. See supra note 620 and accompanying text.  The line of succession includes over 
200 officers who need to be nominated by the President and who are confirmed by and with 
advice and consent of the Senate.  This means over 200 potential officers, if meeting the 
other Presidential qualifications, could have sequential claims to become Acting President 
from within the Department of State alone. 
 624. See supra note 620 and accompanying text. 
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acting secretary far down a departmental line of succession, who becomes 
Acting President but who was not, in fact, authorized to do so.625 
Aside from problems in implementing the line of succession, an 
additional consideration is the qualifications of the individuals who could 
become the Acting President by virtue of serving as an acting secretary.  
This is not to say that an acting secretary will never be qualified to become 
Acting President.  Certainly, there may be instances in which an acting 
secretary, due to the nature of his position or individual talents, will be 
better suited to become Acting President than other individuals in the line 
of succession. 
2.  The Speaker of the House pro tempore and The Acting President pro 
tempore of the Senate626 
Although it has been posited that acting secretaries may be in the line of 
succession, no parallel argument has been made that individuals acting as 
the Speaker (Speaker pro tempore)627 or as the President pro tempore 
(Acting President pro tempore)628 might be in the line as well. 
The language of the 1947 Act does not specifically address this 
possibility.  The 1947 Act states, “If . . . there is neither a President nor 
Vice President to discharge the powers and duties of the office of President, 
then the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall, upon his resignation 
as Speaker and as Representative in Congress, act as President.”629  The 
 
 625. Departmental lines of succession vary from one department to the next, both in depth 
and in order.  First, the number of individuals eligible to become an acting secretary varies 
by department.  Second, the order of succession within the departments is established 
through various means, including an enumerated list, the order in which an individual was 
appointed to office, the order in which an individual took his oath of office, or a combination 
of these three systems.  Having various methods to determine who becomes an acting 
secretary may not typically pose problems.  However, in a time of national catastrophe, 
relying on multiple systems to determine who becomes an acting secretary might lead to 
confusion.  This is especially so when a combination of these three systems is used within 
the same department.  For example, the Department of State first lists officers to become 
acting secretary in the order they are listed, but after succession has passed through these 
officers, it runs through another list of officers, but this time according to the order in which 
they have taken the oath of office. See supra notes 619–21 and accompanying text. 
 626. The Speaker pro tempore is an individual who is named to “act as Speaker pro 
tempore.” RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 112th Cong., R. I(8).  The Acting 
President pro tempore may include the Secretary of the Senate, the Assistant Secretary of the 
Senate, or a Senator appointed by the President pro tempore.  Each of these individuals can 
perform the “duties of the Chair” according to RULES OF THE SENATE, 112th Cong., R. I(2)–
(3).  Apart from the lack of statutory basis for inclusion of the Speaker pro tempore and the 
Acting President pro tempore in the line of succession, public policy considerations also 
militate strongly against their inclusion.  Many legislators can take these temporary 
positions—as many as the legislators themselves decide—and they might be persuaded to do 
so in order to allow a Speaker or President pro tempore to avoid having to resign his position 
and thereby shield himself from having to serve only briefly as Acting President in the case 
of a temporary presidential inability.  The Clinic does not believe that such contingent 
legislative leaders are in the line of succession or should be for the policy reasons outlined 
above. 
 627. RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 112th Cong., R. I(8). 
 628. RULES OF THE SENATE, 112th Cong., R. I(2)–(3). 
 629. Presidential Succession Act of 1947, 3 U.S.C. § 19(a)(1) (2006). 
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1947 Act also states, “If . . . there is no Speaker, or the Speaker fails to 
qualify as Acting President, then the President pro tempore of the Senate 
shall, upon his resignation as President pro tempore and as Senator, act as 
President.”630 
Bills recently introduced by Congressman Sherman have explicitly stated 
that the Speaker of the House pro tempore is not included in the line of 
succession.631  As this is the only indication that any authority has 
considered that the Speaker pro tempore might be in the line of succession, 
the Clinic finds no indication that the Speaker pro tempore or the Acting 
President pro tempore is, or was ever, intended to be in the line of 
succession in any of the Succession Acts.  Additionally, the Clinic would 
not support their inclusion on policy grounds. 
  
 
 630. Id. § 19(b). 
 631. H.R. 6557, 111th Cong. (2010); H.R. 2749, 108th Cong. (2003). 
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 650. See Carina Bergal, Note, The Mexican Drug War:  The Case for a Non-international 
Armed Conflict Classification, 34 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1042 (2011). 
 651. See id., reprinted in 34 A.B.A. NAT’L SECURITY L. REP. 15 (2012). 
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